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I. INTRODUCTION
More than twenty years ago, the United States Congress recog-
nized that this nation had "to give serious and systematic attention
to our marine environment and to the potential resources of the
oceans."' It, therefore, established a special Presidential Commission
on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources to "formulate a com-
prehensive, long-term, national program for marine affairs designed
to meet present and future national needs in the most effective possi-
ble manner. '
In 1969, that Commission, popularly called the Stratton Commis-
sion,' issued its report. It detailed a "plan for national action ' 4 pre-
mised on a comprehensive ocean policy and program5 with one new
federal agency responsible for implementation."
The Commission found that overlapping and conflicting laws and
regulations and the lack of coordination among federal, state, and
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1. COMMISSION ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND RESOURCES, OUR NA-
TION AND THE SEA vi (1969) [hereinafter STRATTON COMMISSION REPORT].
2. Id.
3. The Chair of the Commission was Julius A. Stratton. Id. at iii.
4. Id. at 4.
5. id.
6. Id. at 4, 229-30. This new agency, the "National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Agency," was to be "the principal instrumentality within the Federal Government for
administration of the Nation's civil marine ... programs." Id. at 230.
local agencies hindered our nation's ability to both protect the
oceans and coasts and develop our ocean resources.7 Moreover, to
protect the environment and provide for "constructive management
of the living resources of the sea," an "understanding of ecosystem
dynamics" was essential.'
The solution had to be "comprehensive systems" 9 to regulate our
coasts, to manage living and nonliving resources, and to monitor and
predict environmental changes in the oceans. 10 Ocean programs and
policies had to be integrated by placing the major responsibilities in
one federal agency, and by providing mechanisms within that agency
for coordination of the activities of other federal, state, and local
agencies."-
In this article, I will compare the premises and recommendations
of the Stratton Commission to America's national ocean policy and
program today. I will then suggest that a mechanism now exists to
provide for the establishment of a coordinated and integrated na-
tional ocean policy. That mechanism is the new international law
requirement of comprehensive research, planning, and management
for the ocean's space and resources. This comprehensive (or "ecosys-
tem") model for ocean policy and management is binding in domes-
tic United States law and can be implemented under existing stat-
utes by existing federal and state agencies.' 2
7. See id. at 8, 56-62; see also id. at 11 (laws and agency conflicts hamper
fishery protection and development), 135-37 (nonliving resource development).
8. Id. at 173.
9. See id. at 15.
10. Id. at 96-97 (fisheries), 127 (offshore oil and gas), 15, 171 (monitoring and
prediction).
State coastal zone authorities were to be established, under the guidance of a federal
agency, to coordinate plans and uses and to regulate and develop coastal zones. Id. at 57-
62. The same federal agency was to set national priorities and policies for fisheries man-
agement and protection of endangered fisheries. Id. at 96-97. New leasing and regulatory
policies were to be established that were "geared to a rate of development reflecting all
aspects of national interests." Id. at 127 (offshore oil); see also id. at 127-29 (natural
gas), 135-37 (other marine minerals). A comprehensive national system was to be estab-
lished to monitor and predict the changes of the sea. Id. at 171, 184-85.
11. Id. at 231.
12. This article builds on previous articles and papers by the author that explore
the development of the ecosystem model of marine management. Those earlier papers
argued that a new rule of international law was evolving that could mandate an ecosys-
tem approach. See Belsky, Legal Constraints and Options for Total Ecosystem Manage-
ment of Large Marine Ecosystems, in VARIABILITY AND MANAGEMENT OF LARGE
MARINE ECOSYSTEMs 241 (1986) [hereinafter Belsky - 1986 AAAS]; Belsky, Manage-
ment of Large Marine Ecosystems: Developing a New Rule of Customary International
Law, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 733 (1985) [hereinafter Belsky - 1985 SAN DIEGO]. Later
papers indicated that the ecosystem model was, in fact, a binding rule of customary and
treaty international law and that the model not only required comprehensive manage-
ment, but also ecosystem based research, assessment, and monitoring. See Belsky, Devel-
oping An Ecosystem Management For Large Marine Systems, in BIOMASS AND GEOG-
RAPHY OF LARGE MARINE ECOSYSTEMS 443 (paper given at February 1987 AAAS
Symposium) [hereinafter Belsky - 1987 AAAS]; M. Belsky, The Marine Ecosystem
418
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Parts II and III of this article will review the history of United
States ocean policy. Over the last twenty years, there has been an
extraordinary growth of federal and state marine-related programs
for research, management, and protection. This rapid growth has,
however, been haphazard. Laws have been enacted and policies es-
tablished in response to different crises and varied constituency con-
cerns. The management and policy framework is oriented to a single
purpose and often without consideration of the close interconnections
between multiple offshore uses and resources."3
These practices have led to criticism that the United States has no
ocean policy.' 4 Obviously, this is not accurate. We have a "myriad of
statutes that authorize scores of programs which are administered by
numerous departments and agencies. . . .-1 The problem has been,
and still is, that we have no comprehensive ocean policy.
There has been no coordinating theme to our marine-related pro-
grams, plans, and activities. There has been no theory or model that
requires those in government and those conducting ocean activities to
consider the collective, cumulative, and sometimes conflicting im-
pacts of the separate rules, policies, and actions that are focused on
particular uses of the ocean space.
16
Management Model and the Law of the Sea: Requirements for Assessment and Monitor-
ing, Paper presented at 21st Annual Conference at the Law of the Sea Institute (Aug. 3-
6, 1987) [hereinafter Belsky - 1987 LOSI]; M. Belsky, Interrelationships of Science and
Law in the Management of Large Marine Ecosystems, Paper presented at the Sympo-
sium on Frontiers in Marine Ecosystem Research - AAAS (Feb. 14, 1988) [hereinafter
Belsky - 1988 AAAS]; M. Belsky, Marine Ecosystem Model: The Law of the Sea's
Mandate for Comprehensive Management, Paper presented at the Conference on New
Developments in Marine Science and Technology: Economic, Legal, and Political As-
pects of the Change, sponsored jointly by the Law of the Sea Institute and the Center for
Ocean Management Studies (June 1988); see also Belsky, A Still Evolving Law of the
Sea (Book Review), 17 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 355 (1987). This article applies the new rule
to America's ocean policy and indicates how the new rule mandates a comprehensive and
integrated ecosystem based national ocean policy.
13. See Cicin-Sain & Knecht, The Problem of Governance of U.S. Ocean Re-
sources and the New Exclusive Economic Zone, in MARINE TECHNOLOGY SOCIETY &
INSTITUTE OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS, OCEANS '84 - EXCLUSIVE EC-
ONOMIC ZONE SYMPOSIUM 112-13 (M. Champ ed. 1984).
"Under the present U.S. system of ocean management, no one is responsible for exam-
ining the cumulative effect of various statutes and programs. Few opportunities exist for
examining the ramifications of decisions in one sector on another or for trade-offs to be
made among the conflicting objectives of different programs." Belsky, A Strategy to
Avoid Conflicts, 27 OCEANUS 19 (Winter 1984/85).
14. See infra text accompanying note 98.
15. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, U.S. OCEAN POLICY IN THE
1970's: STATUS AND ISSUES I-1 (1978) [hereinafter COMMERCE OCEAN POLICY].
16. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, OFFICE OF OCEAN, RE-
SOURCE, AND SCIENTIFIC POLICY COORDINATION, OCEAN MANAGEMENT: SEEKING A
Such a coordinating theme now exists. It is the ecosystem man-
agement model. In Parts IV and V of this article, I will describe the
evolution of this comprehensive approach into a binding rule of inter-
national law. As a result of scientific consensus, scholarly writings,
nation-state practice, and international agreements and resolutions,
international law now requires an ecosystem-based integrated ap-
proach to ocean research, planning, management, and policy. This
mandate has been codified in the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).1
7
Part VI will then discuss the impact of the ecosystem model on
United States ocean policy. Customary international law is part of
our domestic law, unless specifically overridden by domestic law.'"
Thus, the model, requiring a comprehensive approach to ocean man-
agement and policy, is binding on federal and state government offi-
cials."9 In implementing the numerous federal and state laws and
regulations applying to the coastal and ocean space, government offi-
cials must exercise their discretion, jointly if necessary, to reconcile
their mandates with an integrated ecosystem model. Failure to do so
is a violation of federal law and redressable in the courts.
The final part of this article will demonstrate how that reconcilia-
tion can occur. Old coordinating mechanisms must be strengthened
and new ones created. Interested citizens must be willing to seek ju-
dicial relief for insufficient administrative action. Funding must be
made available, as necessary, to insure adequate planning and coor-
dination of policy.
II. THE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES OCEAN POLICY
Almost from the beginning of the Republic, it was recognized
that the United States could only succeed as a maritime nation and
that an active marine policy and program was "the inevitable off-
spring of moral and physical necessity." 0 Yet, until the 1930s, the
federal government ocean program was limited to authorizing mini-
mal scientific research,21 promoting commerce, assisting navigation,
and establishing a strong navy.2
NEW PERSPECTIVE 56-57 (J. Armstrong & P. Ryner eds. 1980) [hereinafter COMMERCE
OCEAN MANAGEMENT].
17. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/
121 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1245 (1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
18. See infra text accompanying notes 355-66.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 404-13.
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 11, at 65 (A. Hamilton) (Legal Classics ed. 1983).
21. See G. MANGONE, MARINE POLICY FOR AMERICA: THE UNITED STATES AT
SEA 3-10 (1977).
22. COMMERCE OCEAN MANAGEMENT, supra note 16, at 7.
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A. The Early Years
International law historically allowed nations to claim sovereignty
over a three-mile band adjacent to its coasts.23 In the United States,
the assumption, until the 1940s, was that this sovereignty was to be
exercised by the states and not the federal government.24 States also
claimed the exclusive right to control activities in offshore waters be-
yond three miles,25 with Jthe exception of a few international arrange-
ments for particular fish and for fisheries in particular geographic
regions.26
Some states actively promoted activities off their coasts. In partic-
ular, there was offshore fishing, but it was generally limited to areas
close to the shores.27 There was, however, little, if any, oceano-
graphic-related activity and minimal effort to control or regulate the
exploitation of resources or the quality of the ocean space.2"
In the late 1920s, there were indications that a heightened na-
tional and federal government interest in the oceans might eventu-
ally emerge. First, California began to exploit oil and gas resources
23. The basis for establishment of this three-mile zone was the theory that a na-
tion could have effective control only over the ocean space which could be reached by a
shore-based cannon. The "cannon-shot" rule was later converted into a fixed distance of
three miles. Many nation-states contested this limited breadth, but it seemed to be ac-
cepted as an established rule of customary international law, at least by the United
States. See R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA (1983); L. SOHN & K.
GUSTAFSON, THE LAW OF THE SEA IN A NUTSHELL (1984); see also United States v.
California, 332 U.S. 19, 32-34 (1947).
24. See, e.g., Mumford v. Wardell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall) 423, 435-36 (1867). In
1921, California enacted legislation to control and regulate mineral development off its
coasts. The law was challenged as not being within the state's power. The California
courts upheld the law. Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, 273 P. 797 (1928), cert. de-
nied, 280 U.S. 517 (1929). The Supreme Court of the United States refused to hear an
appeal from that decision on the grounds, as suggested by Mumford, that no substantial
federal issue was involved. Workman v. Boone, 280 U.S. 517 (1929).
25. See G. MANGONE, supra note 21, at 109-26.
26. See COMMERCE OCEAN MANAGEMENT, supra note 16, at 7-8. There was only
limited regulation by some states of offshore activities. When states did seek to control
fishing, for example, they did so by "landing laws" for fish caught outside of coastal
waters and then brought into a state's territorial jurisdiction, by regulation of the activi-
ties of the state's citizens, and by direct control of the activities of all fishing in the
waters immediately adjacent to the coast (territorial sea). Comment, The Fishery Con-
servation and Management Act of 1976: State Regulation of Fishing Beyond the Terri-
torial Sea, 31 ME. L. REV. 303, 306-15 (1980).
27. Ditton, Seymour, & Swanson, Historical Aspects of Managing Coastal Re-
sources, Coastal Resources Management: Beyond Bureaucracy and the Market (1977),
reprinted in M. HERSHMAN & J. FELDMAN, COASTAL MANAGEMENT: READINGS AND
NOTES 15, 16 (1979).
28. COMMERCE OCEAN MANAGEMENT, supra note 16, at 7; Abel, The History of
the United States Ocean Program, in MAKING OCEAN POLICY 3 (1981).
in its offshore waters, and some developers sought assistance from
the national government to establish a federal program for offshore
mineral management.2 9 Then, in 1927, a study sponsored by the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences sought to formulate a national policy for
the oceans and a comprehensive program to advance United States
ocean interests. 30
Government and public response to both initiatives was minimal.
However, the Academy study did result in expansion of the number
of oceanographic laboratories in the 1930s. 1 In addition, the dispute
over control of the "tidelands," ocean areas adjacent to the coasts,
renewed interest in the potential of the oceans for future resource
exploitation. 2
It was not until World War II that national attention was focused
on the United States as an "ocean state. '3 3 Knowledge about the
oceans was essential for national defense purposes, and new technol-
ogy, like sonar, had to be perfected.34 Military strategists argued
that we needed ocean research that was interdisciplinary and in-
volved "engineering, economic, sociological, industrial, . . . geopolit-
ical and perhaps other considerations. '3 5 For these and other rea-
sons, it was urged that more funds and effort be expended on marine
research."'
In addition, the oceans might be a major source for living and
nonliving resources.3 7 Action was necessary to respond to the concern
that domestic fisheries were being depleted.3 8 Planning was required
29. COMMERCE OCEAN MANAGEMENT, supra note 16, at 7-8. Requests for federal
permits were denied on the premise that the federal government had no jurisdiction over
offshore resources. Resources within the territorial waters (three miles) of the coasts
were under the sovereignty of the adjacent state. See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
212 (1845). Resources in the open seas were res nullius and under no nation's sover-
eignty. MacRae, Customary International Law and the United Nations' Law of the Sea
Treaty, 13 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 181, 187, 195-96 (1983).
30. Abel, supra note 28, at 4.
31. As a result of the National Academy of Sciences study, the Rockefeller Foun-
dation awarded grants to establish laboratories at Woods Hole in Massachusetts, and at
the University of Washington. It also provided a grant to expand the Scripps Institution
of Oceanography in California. See Abel, supra note 28, at 4.
32. During the 1930s, a conflict was emerging between the federal government
and the states as to control of the resources of the ocean area adjacent to the coasts (the
territorial sea). This conflict, later titled the "Tidelands Controversy," would not be fi-
nally resolved until the 1970s. See COMMERCE OCEAN MANAGEMENT, supra note 16, at
8-10; see also United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975).
33. See G. MANGONE, supra note 21, at 17.
34. Abel, supra note 28, at 4-5.
35. D. BROOKS, AMERICA Looics TO THE SEA 177 (1984) (quoting a Navy De-
partment report).
36. Abel, supra note 28, at 5.
37. See COMMERCE OCEAN MANAGEMENT, supra note 16, at 8-10 for a discussion
of the gradually increasing interest of the federal government in the resource potential
offshore.
38. See Young, The Political Economy of Fish: The Fishery Conservation and
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for the possibility that substantial mineral resources existed
offshore. 9
In 1943, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes proposed to Presi-
dent Roosevelt that a national marine resources policy study be un-
dertaken to determine the potential of the oceans for resource devel-
opment. Ickes hoped for one single federal management regime that
would include all ocean resources and waters out to the edge of the
continental shelf. Such a study was conducted and, as a precursor to
the future history of national ocean policy, a dispute immediately
arose over which, if any, federal agency would have control over a
"national marine program. '40
The final agreed proposal was to divide the ocean space. An area
called "submerged lands" would cover the present territorial sea,
and be under a single management regime. The ocean space beyond
the submerged lands would not be under one regime, but would be
managed based on the activities or individual resources involved."1
Though this new national policy was approved by President
Roosevelt,42 he died before he could implement the plan. It was left
to President Truman to detail the new American ocean policy in two
Proclamations dated September 28, 1945.43 Proclamation Number
2667 (the Continental Shelf Proclamation) 44 asserted jurisdiction
over all the mineral resources in the lands beneath the oceans, out to
the end of America's continenal shelf.
4 5
Proclamation Number 2668 (the Fisheries Proclamation) 46 was
not so bold. It merely asserted that the United States believed it
"proper" to establish zones for the conservation and protection of
fishery resources. Such zones would include all areas contiguous to
Management Act of 1976, 10 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 199, 200 (1982). In fact, as early
as 1937, legislation was introduced in the United States Congress that would have barred
foreign fishermen from some areas offshore United States territory. Magnuson, The
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976: First Step Toward Improved Man-
agement of Marine Fisheries, 52 WASH. L. REV. 427, 428-29 (1977).
39. See Hollick, U.S. Oceans Policy: The Truman Proclamations, 17 VA. J. INT'L
L. 23, 28 (1976). In 1941, the British-American Oil Co. struck oil from a platform two
miles off the coast of Louisiana in the Gulf of Mexico. G. MANGONE, supra note 21, at
176.
40. COMMERCE OCEAN MANAGEMENT, supra note 16, at 10-11.
41. Id. at 12.
42. Id. at 11.
43. See G. MANGONE, supra note 21, at 178.
44. Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1945).
45. Exec. Order No. 9633, 3 C.F.R. 437 (1945), reprinted in 59 Stat. 885 (1945),
placed responsibility for leasing and management of these offshore resources under the
Secretary of Interior.
46. Proclamation No. 2668, 3 C.F.R. 68 (1945).
our coasts "wherein fishing activities have been or in the future may
be developed and maintained on a substantial scale." The federal
government was free to regulate its own nationals in such zones and
could regulate all others pursuant to treaties with the country of
their nationality.
47
Despite these Proclamations, federal involvement in research or
management of offshore areas continued to be minimal. Until the
mid-1950s, there were a few studies on oceanography, 48 some limited
offshore oil and gas exploration in the Gulf of Mexico and the areas
immediately offshore California, 49 regulation of domestic fisheries al-
most entirely by individual state governments,5" and a few mostly
ineffectual supranational fishery management agreements.51
The major ocean policy controversy and action concerned a juris-
dictional dispute over the resources in the three-mile territorial sea,
above the submerged lands. The states claimed the historic right to
lease and manage the resources in these near-shore areas. The fed-
eral government claimed, pursuant to the Truman Proclamation,
that this area was part of the Continental Shelf and thus under fed-
eral jurisdiction. This "tidelands controversy" was resolved by Con-
gress when, in 1953, it enacted the Submerged Lands Act and the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.52
The Submerged Lands Act53 gave most coastal states exclusive
rights to the resources up to three miles from the coast.54 The Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act 5 gave the federal government jurisdic-
tion over the leasing of mineral resources on the lands lying outward
of state waters, up to the edge of the United States Continental
Shelf. The 1953 Act also established very general guidelines and di-
rectives for managing the resources, under the administrative respon-
sibility of the Secretary of the Interior.56
Thus, as we approached the mid-1950s, our ocean policy consisted
47. Id.
48. See G. MANGONE, supra note 21, at 17; Abel, supra note 28, at 6.
49. For a description of the slow progress of offshore activities until the mid-
1950s, see J. WHITAKER, STRIKING A BALANCE-ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RE-
SOURCES POLICY IN THE NIXON-FORD YEARS 259 (1976).
50. Magnuson, supra note 38, at 432.
51. See Young, supra note 38, at 201.
52. See Murphy & Belsky, OCS Development: A New Law and a New Beginning,
7 COASTAL ZONE MGMT. J. 297, 299-300 (1980).
53. Submerged Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 31, 67 Stat. 49 (1955) (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-56 (1982)).
54. Certain states were allowed to show entitlement to a larger area because of
special arrangements when these states came into the Union. Subsequent court cases
held that, for historic reasons, the boundaries of Texas and Florida would be three
marine leagues-about 10 miles. United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960).
55. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 212, 67 Stat. 462 (1955)
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-56 (1982)) [hereinafter OCSLA].
56. See Murphy & Belsky, supra note 52, at 300.
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of the establishment of national rights over an expanded jurisdic-
tional area and temporary resolution of a conflict over the state and
federal roles in development of this area. During the next period, our
ocean policy would be a marine science policy, where the focus was
on the establishment of a program of research and the advancement
of ocean technology.5
B. The Marine Science Era
During the period from about 1956 to 1969, the international
community's interest in the oceans focused on efforts to resolve a
number of issues relating to jurisdiction and sovereignty over the
ocean space."' The result was a series of Conventions59 in 19580 that
established jurisdictional zones and set a new balance between terri-
torial sovereignty and the freedom of the seas. 1
57. Curlin, Toward a Comprehensive Ocean Policy for Managing National
Ocean Resources, in CENTER FOR OCEANS LAW AND POLICY, MANAGING NATIONAL
OCEAN RESOURCES 19 (1979).
58. See M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 526-
61 (rev. ed. 1987); MacRae, supra note 29, at 208-11.
59. As a result of the first Law of the Sea Conference in 1958, four treaties were
promulgated: Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958,
15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 56 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the Continental
Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on
the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 559 U.N.T.S. 285;
and the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969.
60. A second Law of the Sea Conference was held in 1960. It attempted to estab-
lish a fixed territorial sea breadth and to resolve fishing rights questions. It was unsuc-
cessful in resolving the conflicts. See Knight, International Fisheries Management: A
Background Paper, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 8 (H.
Knight ed. 1975).
61. The 1958 Convention on the High Seas was considered to be merely a decla-
ration of the high seas freedoms already part of customary international law. The other
Conventions contained reiterations of existing rules and pronouncements of new rules. M.
SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 294 (2d ed. 1986).
The Convention on the Continental Shelf codified the emerging rule, based on the
Truman Proclamation, providing coastal states with resource rights but not sovereignty
to the lands beneath their continental shelves. See R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra
note 23, at I11.
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone recognized state sov-
ereignty over its territorial sea but did not define the breadth of that zone. See R. CHUR-
CHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 23, at 57, 60. It also established a zone of the high seas
contiguous to the territorial sea, of a breadth no larger than 12 miles, where the coastal
state could exercise regulatory jurisdiction over customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanita-
tion. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, art. 24, Apr. 29, 1958,
15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 56 U.N.T.S. 205. The Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of Living Resources allowed nation-states to regulate fishing in adjacent
areas of the high seas. However, many of the major fishing nations did not ratify the
Despite the international focus on national rights to resources and
control over adjacent ocean space, America's interest in marine pol-
icy during this period concentrated on efforts to promote and coordi-
nate marine science research and to secure new techniques and tech-
nologies to explore the oceans. 2
By the mid-1950s, some marine scientists and engineers were con-
cerned about the rivalries among marine laboratories and the de-
creasing percentage of federal funding allocated to oceanography.6"
They established a new Coordinating Committee on Oceanography
(CCO)."s In 1956, members of CCO called upon the National Acad-
emy of Sciences to study America's interest in the oceans and to
make recommendations. The Academy responded in 1957 by estab-
lishing its first standing committee for ocean issues-the National
Academy of Sciences Committee on Oceanography (NASCO). In
1959, NASCO published a marine science promotion report, Ocean-
ography 1960-1970.5
Other events were also contributing to a growing interest in ocean
science. In 1957, more than seventy nations joined together to con-
duct an international and interdisciplinary geophysical study. The
United States was an active participant in this effort and hoped to
show its scientific preeminence by launching the first orbiting satel-
lite. The U.S. launch was delayed and, instead, the U.S.S.R.
launched Sputnik and followed this launch with a second satellite
putting the first living organism (a dog) into space. The first Ameri-
can efforts months later seemed minimal.
6
Our nation's scientific ability then became a national policy issue
and marine science directly benefited.67 In 1958, President Eisen-
hower by Executive Order established a Presidential Advisor on Sci-
ence and the Federal Council for Science and Technology. The
Council established working groups and sub-committees on ocean
science issues and eventually an Interagency Committee for Ocean-
ography in 1960.68 In 1959, a new congressional sub-committee on
Convention and it never became accepted as binding international law. See Jacobson,
International Fisheries Law in the Year 2010, 45 LA. L. REv. 1161, 1169-70 (1985).
62. G. MANGONE, supra note 21, at 19.
63. Abel, supra note 28, at 6-7 (During the 1950s, government research and de-
velopment expenditures grew by a factor of five but oceanography support expanded by
less than one-half. In 1958, less than $130 million of a national research and develop-
ment budget of $15 billion was assigned to oceanography ( of one percent).).
64. Id.
65. See Abel, supra note 28, at 7-9; Walsh, Some Thoughts on National Ocean
Policy: The Critical Issue, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 594, 608 (1976); G. MANGONE, supra
note 21, at 18. The Report is popularly called the "NASCO Report."
66. Knecht, Cicin-Sain & Archer, National Ocean Policy: A Window of Oppor-
tunity, 19 OCEAN DE v. & INT'L L. 113, 115-16 (1988).
67. Abel, supra note 28, at 8.
68. Id. at 9-10; G. MANGONE, supra note 21, at 18; Walsh, supra note 65, at 608.
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oceanography was established in the House of Representatives. That
committee and the Senate Commerce Committee held separate hear-
ings on the NASCO Report and on a new Navy report, Ten Years
of Oceanography (TENOC) 9
Our "science gap" became an issue in the presidential election of
1960 and in congressional politics thereafter."0 President Kennedy
became the first president to use the word "oceanography" in a ma-
jor message to Congress. 1 The new Interagency Committee held
workshops on ocean instrumentation. The Senate published a major
report on ocean sciences and national security."2
In the early 1960s, there was a "virtual blizzard" of hearings and
proposed legislation suggesting the need for more ocean research.
7 3
Federal spending for marine sciences increased enormously and ex-
isting federal agencies were given broader mandates to support
marine science students, survey the oceans, increase fisheries re-
search, and evaluate mineral resources in the oceans. 4
In 1963, the new Federal Science Council asked the Interagency
Committee to develop a long-range program plan for the nation's
oceans. This Report became a statement of "national objectives."
The Report first identified all elements of the ocean constituency
that could be invigorated from an expanded oceans program, and
then recommended a geometric growth in federal spending. 5 Con-
gressional interest in the oceans was heightened and led to legislative
proposals for a cabinet level oceanographic council. 6 In addition,
Congress held "landmark" hearings in 1965 that sought to define
how the federal ocean program should be structured and managed.77
To respond to these legislative urgings, the Johnson Administra-
tion began considering, in the mid-1960s, a request from the Science
Advisor for a new oceans program.7 8 However, the Executive
69. See Walsh, supra note 65, at 608.
70. See id. at 609.
71. G. MANGONE, supra note 21, at 18.
72. Abel, supra note 28, at 12-14; D. BROOKS, supra note 35, at 33-34.
73. Walsh, supra note 65, at 609.
74. G. MANGONE, supra note 21, at 19; D. BROOKS, supra note 35, at 33-34. In
1960, the new Interagency Committee on Oceanography asked all federal agencies to
nominate projects for inclusion in a catalog and to include budget requests. The Commit-
tee then reviewed the requests in an attempt to set a national ocean program. The budg-
ets were to be a "baseline" for future budgets to see what progress was being made in
ocean-related research. See Abel, supra note 28, at 11-12.
75. See D. BROOKS, supra note 35, at 34-36.
76. Abel, supra note 28, at 16; D. BROOKS, supra note 35, at 36.
77. See Walsh, supra note 65, at 609.
78. The Science Advisor had appointed a special panel to study and report on the
Branch's evaluation was preempted by legislation-the Marine Re-
sources and Engineering Development Act of 1966.11 Though the
theme of the legislation was marine sciences, it did provide a basis
for a broader ocean policy and program.80
The Act established a new program to assist colleges to conduct
research, provide education, and later offer advisory services-the
Sea Grant Program. It also created a Cabinet Level Marine Sciences
Council, which, under the direction of Vice President Hubert
Humphrey, implemented the National Sea Grant Program, helped
launch the International Decade of Ocean Exploration in 1968, and
suggested the need for coastal zone management.8
The Act also mandated the creation of a Commission on Marine
Sciences, Engineering, and Resources, actually created in 1967, to
examine the national interests in the oceans, delineate national goals,
and establish a comprehensive long-range national program for
marine affairs.82 As noted in the introduction to this article, the
Stratton Commission delivered its report in 1969. Its recommenda-
tions formed the basis for ocean legislation of the next decade and
for the elements of a national ocean policy. 83
This increased interest in marine matters also led to growth in
federal support for ocean programs. Funding was approved for new
marine research ships, for development of a food-from-the-sea tech-
nology, for increased collection of marine data, for research about
resources in the oceans and the technology to obtain those resources,
for scholarship assistance to oceanography students,8 4 and for in-
creased financial support for construction of fishing vessels and com-
mercial fisheries research and development.88
The future seemed bright for development of a comprehensive
oceans policy and program, as recommended by the Stratton Com-
mission. However, national and governmental attention soon focused
on a different issue-the state of our natural environment.86 While
there were some attempts to coordinate ocean activities, manage-
federal oceanographic program. The report, released in July of 1966, made a number of
recommendations for specific ocean projects and for the creation of a national agency for
the ocean. See U.S. GOV'T, PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, PANEL ON
OCEANOGRAPHY, EFFECTIVE USE OF THE SEA (1966).
79. Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-454, 80 Stat. 203 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1101-31 (1982 & Supp. V
1987)) [hereinafter Marine Resources Act].
80. See Walsh, supra note 65, at 610; Knecht, Cicin-Sain & Archer, supra note
66, at 116.
81. Abel, supra note 28, at 17-21; D. BROOKS, supra note 35, at 43-44.
82. Abel, supra note 28, at 23.
83. See Knecht, Cicin-Sain & Archer, supra note 66, at 116-17.
84. See D. BROOKS, supra note 35, at 43.
85. See G. MANGONE, supra note 21, at 132-33.
86. See Knecht, Cicin-Sain & Archer, supra note 66, at 117.
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ment, and policy, the next decade saw passage of numerous singu-
larly-focused ocean-related laws, and the division of responsibility
for ocean matters among more than twenty congressional sub-com-
mittees, twelve different Cabinet departments, eight independent
agencies, and numerous other sub-cabinet federal agencies and advi-
sory groups. 7
C. The Environmental Decade
The period from the mid-1960s to the end of the 1970s has been
termed the "environmental era." Until this period, public awareness
about the state of our environment was minimal. With little ex-
pressed public concern, there was limited legislative action to study,
monitor, and protect our air, water, land, and resources. Beginning
in the mid-1960s, there were a series of reports about environmental
damage, increasing pollution of the air and water, and the need for
increased park and wilderness areas. Only at this point did the pub-
lic begin to press its representatives to take action. 8
Congress responded to this aroused sensitivity and perceived "en-
vironmental crisis" by establishing new sub-committees and ex-
panded staff to study, conduct hearings on, and propose legislation.89
The result was an extensive set of laws90 "to curb the accelerating
destruction of our country's natural beauty." 91
The new national environmental agenda had a direct impact on
ocean policy.92 A series of statutes were enacted that significantly
87. See id.; G. MANGONE, supra note 21, at 24; COMMERCE OCEAN POLICY,
supra note 15, id. at IX-16. For a listing of the committees, agencies, and other groups
involved in ocean-related matters, see id. at IX-13, IX-14 (advisory committees, commis-
sions, and councils), IX-17 to IX-21 (federal agencies).
88. Belsky, Environmental Policy Law in the 1980's: Shifting Back the Burden of
Proof, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 12, 14 (1984); see also R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962)
(widely publicized study on the impact of pesticides); CONG. Q., THE BATTLE FOR NATU-
RAL RESOURCES 110 (1983)(descriptions on the state of our parks and wilderness areas);
Knecht, Cicin-Sain & Archer, supra note 66, at 117 (news reports on the Torrey Canyon
tanker spill off the coast of England in 1968 and the Santa Barbara oil blowout of 1969).
89. Knecht, Cicin-Sain & Archer, supra note 66, at 117.
90. "Starting with the Wilderness Act of 1964 and ending with the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (the
'Superfund'), over twenty federal laws were enacted to protect the environment." Specifi-
cally, new statutes were designed to protect the air, water, oceans, and public lands of
America. Damage from industrial development and operations were to be monitored and
controlled with an eventual goal of a clean environment by the mid-1980s. See Belsky,
supra note 88, at 12-13. For a list of these statutes, see id. at 12 n.56.
91. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 404
(1971).
92. See Curlin, supra note 57, at 19-20.
increased the scope of governmental control over the ocean space
and that sought to protect and manage ocean resources.93 With a
few exceptions, these laws reflected a, "use-by-use," "issue-by-issue,"
and "pollutant-by-pollutant" approach to oceans policy.94 These sin-
gle purpose laws were to be administered by over fifty federal agen-
cies, often with joint responsibility for implementation and enforce-
ment of the same statute.95
By the end of the 1970s, the United States had an extensive and
sophisticated set of marine policies that focused on six goals: devel-
opment of resources; protection of the ocean space; management of
resources; service to ocean users; promotion of marine science, edu-
cation, and technology; and strategic and military use of the
oceans."' However, there was no comprehensive oceans policy. 97 As
one commentator noted:
No. . . broad pronouncements of U.S. policies exist. Rather, the last dozen
years have seen a large number of new, independent ocean initiatives under-
taken, dealing across the full range of issues. . . . These diverse efforts
were not spawned as a part of a coherent national ocean campaign, and
93. See Belsky, Book Review, 11 COASTAL ZONE MGMT. J. 249, 251 (1983)
[hereinafter Belsky, Book Review].
94. See National Ocean Policy Commission Act of 1983, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.,
H.R. REP. No. 98-339, pt. 1 at 9 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Ocean Policy Commission].
The most significant laws enacted during this period that were ocean-related included:
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1986)) [hereinafter NEPA]; the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1986)) [hereinafter FWCPA]; the Marine Mammal Protection
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64
(1986)) [hereinafter MMPA]; the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1052 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-34 and 33
U.S.C. §§ 1401-44 (1986)) [hereinafter MPRSA]; the Coastal Zone Management Act
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1986))
[hereinafter CZMA]; the Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat.
884 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1986)) [hereinafter ESA]; Port and Waterways
Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 92-340, 86 Stat. 424 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-36
(1986)) [hereinafter PWSA]; the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-82 (1986)) (later titled
the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act) [hereinafter MFCMA]; the
Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1567 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§
1251-1376 (1986)) [hereinafter CWA]; the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amend-
ments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 632 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-56
(1986)) [hereinafter OCSLAA]; the Deepwater Ports Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-627,
88 Stat. 2126 (1975) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-24 (1986)) [hereinafter DWA]; the
Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-283, 94 Stat. 941 (codi-
fied at 30 U.S.C. §§ 9101-67 (1986)) [hereinafter OTEC]; the Deep Seabed Hard Min-
eral Resources Act, Pub. L. No. 96-283, 94 Stat. 553 (1980)(codified at 30 U.S.C. §§
1401-73 (1986)) [hereinafter DSHMRA].
95. See Curlin, supra note 57, at 20. For a detailed description of each of these
statutes and their assignment of responsibilities to different agencies, see COMMERCE
OCEAN POLICY, supra note 15, app. A.
96. See Curlin, supra note 57, at 20-23.
97. See J. Byrne, NOAA's Role in a National Ocean Policy, J. Seward Johnson
Lectures in Marine Policy 5-6 (Sept. 17, 1981).
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while each may be achieving its own goals to a certain degree, they remain
today a disparate, uncoordinated, and occasionally conflictive, assembly of
unprioritized programs. 8
There were a few calls for a comprehensive ocean policy during
the 1970s99 and some efforts to reorganize the government'" and to
coordinate governmental activities. 10 1 Yet, there appeared to be little
interest in a unified approach.10 2 Despite this disorganization, federal
government support of ocean research, protection, and management
grew; 03 and individual states increased their involvement with ocean
issues, especially coastal management.'04 To ocean constituents, both
in the Congress and in the resource exploitation and environmental
protection community, the "oceans" was a "growth industry." The
focus was on implementing existing laws and regulations, and secur-
ing increasing funds from the federal treasury.10 5
This confident perspective was about to change. The election of
1980 brought in a new federal administration which was: less con-
cerned about environmental protection;10 6 desirous of decreasing ex-
penditures for all federal programs, including those that were
marine-related;'0 7 and hopeful of imposing its own ideological view
98. Knecht, The United States and the Oceans: A Preliminary Assessment, in
OCEAN POLICY ROUNDTABLE, ASSESSING OCEAN GOVERNANCE 5 (Marine Policy and
Ocean Management Center, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution 1983); see also
Knecht, Cicin-Sain & Archer, supra note 66, at 117.
99. See D. BROOKS, supra note 35, at 213 (quoting a report by the National
Ocean Policy Study of the United States Senate).
100. See infra notes 143-58 and accompanying text.
101. See infra notes 143-58 and accompanying text; see also National Ocean Pol-
lution Planning Reauthorization and Great Lakes Pollution Act-H.R. 3600: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., Feb. 4, 1982, Ser. No. 97-43 (1982) (statement of Mar-
tin H. Belsky, Assistant Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion) [hereinafter statement of Martin H. Belsky].
102. Abel, supra note 28, at 45.
103. See, e.g., FEDERAL INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON OCEAN POLLUTION RE-
SEARCH, DEVELOPMENT & MONITORING, NATIONAL MARINE POLLUTION PROGRAM
PLAN x-xiii (1981) (describing the increased expenditures and programs for ocean pollu-
tion research, developments, and monitoring from 1978 to 1980) [hereinafter 1981 PoL-
LUTION PLAN].
104. See, e.g., J. MYERS, AMERICA'S COASTS IN THE 1980'S: POLICIES AND ISSUES
(1981).
105. See, e.g., CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT, 1980
- A CONTEXT FOR DEBATE (1980); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON OCEANS AND
ATMOSPHERE, OCEAN SERVICES FOR THE NATION: NATIONAL OCEAN GOALS AND OBJEC-
TIVES FOR THE 1980's (1981).
106. See Belsky, supra note 88, at 37-38.
107. See D. BROOKS, supra note 35, at 241-42 (reprinting a letter from the Na-
tional Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere, dated May 15, 1981, criticizing
proposed budget cuts to ocean programs).
of national interest into an international policy for the oceans.'
D. The Reagan Ocean Policy
Until 1983, the "ocean policy" of the Reagan Administration was
identical to its policy towards all federal environmental and resource
management and protection programs. 109 Government was to be mis-
trusted and reduced. The private sector, if left alone, would be able
to secure national prosperity through its own initiatives. Overregula-
tion had thwarted growth and initiative. "Deregulation" was essen-
tial. When government action was required, a "new federalism" pro-
vided that actions should be taken at the level of government closest
to the people-the states, counties, cities, and towns. Federal spend-
ing should be limited to essential services, particularly national se-
curity and defense." 0
As applied to the oceans, this philosophy led to reductions in the
budgets of federal agencies with marine-related regulatory and re-
search responsibilities and the attempted elimination of some pro-
grams, such as Sea Grant and Coastal Zone Management. In fact,
ocean and coastal programs were generally targeted for reform and
reduction."' The new philosophy also meant a change in the federal
government's attitude toward the ocean space.
Ocean resources were to be exploited; developers to be left alone
and allowed to develop; and protective measures only taken upon
concrete proof of real and present injury. 1 2 While seeming to sup-
108. The Reagan Administration rejected the new United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea because of ideological concerns with the common heritage concept
included in the deep seabed portions of that treaty. The Administration sought to create
an alternative international oceans policy at the time it rejected the treaty, when it estab-
lished a 200-mile exclusive economic zone and stated a new United States Ocean Policy.
See Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (1983), 3 C.F.R. 5030 (1983), re-
printed in 22 I.L.M. 465 (1983) [hereinafter EEZ Proclamation]; Statement by Presi-
dent on United States Ocean Policy, accompanying his Proclamation establishing an Ex-
clusive Economic Zone, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PR s. Doc. 383 (Mar. 10, 1983), reprinted in
22 I.L.M. 464 (1983) [hereinafter Reagan Ocean Statement].
109. See Knecht, Cicin-Sain & Archer, supra note 66, at 127; D. BROOKS, supra
note 35, at 48.
110. See Belsky, supra note 88, at 37-38. For a detailed description of the imple-
mentation of this philosophy, see id. at 40-84.
111. See Knecht, Cicin-Sain & Archer, supra note 66, at 121-28; Belsky, Book
Review, supra note 93, at 252-53; see, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oceanog-
raphy, Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (Marine
Sanctuaries Reauthorization), 311 (National Sea Grant Program Proposed Budget), 441
(Coastal Zone Management Budget Cuts) (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Authorization
Hearings].
112. See Belsky, Book Review, supra note 93, at 252-53; Knecht, Cicin-Sain &
Archer, supra note 66, at 123. I have termed this change in policy a shift in the burden
of proof. See Belsky, supra note 88, at 5; Belsky, Book Review, supra note 93, at 252-53.
One problem with requiring proof of real harm before taking protective measures was
that most regulatory decisions are based on "risks" of harm that must be determined
after careful research and monitoring. The Reagan Administration sought to not only
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port the increased state interest in ocean matters, the Reagan Ad-
ministration sought to limit state power to protect the marine envi-
ronment. Less money would be made available for state programs of
research and management. 113 State attempts to manage their coasts
or impact exploitation of offshore resources were vigorously
opposed. x 4
The focus of the ocean community in the early years of the Rea-
gan Administration had to be reactive. Developers supported regula-
tory reforms. Conservationists and scientists fought a "holding ac-
tion." Congress successfully thwarted most attempts to change the
status quo."n5 Ocean programs survived, but this was not the time to
consider establishing a "national oceans policy." Separate ocean con-
stituencies were too busy protecting their own interests." i
However, a new impetus for formulation of a comprehensive
oceans policy arose in 1983. President Reagan refused to sign the
new Convention on the Law of the Sea. He opposed the provisions on
deep seabed mining but accepted the thrust of the remainder of the
Treaty.1 7 To "have his cake and eat it too," he proclaimed that the
United States was unilaterally creating a 200 mile exclusive eco-
nomic zone," 8 and accepting the provisions of the new treaty, except
for the deep seabed provisions, as customary international law, bind-
ing on the United States and all other nations." 9
The President's EEZ Proclamation of 198312° was accompanied by
a Statement on United States Ocean Policy' 2' and a "Fact Sheet"
shift the burden of proof but also to reduce the money and other resources available to
answer the scientific questions essential to determining risk. See Belsky, Book Review,
supra note 93, at 253; Belsky, supra note 88, at 59.
113. See 1981 Authorization Hearings, supra note 111, at 311, 411.
114. See Knecht, Cicin-Sain & Archer, supra note 66, at 126-27.
115. Some commentators have described the situation as a "policy stalemate." Id.
at 123.
116. Id. at 128.
117. Statement by the President at the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 18
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 887-88 (July 9, 1982).
118. EEZ Proclamation, supra note 108.
119. Reagan Ocean Statement, supra note 108; see Malone, Who Needs the Sea
Treaty?, 45 FOREIGN POL'Y 41, 61 (Sept. 1984); see also Boczek, The Protection of the
Antarctic Ecosystem: A Study in International Environmental Law, 13 OCEAN DEv. &
INT'L L.J. 347, 393 (1983) (UNCLOS codifies for the oceans general environmental law,
especially as it relates to a comprehensive obligation to protect the environment); 2 RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 5-6 (1987)
(except for provisions on deep seabed mining and dispute settlement, "substantive provi-
sions of the Convention" are "statements of customary international law binding upon
[nations including the United States]").
120. EEZ Proclamation, supra note 108.
121. Reagan Ocean Statement, supra note 108.
prepared by the White House, explaining the Proclamation and the
President's Statement. 2 The focus of the Fact Sheet, Proclamation,
and Oceans Policy Statement was the United States international
obligations. There was no discussion of the implications of this new
international policy on domestic U.S. policy. Nevertheless, they
formed the basis for extended scholarly and political discussions'23 of
the "window of opportunity" now provided to establish a new na-
tional ocean policy.Y24 This speculation was only the most recent in
the almost twenty year attempt to provide government mechanisms
to mandate an integrated oceans program.
125
The next part of this article will describe these previous attempts,
and suggest why the newest efforts at policy setting and government
reorganization will, like their predecessors, be ineffective. Only a le-
gal doctrine, which I believe now exists, that mandates a comprehen-
sive ecosystem model of science and management, will force our na-
tional policymakers to take a holistic approach.
III. ATTEMPTS TO ORGANIZE NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY AND
PROGRAMS
As discussed earlier, Congress made its first efforts to set a na-
tional policy agenda for the oceans more than twenty years ago,
when it enacted the Marine Resources and Engineering Develop-
ment Act of 1966. That Act established both a National Council on
Marine Resources and Engineering Development (popularly called
the Marine Science Council) and a Commission on Marine Science,
Engineering, and Resources (later called the Stratton Commission).
Since then, there have been numerous attempts to force the federal
122. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet, United States
Ocean Policy, 22 I.L.M. 461-62 (1983).
123. See, e.g., Exclusive Economic Zone Implementation Act, H.R. 2061, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); Exclusive Economic Zone Implementation Act, S. 750, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (policy statements and amendments to existing statutes to set
forth United States ocean policy); Center for Ocean Management Studies, Implications
of a United States Claim to a 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (summary of a work-
shop held Apr. 11-12, 1983); OCEAN POLICY ROUNDTABLE, ASSESSING OCEAN GOVERN-
ANCE (Marine Policy and Ocean Management Center, Woods Hole Oceanographic Insti-
tution 1983); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, THE
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE OF THE UNITED STATES: SOME IMMEDIATE POLICY ISSUES
(May 1984) [hereinafter NACOA EEZ]; MARINE TECHNOLOGY SOCIETY & INSTITUTE
OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS, OCEANS '84 - EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC
ZONE PAPERS; 1983 Ocean Policy Commission, supra note 94, at 10-12 (President's deci-
sion to not sign UNCLOS and to establish an Exclusive Economic Zone adds impetus to
the need for a comprehensive approach to ocean policy-making).
124. See Knecht, Cicin-Sain, & Archer, supra note 66, at 128; see also NACOA
EEZ, supra note 123, at 3; Belsky, supra note 13, at 19; Knecht & Kitsos, Multiple Use
Management in the EEZ, 27 OCEANUS 13, 17-18 (Winter 1984/85).
125. See Juda, The Exclusive Economic Zone and Ocean Management, 18 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L L. 305, 319 (1987).
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government to pursue a more comprehensive ocean policy.
Those attempts have concentrated on four strategies to assert an
oceans agenda and determine an oceans policy: (1) elevation of
ocean issues and coordination to the highest levels of government;
(2) reorganization of the federal government; (3) oversight by spe-
cial committees, commissions, and interagency coordinating bodies;
and (4) mandates for reports and coordination by special legisla-
tion. 26 Each has had only limited success. 12 7 The status of ocean
policy today is still that of scattered laws, administered by scattered
federal agencies, with minimal presidential attention, and minimal
integration. 28
A. Seeking a White House Focus
Some ocean advocates urge that only direct Executive Office inter-
est and involvement will assure adequate coordination, development,
and oversight of marine policy.' 29 Such high-level responsibility was
the intent of the Marine Resources and Engineering Development
Act, and its creation of a Marine Science Council. This Council was
established as a Cabinet-level interagency group, under the chair-
manship of Vice President Humphrey.
During its history, the Council formulated policy, recommended
programs, and took an active leadership role in federal ocean legisla-
tion, management, and coordination.'3 It helped expand the ocean's
budget, secure legislation, and establish coordinating mechanisms for
ocean research, marine-related education, fisheries development, and
coastal zone development. 13  However, in 1971, it was terminated
because of "lack of interest" by the Administration. 3
126. See Bowen, The Major United States Federal Government Marine Organiza-
tion Proposals, in MAKING OCEAN POLICY, supra note 28, at 51; Knecht, Cicin-Sain &
Archer, supra note 66, at 120.
127. See Statement of Martin H. Belsky, supra note 101.
128. See National Ocean Policy Commission Act of 1987: Hearings Before the
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-11 (1987)
[hereinafter 1987 Ocean Commission Hearings].
129. See COMMERCE OCEAN POLICY, supra note 15, at IX-4; see, e.g., Walsh, Na-
tional Organization For Ocean Management: Centralization v. Functionalization, in
MAKING OCEAN POLICY, supra note 28, at 85 ("Policy formation and direction must
come from a presidential-level council [and implementation through] an ocean policy
directorate within the OMB.").
130. See COMMERCE OCEAN POLICY, supra note 15, at IX-5.
131. D. BROOKS, supra note 35, at 42-44.
132. E. WENK, THE POLITICS OF THE OCEAN 163 (1972). The Senate had origi-
nally wanted to establish a permanent Council, but eventually compromised for a tempo-
rary one to expire in 24 months. See G. MANGONE, supra note 21, at 137. Subsequent
With the termination of the Council, the responsibility for marine
policy oversight within the Executive Office was moved to the Office
of Science and Technology. That office was dismantled in 1973.
Since that time, no special White House organ has been given re-
sponsibility for oceans issues.133 Only a limited Interagency Commit-
tee on Oceans and Atmosphere (CAO), under the Federal Coordi-
nating Council for Science and Technology, presently exists.1 34 CAO
has no real responsibility or leadership. It merely provides a forum
for agencies with ocean responsibilities to meet irregularly and to
occasionally collect a list of ocean activities in a report.
13 5
With the relegation of ocean policy coordination to lower level in-
teragency coordinating committees, 36 ocean activists sought to en-
courage other White House Councils to take a more active interest
in ocean affairs. 37 However, ocean interests cut across the various
councils established by Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Rea-
gan. 38 Continuing calls for a new Cabinet-level Marine Council or a
marine affairs coordinator have gone unheeded.3 9
Each president has also established review mechanisms involving
the White House staff. However, the staff reviewed policy on an is-
sue-by-issue basis. Ocean policy, as an issue, was not comprehen-
sively addressed but, rather, was set "in the context of functional
problems within the [broader] framework of domestic and foreign
policy."' 4
0
legislation extended the life of the Council to 60 months. See Walsh, supra note 65, at
610. When President Nixon did not propose re-authorizing legislation in 1971, it was
terminated by operation of law. See COMMERCE OCEAN POLICY, supra note 15, at IX-5.
133. See COMMERCE OCEAN POLICY, supra note 15, at IX-6. A new Office of Sci-
ence and Technology Policy was established in 1976. That new Office, however, never
assumed direct responsibility for marine policy oversight. Id.
134. See id. at IX-5-IX-6, IX-8. One commentator has termed the work of the
CAO "intellectual oatmeal" rather than "caviar." Walsh, supra note 65, at 612.
135. See, e.g., CAO, REVIEW OF FEDERAL STATUTORY AUTHORITIES FOLLOWING
THE PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION OF A 200 MILE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (Nov.
1985). During the time I was Assistant Administrator for NOAA, my office acted as
staff for CAO. Representatives to CAO meetings came from the middle-management
level of federal agencies and sought only to discuss their individual ocean agenda and not
broad policy issues. Moreover, the top administrators of these agencies never showed any
interest in the activities of CAO, except for grumbling about the time that had to be
spent in preparing the supposedly annual report on Federal Oceans Programs, mandated
by the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act. See also COMMERCE
OCEAN POLICY, supra note 15, at IX-5.
136. See COMMERCE OCEAN POLICY, supra note 15, at IX-5.
137. See, e.g., Curlin, supra note 57, at 25-29.
138. Separate councils dealt with general domestic issues, energy resources, na-
tional security, and environmental quality. Ocean issues and activities, of course, were
discussed and recommendations for presidential decisions made; but recommendations
were made by each Council, in the context of its own broader policy agenda. See CoM-
MERCE OCEAN POLICY, supra note 15, at IX-6-IX-9; see also D. REGAN, FOR THE REC-
ORD 235 (1988).
139. See COMMERCE OCEAN POLICY, supra note 15, at IX-9-IX-12.
140. Id. at IX-9. One example of this process relates to the interagency conflict
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Similarly, the President's Office of Management and Budget
(OMB)- is divided to parallel the departments and agencies it over-
sees. Thus, federal ocean management and budget issues, supposedly
to be analyzed in a coordinated manner, are analyzed by separate
components of OMB with little coordination of overall policy.141
Even the most recent White House task force to review the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea focused on narrow issues
such as the meaning of the "Common Heritage of Mankind" and the
ability of the President to establish new international law by a Proc-
lamation, rather than by signing the Convention. It did not address
any broader issues or the need to establish a comprehensive national
oceans policy in response to our new international policy.
142
B. Reorganization
Another means to establish a comprehensive oceans program and
policy might be the creation of a federal oceans agency or Cabinet
level department. In fact, the Stratton Commission believed that a
national oceans program could only be achieved "by creating a
strong civil agency within the Federal Government with adequate
authority and adequate resources.' 43 It recommended creation of a
new independent agency-the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Agency.
This agency was to have "unified management" responsibilities for
all then-existent civil marine programs and was to be the home for
all future programs so as to "provide for their initiation and guide
their development.' 44 In those limited situations where the national
between NOAA and the Department of Interior as to responsibility over marine re-
sources other than fish and oil and gas. Now in its tenth year, the debate, so far as the
White House is concerned, concerns only which agency should have responsibility, and
not the larger question of the impact of the development of new resources in the context
of a larger national ocean policy. See Office of Policy and Planning, National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce, Memorandum on Adminis-
trative Responsibility for Ocean Mining (May 29, 1979); Office of the Assistant Secre-
tary, Energy and Minerals, Department of the Interior, Memorandum on Implementa-
tion of S. 493 "Deep Seabed Mineral Resources Act" by the Department of the Interior
(May 30, 1979); see also NACOA, MARINE MINERALS: AN ALTERNATIVE MINERAL
SUPPLY (July 1983).
141. See Curlin, supra note 57, at 27-29.
142. See Ratiner, The Law of the Sea: A Crossroads for American Foreign Pol-
icy, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 1006, 1007-12 (1982); Hoyle, National Legislation, in CENTER
FOR OCEAN MANAGEMENT STUDIES, THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT THE LAW OF THE
SEA TREATY: OPPORTUNITIES AND COSTS 253, 255-56 (1983).
143. STRATTON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 229.
144. Id.
interest required placement of an ocean program in some other or-
gan of the federal government, the new agency would be responsible
for the coordination of those programs and setting the national
oceans policy agenda. 45
President Nixon did not wholeheartedly accept the Commission's
recommendation. He appointed a new task force which also recom-
mended a national agency, independent and reporting directly to the
President, that would coordinate the national ocean program. How-
ever, the new task force suggested that the new agency be given only
the responsibility to coordinate the nation's ocean program, and not
necessarily control of all present and future ocean programs. Presi-
dent Nixon then took that recommendation, and by Reorganization
Plan Number 4 of 1970, established an "administration"-the Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)-that was
placed in the Department of Commerce. " '
NOAA was given responsibility for marine fisheries, some environ-
mental sciences and engineering programs, the National Weather
Service, and some minor programs in other agencies. 47 Later legis-
lation gave NOAA the responsibility for coastal zone management,
deep seabed mining, and ocean pollution research and coordina-
tion. 4 8 Despite the Stratton Commission recommendation, NOAA
never became the lead civil agency for oceans programs and poli-
cies.' 49 It has, however, become the focus for subsequent proposals to
centralize the federal ocean program.
In 1974, the National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmo-
sphere (NACOA), established as a result of the recommendations of
the Stratton Commission,'" recommended expanding NOAA to give
it broad ocean management and policy responsibilities, either as an
independent agency or within a new Department of Energy and Nat-
ural Resources. In 1976, Senator Ernest Hollings of South Carolina
recommended a new Department of Environment and Oceans which
was to include all oceans programs in a new department with a re-
search, conservation, and environmental policy focus.' 5' In 1977,
Professor John Norton Moore similarly recommended an indepen-
dent oceans and atmospheric administration, responsible for all do-
145. Id. at 231, 244.
146. Reorg. Plan No. 4 of 1970, reprinted in 84 Stat. 2090 (1970).
147. See Walsh, supra note 65, at 611-12; Abel, supra note 28, at 25.
148. See Abel, supra note 28, at 25-32; see also Statement by John B. Breaux,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment,
in COASTAL STATES ORGANIZATION, OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC POLICY ISSUES OF THE
1980's: THE ROLE OF THE NOAA ORGANIC ACT 40, 42 (1980) [hereinafter Breaux
Statement].
149. See COMMERCE OCEAN POLICY, supra note 15, at IX-30; Breaux Statement,
supra note 148, at 42-43; Abel, supra note 28, at 46-47.
150. See STRATTON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 245-46.
151. See COMMERCE OCEAN POLICY, supra note 15, at IX-31-IX-32.
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mestic oceans programs and coordination of oceans policy.'5 2
Other broader reorganization proposals also led to suggestions for
a coordinated federal oceans program, under one administration. In
1971, President Nixon proposed a Department of Natural Re-
sources, which, among other things, would have "consolidated" pro-
grams for marine resources and technology.5 3 In 1978, President
Carter proposed a new Department of Natural Resources, that
would include a "focal point in the federal government for develop-
ing ocean resource policies [and] for providing comprehensive man-
agement of ocean-related natural resources."'"1
More recently, President Reagan proposed to reorganize all fed-
eral trade functions into the Department of Commerce and to split
off NOAA, presumably as an independent agency, but without any
responsibilities beyond what it had as part of the Department of
Commerce. 55
None of these proposals came to fruition. They faced the tradi-
tional obstacles to any proposal for reorganization from an issue-by-
issue constituency, from an established bureaucracy, and from con-
gressional committees fearing a shrinkage of jurisdiction.56 How-
ever, these reorganization proposals did lead to numerous bills, none
of which ever became law, that would have provided an Organic Act
for NOAA.157 Among the goals of these proposed Organic Acts were
the centralization of ocean policy and management responsibilities in
NOAA and the attainment of the goal of the Stratton Commission
152. Moore, Symposium: New Directions in United States Ocean Policy, 19 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1 (1977).
153. COMMERCE OCEAN POLICY, supra note 15, at IX-30.
154. See Bowen, supra note 126, at 63 (quoting a staff report from President
Carter's Reorganization Project detailing the proposed Department of Natural Resources
and proposing a new oceans and atmospheric agency within this DNR with broad ocean
policy and management responsibilities).
155. See NOAA as an Independent Agency: Hearings on H.R. 3381, Before the
Subcomm. on Oceanography, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1 (1983) (statement of Rep.
D'Amours) [hereinafter Independent NOAA Hearings]; id. at 68 (statement of Robert
Knecht).
156. See Knecht, Cicin-Sain & Archer, supra note 66, at 120; see also Bleicher,
Reflections on the Failure of NOAA's Ocean Management Office, 11 COASTAL ZONE
MGMT. J. 353, 363 (1984) (describing why "ocean management [is] so difficult to
implement").
157. See, e.g., The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Organic
Act of 1979, H.R. 9708, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); The National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration Organic Act of 1983, H.R. 3381 & H.R. 3355, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983); see also Ocean Sci. News, July 15, 1988, at 1, 7-8 (reporting on legislation
introduced in July of 1988 that would create an independent NOAA and give it "lead
agency" responsibility for all ocean issues).
that NOAA be, in fact, the lead civil oceans agency.158
Attempts to set a national oceans agenda and policy were not lim-
ited to formal reorganization. Repeated efforts were made to use
more informal advisory committees, congressional study groups, and
other mechanisms to focus governmental interest in and action on
ocean issues.
C. Committees, Commissions, and Congressional Oversight
As early as the 1950s, scientists realized that there was a need for
coordination, planning, and policy setting for marine issues, espe-
cially marine science. From 1956 to 1966, government researchers
and engineers formed a series of coordinating committees in an at-
tempt to increase their "clout" and develop an integrated strategy
for marine science.159 Scientists in the academic community also
sought a new organizational structure to support coordinated ocean-
related research and technology.' 60
The impact of these efforts was mixed. Reports were published
stressing the importance of oceanography to our national interests.
New procedures were adopted to collect information on federal
marine science expenditures and programs and to suggest future
goals and funding. In addition, efforts were begun to develop a long-
range plan for the nation's ocean program. However, the focus was
mostly on science and technology. More general policy issues were
not addressed.' 6 '
These early efforts led to legislation formally establishing the Na-
tional Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development.
As described earlier, this Council was eventually terminated and was
replaced by a low-level Interagency Committee on Oceans and At-
mosphere (CAO). Over the last twenty years, interagency panels or
158. Statement of Martin H. Belsky, in Independent NOAA Hearings, supra note
155, at 213-21; Statement of Samuel Bleicher, in id. at 222-26. See generally COASTAL
STATE ORGANIZATION, OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC POLICY ISSUES OF THE 1980's: THE
ROLE OF THE NOAA ORGANIC ACT (1980).
159. See Abel, supra note 28, at 6-17. In the early 1950s marine scientists within
the Navy bureaucracy established an "Informal Oceanographic Discussion Group."
Later, in 1956, they included individuals from other agencies in a more formal "Coordi-
nating Committee on Oceanography." As a result of Sputnik, and a more general gov-
ernment interest in science and technology, a newly created Federal Council for Science
and Technology formed in 1959 a special subcommittee to review plans and programs of
the various federal agencies charged with responsibilities that related to the oceans. In
1960, this became the "Interagency Committee on Oceanography." Id.
160. In 1957, the National Academy of Sciences established its first standing
Committee on Oceanography which, from 1959 to 1961, published a series of reports
identifying national goals and policies for marine science. See Abel, supra note 28, at 8-
9. This Committee in the 1960s became the Ocean Sciences Board. In addition, the
Academy also established a Marine Board, an Ocean Policy Committee, and a Marine
Transportation Research Board. Id. at 42.
161. See supra notes 58-87 and accompanying text.
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groups have been established so that today there are, in addition to
CAO, over fifty such organs. 62 These interagency groups rarely take
action, and then only as the result of outside pressure.16 3 In most
cases they fail because "regardless of how well-intentioned they may
be, they have no power to implement."' 4
Blue ribbon advisory commissions and committees are alternative
devices that are often used to force government to coordinate activi-
ties and set broad policy goals.'65 The Stratton Commission is a good
example of the value of such groups. Blue ribbon commissions can
review various projects, plans, and government policies, and establish
overall goals. They can also recommended future actions, structures,
and programs to implement those goals. The prestigious nature of a
committee or commission's membership gives it the potential to im-
pact the making of policy.' 66
The Stratton Commission, believing in the value of such an advi-
sory mechanism, recommended the establishment of a new National
Advisory Committee for the Oceans (NACOA). 67 This Advisory
Committee was to consist of experts, appointed by the President,
who would oversee the nation's oceans programs, with appropriate
liaisons with each federal agency that had ocean responsibilities.' 68
NACOA was created in 1971169 and continued, with some modifica-
tions, 70 until the end of 1982.'7'
162. Rothchild & Roales, Public Policy For A Specialized Interest: The Oceans,
in CENTER FOR OCEAN MANAGEMENT STUDIES, COMPARATIVE MARINE POLICY 236, 240
(1981).
163. Id. at 242.
164. Id. at 241.
165. See NATIONAL OCEANS POLICY COMMISSION ACT OF 1987-H.R. 1171, H.R.
REP. No. 100-300, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 11 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 OCEAN
COMMISSION REPORT].
166. See Statement of Senator John B. Breaux, in 1987 Ocean Commission Hear-
ings, supra note 128, at 3-4.
167. STRATTON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 19.
168. Id. at 245-46.
169. National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere Act of 1971, Pub.
L. No. 92-125, 85 Stat. 344 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 857-6 (1986)).
170. In 1977, the original NACOA Act was repealed and new legislation enacted
to reconstitute it, with more members and specific qualifications for membership to as-
sure its "blue ribbon" status. National Advisory Committee on the Oceans and Atmo-
sphere Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-63, 91 Stat. 265; see COMMERCE OCEAN POLICY,
supra note 15, at IX-12.
171. The last chair of NACOA indicated that the basis for the termination of
NACOA was that "Congress had lost sufficient confidence in [it]." See 1987 Ocean
Commission Hearings, supra note 128, at 120 (letter from John A. Knauss, to Walter B.
Jones, Chair, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries (May 18, 1987)). Some
members of Congress proposed to replace NACOA with a "blue ribbon" National Ocean
NACOA produced many worthwhile reports, 172 and made at-
tempts at open hearings and in communications to the Executive
Branch and Congress to coordinate ocean policy, oversee implemen-
tation of ocean programs, and suggest reforms in government struc-
ture, management, and policy-making. 173 However, it was generally
ill-suited for real policy coordination and development. It had a
traditional program-by-program focus and a small staff.' 74 Its mem-
bers were frequently selected on the basis of politics rather than
expertise.Y75
When, pursuant to the recommendation of the Stratton Commis-
sion, NACOA was placed in the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, it also lost some of its credibility with other federal
agencies and became involved in the bureaucratic infighting so com-
mon to ocean policy.1 76 Moreover, the ocean constituency, both in
and out of government, was issue-by-issue oriented. Instead of one
comprehensive advisory group, NACOA co-existed with separate ad-
visory committees for fisheries, coastal zone management, Sea
Grant, and off-shore oil and gas development.177
Perhaps, the main reason for the lack of total success for NACOA
is the nature of advisory committees generally. As overseers, from
the outside, their advice is not self-executing and must be translated
Policy Commission-in effect, a Stratton II. See 1983 Ocean Policy Commission, supra
note 94, at 11.
172. See, e.g., NACOA, FISHERIES FOR THE FUTURE (1982); NACOA, THE Ex-
CLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE OF THE UNITED STATES: SOME IMMEDIATE POLICY ISSUES
(1982); NACOA, OCEAN SERVICES FOR THE NATION: NATIONAL GOALS AND OBJEC-
TIVES FOR SERVICES TO OCEAN OPERATIONS IN THE 1980's (1981); NACOA, THE ROLE
OF THE OCEAN IN A WASTE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY: A SPECIAL REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT AND CONGRESS (1981).
173. See Abel, supra note 28, at 44; Bowen, supra note 126, at 66-69; see, e.g., D.
BROOKS, supra note 35, at 51-54 (fisheries), 83-84 (shipping). See generally Hearings on
H.R. 6197, National Advisory Comm. on Oceans and Atmosphere Reauthorization,
Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 102-22 [hereinafter 1982
NACOA Reauthorization Hearing].
174. 1983 Ocean Policy Commission, supra note 94, at 11.
175. See Abel, supra note 28, at 44. Perhaps the clearest example of the politics of
advisory committee appointments was the proposal of President Reagan to appoint Anne
Gorsuch Burford to NACOA. Ms. Gorsuch had little expertise and it was generally ac-
cepited that her appointment was an attempt to ameliorate her recent removal as Admin-
istrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. See L. SPEAKES, SPEAKING OUT 249
(1988).
176. While the author served as Assistant Administrator of NOAA, responsibility
for administration of NACOA, and assistance in staffing and budgeting, was located in
the Assistant Administrator's office, the Office of Policy and Planning. Some agency rep-
resentatives believed that NACOA was a "NOAA tool" and that it existed to serve only
NOAA's turf-fighting and budget-funding goals. They assigned lower-level employees as
liaisons and only reluctantly acceded to requests to appear before the Committee or to
requests for information.
177. See COMMERCE OCEAN POLICY, supra note 15, at IX-13. Dr. James Curlin,
author of the Ocean Policy Report, suggested that there were at one time 75 advisory
committees, commissions, and councils. Id. at IX-12.
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into governmental action. There is no process to ensure that advice
will be implemented. 17
The most recent efforts at securing policy coordination have been
to secure a new blue ribbon commission, Stratton - II. Three at-
tempts have been made since 1983 to secure such a commission to
"develop recommendations on a comprehensive national oceans pol-
icy.' 71 9 None has yet been successful.
In addition to interagency coordinating committees and special
commissions and advisory committees, another method of attempting
to secure some policy implementation is by congressional action and
oversight. 180 As noted above, however, Congress itself did not pursue
any overall ocean policy. Ocean problems were addressed on an is-
sue-by-issue basis. Oversight of implementation was similarly
divided.' 8 '
There have been, however, at least two attempts at strengthening
the ability of Congress to legislate and oversee ocean issues. In 1974,
the Senate established a National Ocean Policy Study (NOPS), as
178. See Curlin, supra note 57, at 26; COMMERCE OCEAN POLICY, supra note 15,
at IX-14. The author's experience at NOAA highlights this problem. Senior administra-
tors in other federal agencies and in NOAA itself did not like being "second-guessed" as
to their programs and policies by an outside group-especially one that consisted of
members outside of their particular issue area. This led to requests for and creation of
special advisory committees for specialized ocean topics. It also led to agency antagonism
to recommendations made by NACOA, as many of these recommendations sought to
take a broader look at ocean problems. Compare NACOA, FISHERIES FOR THE FUTURE
(1982) with NOAA FISHERY MANAGEMENT STUDY (1986). A considerable period of the
author's time was spent explaining to other senior administrators about the need for
outside advice and how the administration benefited from having to respond to intelligent
inquiries from a broad-based "blue ribbon" committee. See Hearings on H.R. 2448,
NACOA Authorization Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 7-
8 (1981) (statement of Martin H. Belsky) [hereinafter NACOA 1981 Authorization
Hearing].
Moreover, as the budget and staffing for NACOA were within the overall NOAA
budget, NACOA became an easy target when other parts of the agency were fighting
personnel and funding cuts. See 1982 NACOA Reauthorization Hearing, supra note
173, at 115 (NACOA chair never consulted on proposed cut for NACOA budget);
NACOA 1981 Authorization Hearing, supra, at 8 (explanation that NACOA budget
and personnel are part of NOAA allotment).
179. See National Oceans Policy Commission Act of 1983, H.R. 2853, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess., § 4(a) (1983); National Oceans Policy Commission Act of 1987, H.R. 1171,
100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3 (1987); Ocean Sci. News, July 15, 1988, at 7.
180. See Abel, supra note 28, at 13.
181. As one committee indicated: "Within Congress, legislative responsibilities are
shared by thirty-nine subcommittees of twelve standing committees in the House of Rep-
resentatives and thirty-six subcommittees of ten standing committees in the Senate. The
institutional obstacles posed by this diffusion of responsibility for systematic and consis-
tent policy-making are substantial." 1983 Ocean Policy Commission, supra note 94, at
11.
part of the Committee on Commerce. NOPS had no legislative re-
sponsibilities and thus avoided jurisdictional fights. Its task was to
review present ocean programs and seek a "comprehensive national
policy" for the oceans.18
2
The Study Committee "held extensive hearings, made several
studies, and recommended legislation to the Senate."' 83 In fact, it
even recommended a new National Oceans Administration and the
assignment of coordinated and comprehensive ocean management to
a special office in that new agency.18 4 However, its effectiveness va-
ried with its membership and staff, and it never overcame the bu-
reaucracy's and Congress's single-issue focus and opposition to com-
prehensive policy-making. 185
Another effort at overcoming congressional committee divisions in
order to address ocean policy involved the establishment of an ad
hoc, and later a select committee, to draft amendments to the 1953
Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Lands Act. 18  The leadership of the
House of Representatives recognized in 1975 that any attempts to
revise the outmoded 1953 law would be hindered by the claims of
various congressional committees as to jurisdiction. The leadership
therefore secured House approval of the creation of a special OCS
committee, consisting of members and staff of the three primary
committees claiming jurisdiction, and gave it the task of proposing
"comprehensive" legislation to amend the law concerning offshore
development.Y8 7
The attempt at congressional coordination was successful and led
to a new law, attempting to balance the various energy, environmen-
tal, federal-state relations, and other issues.' 88 Yet, it was still fo-
cused on a single-issue area-the Outer Continental Shelf Oil and
Gas Program-and did not attempt to state or require any compre-
hensive oceans policy. 89 Moreover, a short time after passage of the
new statute, oversight and legislative responsibilities soon passed
back to "approximately eleven standing committees of the
House." 90
182. S. REP. No. 685, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974).
183. G. MANGONE, supra note 21, at 299.
184. Bleicher, supra note 156, at 354.
185. See D. BROOKS, supra note 35, at 102-03, 213-14.
186. See H.R. REP. No. 1084, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 290,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1801-66 (1983)).
187. See Murphy & Belsky, supra note 52, at 303.
188. See generally Murphy & Belsky, supra note 52.
189. See OCSLAA, supra note 94, at § 202 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §
1332 (1983)) (setting forth "National Policy for the Outer Continental Shelf" by
amendment of § 3 of the 1953 law).
190. See Jones, The Development of Outer Continental Shelf Energy Resources,
11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 9, 47 n.186 (1983).
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Congressional supporters of oceans programs have recognized this
inability to secure a comprehensive approach through legislation and
oversight. 9' They therefore sought a more informal mechanism to at
least make an attempt at such policy-making. Perhaps, if Congress
mandated that the agencies develop comprehensive plans and submit
regular reports, the federal government would "get its oceans act
together."'
1 92
D. Reports and Plans
As described above, ocean policy history up until the Stratton
Commission, and the environmental era that began almost immedi-
ately thereafter, is replete with studies and reports that have led to
advances in marine science and, later, policy.' 93 Since the Stratton
Report, however, Congress has been consistently frustrated by its in-
ability to force federal agencies, and itself, to coordinate ocean man-
agement, to set priorities in marine-related programs, and to develop
agendas for action in the future. 94 As an alternative, it has turned
to less-threatening coordinating and planning mechanisms, including
the idea of a Stratton II Commission to prepare reports that might
force action.
Use of reports as a coordinating mechanism has been only par-
tially effective. For example, in establishing NACOA, Congress
mandated that the Committee submit an annual report to review and
assess all ocean programs and make recommendations on the Na-
tional Ocean Program. 95 Similarly, in establishing the National
Oceans Policy Study, the Senate sought a means for reporting on the
problems of our ocean space and on proposed solutions.'9 8 While
both NACOA and NOPS did issue recommendations for oceans re-
191. See 1983 Ocean Policy Commission, supra note 94, at 11.
192. See D. BROOKS, supra note 35, at 230; see also 1987 Ocean Commission
Hearings, supra note 128, at 54-56 (statement of Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr.).
193. See supra notes 30, 64-75 and accompanying text (NAS 1927 study on ocean
policy and interest; NAS Study - Oceanography 1960-70; Navy Report - Ten Years of
Oceanography; 1960 House Report on Ocean Sciences and National Security; 1963 In-
teragency Report - Oceanography - The Ten Years Ahead); see also supra notes I-11,
83 (Stratton Commission).
194. See Statement of Hon. Gerry E. Studds, in 1987 Ocean Commission Hear-
ings, supra note 128, at 1-2.
195. See Abel, supra note 28, at 44; D. BROOKS, supra note 35, at 47; COMMERCE
OCEAN POLICY, supra note 15, at IX-14.
196. See S. REP. No. 685, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974); see also G. MANGONE,
supra note 21, at 298-99.
organization and better policy and management coordination,'97
most reports focused on particular policy issues and not on an overall
oceans strategy. 9"
In addition, as new ocean-related programs were established, en-
acting legislation required annual reports on the implementation of
statutory mandates. The focus was on the specific program, and spe-
cific program-related issues-not on an overall oceans policy or pro-
gram.199 The only real attempt at forcing coordination occurred in
the marine pollution area.
In 1978, Congress enacted the National Ocean Pollution Research
and Development and Monitoring Act of 1978200 (later retitled the
National Ocean Pollution Planning Act20'). Congress found a need
for a "comprehensive plan" for ocean pollution.20 2 To achieve this, it
required all federal agencies to submit their proposed pollution pro-
grams and budgets to a "lead agency"-NOAA. 20 3 NOAA, in turn,
was to report to Congress and the President with an inventory of
existing programs, an analysis of the success of these programs, and
recommendations on changes in the federal effort and on
coordination.20 4
This effort, limited though it was to pollution and not overall pol-
icy, could have formed a basis for developing at least a comprehen-
sive approach to ocean activities and the impact of these activities on
marine and coastal areas. In fact, the plan proposed by NOAA, as
required by the Act, did include an analysis of the federal effort and
responsibilities in waste disposal, mining, energy development, trans-
portation, coastal land use, and coastal and ocean pollutants.20 5
The requirements for reports and plans do serve a useful function.
They force agencies to get together and put down on paper informa-
tion that they otherwise might not collect. They also allow Congress
197. See, e.g., D. BROOKS, supra note 35, at 234 (noting a NACOA Report, Reor-
ganizing The Federal Effort In Oceanic And Atmospheric Affairs (1979)); Bleicher,
supra note 156, at 354-55 (citing a NOPS study on reorganization of ocean functions).
198. See, e.g., NACOA, FISHERIES FOR THE FUTURE (1980); Hearing Before the
National Ocean Policy Study of the Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
199. See, e.g., CZMA, supra note 94, at § 313; OCSLAA, supra note 94, at §§
314, 406.
200. National Ocean Pollution Research and Development and Monitoring Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-273, 92 Stat. 228 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1701-09 (1986)) [here-
inafter NOPPA].
201. National Ocean Pollution Planning Act, Pub. L. No. 96-255, 94 Stat. 420
(1980).
202. NOPPA, supra note 200, at § 2.
203. Id. at § 4(a).
204. See National Ocean Pollution Planning Reauthorization and Great Lakes
Pollution Act - H.R. 3600, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23 (1982) (statement of Martin H. Belsky) [hereinafter NOPPA
1982 Hearings].
205. See 1981 POLLUTION PLAN, supra note 103.
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and Executive office staff to see all programs as a unit and to see
agency priorities. They could serve as the mechanism for coordinated
action.20 6
However, mandates for reports and plans provide only the poten-
tial for overcoming ad hoc decision-making. For example, as could
be expected, the requirement of a pollution plan never led to real
coordination. Agencies assigned low-level staff to work on the pro-
gram and plan. They merely prepared their own pollution programs
and reported them to the Pollution Office in NOAA.2 °7 Recommen-
dations for action and for funding had to be cleared by the OMB
and never became a basis for a coordinated budget review and analy-
sis of the effectiveness of present funding and agency priorities. 0
The dream of congressional mandates forcing development of a
national oceans policy still exists. Representatives in both the Senate
and House have proposed legislation, held hearings, and, at least
twice, reported out bills on the establishment of a new National
Ocean Policy Commission that would develop recommendations on a
comprehensive national oceans policy. 0
The mandate of a new commission to set a national oceans agenda
is simply another effort, that must be added to all the previous ef-
forts described in this section, to elevate and coordinate ocean policy.
Whether such a commission would be more successful, and could
overcome the years of bureaucratic in-fighting in government and
the single-issue focus of the ocean constituency is yet to be
determined 10
While such an effort is certainly not harmful and could be helpful,
it will not successfully lead to an integrated approach to ocean is-
sues. Some legal action-forcing mechanism is required. Such a
mechanism could be a new international law mandate that has re-
cently evolved that requires a comprehensive ecosystem-based ap-
206. See NOPPA 1982 Hearings, supra note 204, at 37 (the author gave a similar
analysis in response to a question of whether requirement of a pollution plan can lead to
successful integration and policy-making).
207. During the author's tenure as NOAA Assistant Administrator for Policy and
Planning, the federal coordinating office, titled the National Marine Pollution Program
Office, was housed in that office. See NOPPA 1982 Hearings, supra note 204, at 23
(statement of Martin H. Belsky).
208. See 1981 POLLUTION PLAN, supra note 103, at 29-35.
209. 1983 Ocean Policy Commission, supra note 94, at 12; 1987 OCEAN COMMIS-
SION REPORT, supra note 165, at 16; see also COASTAL MGMT., Aug. 10, 1988, at 1, 7
(report on H.R. 5069, proposing a national ocean policy commission).
210. See, e.g., 1987 Ocean Commission Hearings, supra note 128, at 89 (state-
ment of opposition by Department of Interior); id. at 148 (statement by representative of
Sea Grant Association).
proach to the oceans.
IV. THE ECOSYSTEM MODEL
Marine scientists have long accepted that the ocean is a total re-
source system. This system consists of many species that interact. It
is affected by natural changes and by coastal and offshore activities
and the pollution that is caused by those activities."1' The pattern of
relationships between species and activities affecting the species and
their habitats is defined as an "ecosystem" 212 and the oceans consist
of a series of such ecosystems.21 3
An ecosystem model responds to these scientific truisms. It calls
for research and regulatory decisions that recognize this "pattern of
relationships." Studies must be made of the whole ecologic mosaic in
a region. Research must look: at the basic ecosystem structure; the
impact of pollution; the impact of exploitation of one species on
other species; and the effect of particular controls on pollution and
catch levels. The ecosystem model also means that integrated proce-
dures and standards must be established for the conservation and
exploitation of living resources and protection of the ocean space,
which is the habitat for these resources.
21 4
In other words, the premise of this model is simply a plea by
scientists for holistic or comprehensive research and management.21 5
211. Gordon, Management of Living Marine Resources: Challenge of the Future,
in CENTER FOR OCEAN MANAGEMENT STUDIES, UNIV. RHODE ISLAND, COMPARATIVE
MARINE POLICY 163-64 (1981); J. KINDT, MARINE POLLUTION AND THE LAW OF THE
SEA 144, 783 (1986); Teclaff & Teclaff, International Control of Cross-Media Pollu-
tion-An Ecosystem Approach, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 21 (1987).
212. T. HOBAN & R. BROOKS, GREEN JUSTICE: THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE
COURTS 5 (1987). Another similar definition of an ecosystem is that it "is a functional
unit of physical and biological organization with characteristic trophic structure and ma-
terial cycles, some degree of internal homogeneity, and recognizable boundaries." Lie,
Marine Ecosystems: Research and Management, in MANAGING THE OCEAN: RESOURCES,
RESEARCH, LAW 311, 312 (J. Richardson ed. 1985) (quoting E. Odum, The Emergence
of Ecology as a New Discipline, 195 SCIENCE 1289-93 (1977)). It consists of both living
and nonliving elements. Lie, supra, at 312.
213. See, e.g., Sherman, Grosslein, Mountain, Busch, O'Reilly & Theroux, The
Continental Shelf Ecosystem off The Northeast Coast of the United States, in 27
NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE FOR SEA RESEARCH, ECOSYSTEMS OF THE WORLD: CONTINEN-
TAL SHELVES (1988).
214. See Lie, supra note 212, at 325; Yuru, Amassing Scientific Knowledge to
Preserve the Marine Environment, in MANAGING THE OCEAN: RESOURCES, RESEARCH,
LAW, supra note 212, at 126-27; R. Roe, The Management of Interjurisdictional Fisher-
ies, Proceedings, University of Delaware, Center for Marine Science, "Coastal States are
Ocean States" 33, 34 (Apr. 1-3, 1987); A. SPRINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
POLLUTION 89 (1983)(establishment of "ecostandards"); see, e.g., NATIONAL OCEANIC
AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, NOAA FISHERY MANAGEMENT STUDY 16 (1986)
(study conducted by NOAA, the parent administration responsible for fisheries manage-
ment and coordination of marine pollution research, monitoring, and assessment); 1981
POLLUTION PLAN, supra note 103, at 106-09.
215. Frye, Book Review, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 653 (1986) (reviewing VARIABIL-
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Yet, until recently, these pleas had gone unanswered. Just as the ad
hoc approach dominated the historical development of United States
ocean policy, the ecosystem or comprehensive approach to marine
policy and the actions to implement that policy were historically re-
jected by other nations and the international community.
16
A. Traditional International Law and the Comprehensive Model
The refusal by nation-states and the international community to
accept a comprehensive approach to ocean policy was premised on
traditional international law doctrines. National sovereignty was to
be the primary basis for legal rules and the institutions to enforce
those rules.21 7 Nation-states had the unilateral power to decide what
and how activities were to be conducted in their own territory, 18 and
how resources within their sovereign territory were managed.219
Rules for activities, including exploitation of resources, beyond na-
tional sovereignty had to be established by each nation-state for its
own nationals or flag vehicles,22 0 or by international agreement or
consensus.
2 21
Under these principles, the ocean areas adjacent to a country's
coast were part of that country's territory, and therefore each nation
ITY AND MANAGEMENT OF LARGE MARINE ECOSYSTEMS (K. Sherman and L. Alexander
eds. 1986)); see Byrne, Large Marine Ecosystems and the Future of Ocean Studies: A
Perspective, in VARIABILITY AND MANAGEMENT OF LARGE MARINE ECOSYSTEMS, supra
note 12, at 300.
216. See Friedheim, Ocean Ecology and the World Political System, in WHO
PROTECTS THE OCEAN? 151-53 (J. Hargrove ed. 1975); Carroll & Mack, On Living To-
gether in North America: Canada, The United States and International Environmental
Relations, 12 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 35, 35-37 (1982) (U.S./Canada handling of
transnational pollution problems based on ad hoc approach).
217. M. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (1988); M. SHAW,
supra note 61, at 6.
218. The classic exposition of this rule of international law can be found in The
S.S. Lotus Case (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 18-19:
Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a
state is that-failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary-it may
not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this
sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State
outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from interna-
tional custom or from a convention.
219. Bilder, International Law and Natural Resources Policies, 20 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 451, 453 (1980); Oda, Fisheries Under the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 739, 739 (1983).
220. This is the so-called "nationality principle." It includes natural and juridical
persons and vessels, aircraft, and space craft registered in the state. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 119, at § 402 comments e & h.
221. See Statute of International Court of Justice, art. 38(1).
had the exclusive right to design and enforce its own laws for that
area. 222 The areas beyond coastal waters, called "high seas," were
res nullius, belonging to no one,223 and were to be regulated only by
controls placed by a particular nation on its own citizens or
vessels.224
Of course, the nations of the world could voluntarily agree, either
through treaty or accepted custom, to establish rules for their terri-
tory or nationals and flag vessels.2 25 However, until the 1960s, na-
tion-states exercised their "sovereign" -territorial rights and high seas
freedoms with little consideration of environmental risks or conse-
quences.226 Environmental assessment, conservation, and pollution
were not major concerns.227 Neither were cooperation with other
countries and the sharing and protection of common resources.22s As
a result, there were few national or international rules governing the
oceans and coasts.229
As described earlier, a new environmental awareness emerged in
the late 1960s that led a number of nations, including the United
States, to adopt laws, regulations, and policies to control overex-
ploitation of living marine resources and to limit pollution of the
ocean space adjacent to their coasts.230 The policies established and
the rules to implement those policies were, however, "problem-ori-
ented" and singularly focused. Separate policies and regulations
were developed for different types of pollution problems and separate
management regimes were established for particular species.23'
222. See Knight, supra note 60, at 1-3.
223. MacRae, supra note 29, at 187, 195-96.
224. See United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933); Lauritzen v. Larson, 345
U.S. 571 (1953).
225. See The S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. at 19.
226. See Comment, An Environmental Assessment of Emerging International
Fisheries Doctrine, 4 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 143, 144 (1977).
227. T. HOBAN & R. BROOKS, supra note 212, at 5. Each nation-state believed
that "growth" was the key to future success and thus resources were to be exploited to
the maximum. Comment, supra note 226, at 144-45.
228. Nation-states were possessive of the resources in their own coastal areas and
of the rights of their nationals to exploit resources in the high seas. See D.
VANDERZWAAG, THE FISH FEUD 41-43 (1983); see also Wenk, Global Principles for
National Marine Policies: A Challenge for the Future, in CENTER FOR OCEAN MANAGE-
MENT STUDIES, UNIv. RHODE ISLAND COMPARATIVE MARINE POLICY 4-5 (1981); Chap-
man, Fishery Resources in Offshore Waters, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: OFFSHORE
BOUNDARIES AND ZONES 87, 95 (L. Alexander ed. 1967); Friedheim, supra note 216, at
171-79.
229. See Young, supra note 38, at 199; Carroz, Institutional Aspects of Fishery
Management Under the New Regime of the Oceans, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 513, 514-15
(1984).
230. Belsky - 1985 SAN DIEGO, supra note 12, at 740-42.
231. Domestic legislation was enacted on an "as perceived as needed" basis. D.
BROOKS, supra note 35, at 8-9. Government officials were reluctant to act unless there
was concrete evidence of a problem, combined with clear public sentiment for restric-
tions. Walsh, The Political Context, in CENTER FOR OCEAN MANAGEMENT STUDIES,
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This ad hoc approach also prevailed at the multinational and in-
ternational level. The international community had recognized as
early as the 1950s the need for some cooperative action to handle
and control transnational and high seas pollution and resource
problems. 32 However, this recognition was tempered by each na-
tion's desire to protect the access of its citizens to the ocean space,
and by its concerns about establishing restrictions that could affect
its territorial sovereignty. 33
Thus early agreements were minimal in scope.2 34 Later, broader
agreements2 35 were still focused on particular problems and left eco-
systems largely unregulated. 3 6 While the number of supra-national
agreements seems impressive, in fact their impact is unimpressive.
The organizations set up to operate these agreements had insufficient
authority, and individual nations were often unwilling to cooperate
fully in practice. 37
B. Developing the Policy Basis for the Comprehensive Approach
The early and limited attempts at a national and international re-
sponse to ocean policy and management formed the basis for broader
national and multinational ocean policies and doctrines. Laws and
policies were being implemented: (1) to require assessment and mon-
itoring of the impact of development and other activities; (2) to pro-
vide more stringent controls over marine pollution; (3) to require
plans for protection of the coasts and adjacent waters; and (4) to
mandate reconciliation of conflicting uses of the ocean space. 38
UNIV. RHODE ISLAND IMPACT OF MARINE POLLUTION ON SOCIETY 3 (1982). When they
did act, they responded with separate rules to control dumping, land-based discharges,
vessel pollution, and offshore activities. When they decided on limits to overfishing, they
set up regulatory schemes on a species-by-species basis. See Belsky - 1985 SAN DIEGO,
supra note 12, at 740-42.
232. R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 23, at 216 (pollution); Carroz, supra
note 229, at 515-16 (fisheries).
233. Comment, supra note 226, at 143-44; Young, supra note 38, at 200.
234. Friedheim, supra note 216, at 153-59.
235. R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 23, at 200-05 (fisheries), 216-22
(pollution).
236. Carroz, supra note 229, at 514-15.
237. Young, supra note 38, at 201; Carroll & Mack, supra note 216, at 38; Jacob-
son, supra note 61, at 1170.
238. See Gold, The Control of Marine Pollution From Ships: Responsibilities and
Rights, in LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE, THE LAW OF THE SEA: WHAT LIES AHEAD? 279
(T. Clingan ed. 1988) (Proceedings of the 20th Annual Conference of the Law of the
Sea Institute, July 21-24, 1986); see also Sun, Environmental Awakening in the Soviet
Union, 241 SCIENCE 1033, 1034 (1988) (Soviet Union considering "comprehensive set of
environmental laws" that look to ecological protection). See generally Lutz, The Laws of
Nation-states also desired to secure broader international rights to
resources beyond their traditional limited territorial seas and to con-
trol activities in extended areas beyond their coastal waters. This led
to unilateral claims to hydrocarbons and living marine resources in
"exclusive economic zones" as far out as 200 miles from each na-
tion's coasts.2 39 These claims, and the domestic statutes that followed
these claims, were accompanied by concerns about foreign exploita-
tion and domestic and foreign overexploitation. Further, these claims
led to rules and restrictions on development of mineral resources' 4"
and harvesting of both endangered and commercial species.24'
Through this process, more of the ocean space came under individ-
ual nation-state control. Thus, fewer resources and activities re-
mained unregulated in international waters. By the 1980s, it was es-
timated that thirty-eight percent of the oceans, over ninety percent
of the potential commercially exploitable fish stocks, and eighty-
seven percent of offshore hydrocarbons existed within the collective
exclusive economic zone of all nations.' 2
These expanded zones also increased the number of overlapping
jurisdictional claims and the potential for conflict between adjacent
coastal states. Nation-states sought access to, and conservation of,
shared resources for their present and future citizens.243 They also
recognized the need to minimize adverse impacts on their coasts and
adjacent ocean space from activities of nearby states.244
Cooperative action was thus essential to avoid conflicts and assure
access and future use of resources. Nation-states became more will-
ing to negotiate broader pollution agreements, establish international
environmental standards, and consider new resource management
strategies. 45
A major impact of this new broadened nation-state responsibility
Environmental Management: A Comparative Study, 24 AM. J. COMP. L. 447 (1976).
239. Pinto, Emerging Concepts of the Law of the Sea: Some Social and Cultural
Impacts, in MANAGING THE OCEAN: RESOURCES, RESEARCH, LAW, supra note 212, at
301. See generally MacRae, supra note 29, at 210.
240. See, e.g., OCSLAA, supra note 94.
241. Young, supra note 38, at 202; see also Copes, Marine Fisheries Management
in Canada: Policy Objectives and Development Constraints, in CENTER FOR OCEAN
MANAGEMENT STUDIES, COMPARATIVE MARINE POLICY 136 (1981); Farnell, EEC Fish-
eries Management Policy, in CENTER FOR OCEAN MANAGEMENT STUDIES, COMPARATIVE
MARINE POLICY, supra, at 140; Gordon, supra note 211, at 146. While the major pur-
pose of most of these laws was to provide exclusive access for a particular nation's citi-
zens to the resources off that country's coasts, these laws also included detailed provisions
for the protection of fisheries and their habitats. See Young, supra note 38, at 207.
242. R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, supra note 23, at 126.
243. See D. VANDERZWAAG, supra note 228, at 95-98.
244. See Comment, Compensating Private Parties for Transnational Pollution In-
jury, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 528, 528-33 (1984).
245. See Boczek, The Concept of Regime and the Protection of the Marine Envi-
ronment, 6 OCEAN Y.B. 271, 282-87 (1986).
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for ocean policies and management was consideration of a compre-
hensive approach to the oceans. A new environmental sensitivity was
developing among the public. This sensitivity focused on the scien-
tific consensus that the oceans could not continue to be managed on
an ad hoc basis. A new ocean policy, and domestic laws and interna-
tional agreements to implement this policy, must address the interac-
tion of pollution and resource management.246
Faced with this increased public concern about the need for envi-
ronmental protection, and with increased obligations over a broader
patrimonial sea, government officials in many nations began to look
at the connection between environmental and resource management
programs. 47 Extended jurisdiction made it more likely that an
ecosystem or large parts of an ecosystem were within one nation's
ocean space. Regulators began to recognize the impact of exploita-
tion of one resource over others and the cumulative impact of indi-
vidual policies on the whole ecological mosaic.248
Jurisdictional overlaps, the desire to assure access to shared re-
sources, and the need for multinational cooperation necessitated con-
sideration of a comprehensive approach. Transnational resources also
existed in ecosystems, and efforts to control activities and exploit
shared and open seas resources had to take that scientific fact into
account. 49
As a result, international practice soon paralleled that of individ-
ual nations. In reviewing their common international obligations, the
nations of the world accepted a duty to cooperate in the use of re-
sources in order to avoid harm. 5° Multinational agreements and pol-
icies soon focused on a shared responsibility to take a comprehensive
246. T. HOBAN AND R. BROOKS, supra note 212, at 6-7; E. BORGESE, THE FUTURE
OF THE OCEANS: A REPORT TO THE CLUB OF ROME 2 (1986); Levy, Towards an Inte-
grated Marine Policy in Developing Countries, 12 MARINE POL'Y 326, 328 (1988). A
common public expression of this need for a comprehensive approach was the need to
avoid the "tragedy of the commons." An otherwise "rational being" seeks only to maxi-
mize his or her own gain and thus increases his or her own exploitation of resources and
his or her own discharge of pollutants. These individual actions are taken without regard
to their cumulative and comprehensive adverse effects. Hardin, Tragedy of the Com-
mons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968).
247. See Wolf, On the Brink of Extinction: Conserving the Diversity of Life, 78
WORLDWATCH PAPER 39-41 (June 1987) (nation-states are using data about ecosystems
in development plans); S. LYSTER, INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 299 (1985) (wildlife
treaties now premised on role species play in the ecosystems in which they occur); see,
e.g., Levy, supra note 246, at 332 (India), 334 (Sri Lanka).
248. See Gordon, supra note 211, at 163-64.
249. Lie, supra note 212, at 325.
250. See Bilder, supra note 219, at 459 (describing art. 3 of the U.N. Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States).
look at the ocean space.25 In establishing joint arrangements for
transboundary pollution or resource management, countries adopted
requirements that considered the environmental impact of particular
activities. 52
By the late 1970s, the international rhetoric had changed from one
of unlimited nation-state authority and power to one of "responsible
stewardship. ' 253 A comprehensive approach was accepted as sound
national and international policy, but was it binding on nation-states
as law? The next section of this article reviews the bases for the
establishment of new international law rules, traces the emergence of
the comprehensive approach as a legal doctrine, and concludes that a
comprehensive ecosystem approach to ocean management and policy
is now binding international law.
C. Developing a New Rule of International Law
Municipal laws are established by the legislatures or political ex-
ecutives of each nation-state.254 International law is not promulgated
or enforced by any worldwide legislature or agency. 5 Rather, it is
established and enforced by the nations of the world, either individu-
ally or collectively. 56
The "rules" of international law develop informally.5 7 They result
from explicit or implicit acceptance by the international community
of nations.258 This acceptance is shown by: (1) international conven-
tions; (2) the practice of nations-or custom; and (3) acceptance by
251. Bilateral and multilateral agreements that separately dealt with unique
marine resource or pollution problems were recognized as only the first step. See Goldie,
International Maritime Environmental Law Today - An Appraisal, in WHO PROTECTS
THE OCEANS 121 (L. Hargrove ed. 1975). The community of nations accepted and
adopted the arguments of scientists that the oceans were unique international resources
and thus the responsiblity of the world community. See Speranskaya, Marine Environ-
mental Protection and Freedom of Navigation in International Law, 6 OCEAN Y.B. 197
(1986).
252. See Miller, The Earth's Living Terrestrial Resources: Managing Their Con-
servation, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION 240, 245,
249-50, 257-60 (1983); McCaffrey, The Work of the International Law Commission
Relating to the Environment, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 189, 189 n.4 (1983); see, e.g., Carroll &
Mack, supra note 216, at 37 (program for research and monitoring in Great Lakes"ecosystem"); see also Boczek, supra note 245, at 282 (trend towards more comprehen-
sive regimes); Lutz, supra note 238, at 492 n.230 (growing acceptance of international
assessment approaches).
253. See, e.g., Johnson, Comments on Stewardship, in COASTAL STATES ORGANI-
ZATION, FINAL REPORT - OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC POLICY ISSUES OF THE 1980's -
THE ROLE OF THE NOAA ORGANIC ACT 159 (1980).
254. See L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 24-25 (1968).
255. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 119, ch. 1 introductory note at 17.
256. See M. SHAW, supra note 61, at 6.
257. See Reisman, The Teaching of International Law in the Eighties, 20 INT'L
LAW. 987, 991 (1986); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 119, ch. 1, introductory note
at 19.
258. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 119, § 102 (1).
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the world community as a general principle of law.25
An international convention is binding between the parties to that
convention but might also indicate an accepted state practice or cus-
tom when such agreements, or the activities of nations in preparing
that treaty, indicate wide acceptance by the world community. 60
State practice, or custom, may be shown not only by a pattern of
state behavior, but also by seemingly inconsistent acts, when the na-
tion-state seeks to justify such behavior as in accord with the rule.2 61
A "general principle" of law may be shown by looking at the laws
of the major legal systems of the world for common concepts; 62 but,
like custom, it must be a doctrine that is accepted as a binding inter-
national obligation. 3 In fact, a principle common to the major legal
systems may evolve into a customary rule or form the basis for a
treaty codification." 4
One or more of these sources may form the basis 65 for showing
acceptance by the world community of a legal obligation and thus a
rule of law.2 66 Proof through these sources of the existence of a rule
of international law is often difficult and complex. 67 Except for
259. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1); see also RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 119, § 102.
260. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 119, § 102(3); International Law As-
sociation, American Branch, Report of the Committee on the Formation of Customary
Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN BRANCH, PROCEEDINGS 106-07
(1987-88) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS].
261. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 260, at 108.
262. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 119, § 102 reporter's note 7.
263. The distinction between a customary rule and general principle of law is not
always clear. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 260, at I10-
11. In fact, some argue that a general principle means merely a principle, whether devel-
oped by domestic state practice or not, that is accepted by nation-states as customary
international law. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 119, § 102 reporter's note 7.
264. RESTATEMENT (THIRD). supra note 119, § 102 reporter's notes 5 & 7. One
commentator has called general principles of law "gap fillers" that substantiate determi-
nations of customary international law by establishing inherent norms that can be
changed by nation-states by protest or argreement. See M. JANIS, supra note 217, at 49;
see also M. SHAW, supra note 61, at 81-84; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 119, §
102 comment 1.
265. A new rule of international law may be based on more than one of these
sources. See M. JANIS, supra note 217, at 4.
266. Whether through treaty or custom, or even state practice, an international
law doctrine only exists if it is accepted as opinio juris - that is, that states accept the
rule out of sense of legal obligation. See McDougal & Reisman, The Prescribing Func-
tion in the World Constitutive Process: How International Law is Made, in M. McDou-
GAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS 362-65 (1981). Opinio juris may, of
course, be inferred from acts or omissions. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 119, § 102
comment C.
267. See L. HENKIN, supra note 254, at 25.
those cases where a multilateral treaty is accepted by all nations of
the world, rules of international law do not suddenly occur, but
rather, crystallize.2"'
The process of discerning whether a new rule exists is often the
result of articulation of the new rule and its sources in judicial deci-
sions by national and international courts, the writing of scholars,
and individual or collective pronouncements of governments. 6 9
For example, decisions by respected jurists in some nation-states,
and by international courts and tribunals, can often bring a rule out
of "twilight existence" 270 by either restating it or even creating it.271
Similarly, the writing of scholars or "publicists" is often a means for
nation-states, courts, and other scholars, to show that there is a con-
sensus that a rule of international law exists. 2
Finally, nation-state acceptance of a rule of law can be shown by
words, even without action. Even if a treaty is not ratified by a na-
tion-state, the legal rules in that treaty may become customary law
when representatives of nation-states indicate that the treaty merely"codifies" existing law or argue that some of the principles in that
draft convention "express consensus" of the international community
on a rule of law. 73
Similarly, the nature of the legal and political arguments made by
a nation-state can indicate acceptance of a norm or rule of interna-
tional law. Custom can be established by "legal practice," consisting
of the claims and arguments of states in the context of concrete dis-
268. Even with generally accepted multinational treaties, only some "make new
law." Many seek to codify and crystallize emerging customary law. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 119, § 102 comment f.
269. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 119, § 103(2).
270. New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361 (1934) (Cardozo, J.).
271. M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, supra note 266, at 369.
272. The International Court of Justice includes the "teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists" as "subsidiary means" for the determination of rules of law. Statute,
International Court of Justice, art. 38(l)(d). Thus, the more respected the group of
scholars, and the more they agree, the more likely their opinion that the rule exists will
be accepted. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 119, § 103 reporter's note 1; M.
SHAW, supra note 61, at 89. See generally, Lachs, Teachers and Teaching of Interna-
tional Law, 151 REC. DES COURS 163-252 (1976-III).
273. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 260, at
106; Charney, International Agreements and the Development of Customary Interna-
tional Law, 61 WASH. L. REV. 971, 983 (1986); Sohn, "Generally Accepted" Interna-
tional Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1073, 1074 (1986) [hereinafter Sohn, Washington Arti-
cle]. Professor Sohn argues that multilateral negotiations on a treaty can lead to the
establishment of a rule of customary international law. When a rule is agreed to at such
a multinational conference, the new norm is presumed to be binding as custom once a
number of interested states behave in conformity with the rule. In effect, the agreement
by the nation-states at the conference establishes a "consensus" that a rule of custom-
ary law exists. See Sohn, The Law of the Sea: Customary International Law Develop-
ments, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 271, 279 (1985) [hereinafter Sohn, American University Arti-
cle]; see, e.g., Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of
Maine Area (Canada v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 294 para. 94.
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putes. Even if actual practice is inconsistent with an alleged rule, if
the action is politically justified as being in accord with the rule, or
an exception to the general rule, it is indicative of the emergence of
that rule into binding custom. 27
4
Joint statements of nation-states, through United Nations Decla-
rations or Resolutions, can also be proof of the existence of a rule of
international law.27 5 Some statements by the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly or U.N. Specialized Agencies purport to declare ex-
isting international law. The more nations that vote for or acknowl-
edge the Declaration or Resolution as stating the law, the more
likely that the rules in those documents are, in fact, customary inter-
national law.2  In other cases, Declarations or Resolutions can "cre-
ate" new norms when they are passed by large majorities as they
can, in certain instances, indicate an "instant" intention by these na-
tions-and thus a "state practice"-to be bound by these new
norms.2 7
7
The next part of this article will look at these sources of interna-
tional law and the various methods to prove that a rule of interna-
tional law exists. Using these standards and tests, it will show that
the ecosystem model has evolved into a new and binding legal doc-
trine. This evolution has been recently confirmed by the acceptance
of a new international "oceans policy" as expressed in the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).278
274. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS, supra note 260, at 107;
see, e.g., id. at 108 (citing the decision of the International Court of Justice in The
Nicaragua Case, Merits, para. 186 (1986)). When nation-states seek to justify their ac-
tions as being in accord with a norm of international law, even if it, in fact, is not that
state's "practice," this helps to confirm the existence of that particular rule. State prac-
tice can be shown not only by what nations do, but also by what they say. M. AKEHURST,
A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (3d ed. 1977).
275. Sohn, American University Article, supra note 273, at 278; see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 119, § 103 reporter's note 2.
276. M. AKEHURST, supra note 274, at 34; Schachter, Resolutions of the General
Assembly as Evidence of Law, 178 REC. DES COURS 110, 114-21 (1982-V) (question of
intent of adherents).
277. M. SHAW, supra note 61, at 91; McDougal and Reisman, supra note 266, at
363; see, e.g., Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (series of United
Nations General Assembly Resolutions indicates that the right of self-determination for
non-self-governing territories had become a norm of international law).
278. See Reagan Ocean Statement, supra note 108 (UNCLOS, except for provi-
sions on mining, states governing oceans policy); see Boczek, supra note 119, at 393
(UNCLOS codifies for the oceans general environmental law principles--especially as
they are related to a comprehensive obligation to protect the marine environment).
D. Evolving International Law and the Ecosystem Model
As described above, nation-states have recognized the inter-con-
nected nature of oceans policy and the need to coordinate separate
policies on an ecosystem basis to assure both maximum protection of
their oceans and coasts and the future continued exploitation of the
oceans resources. They have been moving in their actual state prac-
tice toward applying this ecosystem approach. 7 9
This individual practice has been confirmed by the collective ac-
tions of nation-states in evolving new rules of state responsibility
generally, and in specific United Nations resolutions and reports and
multilateral agreements applying this responsibility to the environ-
ment and the ecosystem model.
Nation-states accept a new obligation to prevent harm to their
own environment and resources, and also harm to the environment of
other nation-states and to adjacent and shared resources.280 They
also accept as binding customary law an obligation of rational and
equitable utilization of their resources.281 Prevention of harm and
"rational and equitable use," of course, mean that resources and uses
must be studied and managed in a comprehensive manner.2"2
In 1972, the United Nations General Assembly accepted this mul-
tinational responsibility and endorsed2 83 a Declaration and Principles
and Recommendations prepared that year by the United Nations
279. Boczek, supra note 245, at 290; see Lutz, supra note 238, at 450 (trend by
nation-states toward comprehensive environmental management institutions premised on
"ecological control," citing references to ocean and pollution); see, e.g., R. Roe, supra
note 214, at 33 (representative of U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service states that
"our goal should be to provide an ecosystem-wide management program for fish and
other living marine resources"); Levy, supra note 246, at 341-42 (governments adopting
different approaches to coordinating and integrating marine policies).
280. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Canada), 3 U.N. Rep. Int. Arb. Awards 1911,
1965 (1941) (air pollution); see Bilder, supra note 219, at 459-60; Goldie, Equity and
the International Management of Transboundary Resources, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 665,
675, 698 (1985); see e.g., Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, art. 3, G.A.
Res. No. 3281, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 252, 255 (1975).
281. See Handl, National Uses of Transboundary Air Resources: The Interna-
tional Entitlement Issue Reconsidered, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 405, 410-11 (1986);
Handl, The Principle of 'Equitable Use' As Applied to Internationally Shared Natural
Resources: Its Role in Resolving Potential International Disputes over Transboundary
Pollution, 14 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INT'L 40, 44-45, 52-53 (1978); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 119, §§ 601, 602; see also Szekely, Tuna in the Eastern Tropical
Pacific, in LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE, THE LAW OF THE SEA: WHAT LIES AHEAD? 179
(T. Clingan ed. 1988) (Proceedings of the 20th Annual Conference of the Law of the
Sea Institute, July 21-24, 1986) (doctrine applicable to oceans); Bilder, supra note 219,
at 459-60 (analyzing doctrine applicable to resource management and coastal pollution).
282. See Harville, State-Federal Interactions for Management of Shared Fisher-
ies Resources, in COASTAL STATES ORGANIZATION, FINAL REPORT - OCEANIC AND AT-
MOSPHERIC POLICY ISSUES IN THE 1980's - THE ROLE OF THE NOAA ORGANIC ACT 138
(1980); White, Environment, 209 SCIENCE 183, 187 (1980).
283. G.A. Res. 2994, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 42, U.N. Doc. A/8730
(1972).
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Conference on the Environment held in Stockholm (Stockholm
Declaration) .284
The Stockholm Declaration assumed that "to achieve [the interna-
tional goal of preserving and protecting the environment], govern-
ments and peoples [must] exert common efforts for the preservation
and improvement of the human environment."2 85 Through this Dec-
laration, the international community stressed the fact that every-
thing is part of an interdependent system, and that pollution and
resource management are inextricably intertwined.2"8
Nation-states have the individual obligation to "safeguard and
wisely manage, 28 7 and to "take all possible steps to prevent pollu-
tion."2 a To satisfy these obligations "to achieve a more rational
management of resources and thus to improve the environment, [na-
tions must] adopt an integrated and coordinated approach to their
development planning so as to ensure [compatibility] with the need
to protect and improve the human environment ... ."28
Nation-states also have a collective responsibility. "States have, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the princi-
ples of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own re-
sources . . . and the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment
of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion."2 ' To fulfill this responsibility, they must take steps, by "co-
operation through multilateral or bilateral arrangements or other ap-
propriate means . . . to effectively control, prevent, reduce and
eliminate adverse environmental effects ... 291
The premise of the Stockholm Declaration and later United Na-
tions Resolutions, and bilateral and multilateral treaties,2 92 is that
284. Declaration of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 48/14, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declara-
tion]; see Bilder, supra note 219, at 460; Comment, Transboundary Pollution From
Mexico: Is Judicial Relief Provided by International Principles of Tort Law?, 10 Hous-
TON J. INT'L L. 105, 111-12 (1987).
285. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 284, at 1416, preamble 7.
286. See Smith, The United Nations and the Environment: Sometimes a Great
Notion?, 19 TEx. INT'L L. REV. 335, 338 (1984).
287. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 284, principle 4.
288. Id. principle 7.
289. Id. principle 13.
290. Id. principle 21.
291. Id. principle 24.
292. See Bilder, supra note 219, at 460-63 (discussing Draft Principles of the
United Nations Environmental Program of 1978 and various treaties); International Law
Association, Report of the 52d Conference, Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of
this cooperative approach must be based on the ecosystem model.
Thus, the Declaration states: "The natural resources of the earth in-
cluding the air, water, land, flora and fauna and especially represen-
tative samples of natural ecosystems must be safeguarded for the
benefit of present and future generations .. . ."'I' In a later Draft
World Charter for Nature, the United Nations General Assembly
reaffirmed this thesis when it called for the actions by the commu-
nity of nation-states and their citizens to be conducted in such a way
so as not to threaten the "integrity of the ecosystems and organisms
with which they coexist."294
Evidence of the emergence of this new mandate for a comprehen-
sive ecosystem approach can be found in recent multilateral agree-
ments.2 15 Under the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of
Antarctic Living Marine Resources, for example, management is
based on a total ecosystem conservation standard.2" 6 In addition, the
Convention requires signatory states to conduct their affairs so as to
minimize risks to the Antarctic marine ecosystem. 9 7
Similarly, the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties are now in
the final stages of submitting a Convention for the management and
exploitation of Antarctica's nonliving resources. The most recent
drafts of proposed elements of this Convention are premised on
maintenance of the conservation elements, including the ecosystem
standard, of the living resource Convention.2 98
Finally, in the recent Convention for the Protection of the Natural
Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region, the nations
of the South Pacific Region "recognized" the special ecological na-
ture of the region and the potential threat to the "ecological equilib-
rium" of that region. They agreed in their domestic laws and in their
International Rivers 477 (Aug. 20, 1966); Annex I, Background and Objectives, % 15,
Agreement on the Action Plan for the Environmentally Sound Management of the Com-
mon Zambezi River System (May 28, 1987), Botawana-Mozambique-Tanzania-Zambia-
Zimbabwe, 27 I.L.M. 1109 (1988) (plan for management must be for "whole [Zambezi]
River System") [hereinafter Zambezi River Treaty].
293. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 284, principle 2.
294. On October 30, 1980, the United Nations General Assembly adopted, without
vote, a Resolution calling for a Draft World Charter for Nature. G.A. Res. 35/7, 35
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1980), reprinted in 20 I.L.M.
462 (1980); see Smith, supra note 286, at 341.
295. See Zambezi River Treaty, supra note 292; Boczek, supra note 119, at 375-
76, 394; Joyner, Antarctica and the Law of the Sea: An Introductory Overview, 13
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 277, 281 (1983); Oxman, Antarctica and the New Law of the
Sea, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 211, 233 (1986).
296. Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Living Marine Resources, May
7, 1980, preamble & art. 11 (3), T.I.A.S. No. 8826, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 841 (1980).
297. Id. at arts. V, XXI, XXII.
298. See Laughlin, The Antarctic Treaty System as a Conservation System, paper
presented at the Center for Oceans Law and Policy Seminar, "The Polar Regions" 9-10
(1987); see also Joyner, The Southern Ocean and Marine Pollution: Problems and Pros-
pects, 17 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 165, 185-89 (1985).
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international arrangements to "take all appropriate measures" to
"control pollution . . . and to ensure sound environmental manage-
ment and development of natural resources."2 99
This language, though not using the exact words, is the ecosystem
model. By including this language, the signatories of the South Pa-
cific Region Convention, like those of the Antarctic Conventions, as-
sume that the ecosystem model is in accordance with international
law.3
00
Legal scholars, looking at this individual and collective state prac-
tice, argue that their long existing preference for a comprehensive
ecosystem approach to the oceans is now the evolved rule of interna-
tional law. They point to UNCLOS as proof that the evolution is
complete.3 1'
E. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Perhaps, the strongest support for a new international law man-
date of comprehensive ocean ecosystem management can be found in
the text of UNCLOS. Under the 1982 Convention, nation-states
have a general "obligation to protect and preserve the marine envi-
ronment."302 They are individually and collectively responsible for
their ocean space, and, with other nations, responsible for all the
world's seas.303
Each nation is to control activities in its ports, its coastal areas,
and its exclusive economic zone. It also must control the activities of
299. Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of
the South Pacific Region, Nov. 25, 1986, arts. 4(l), 5(l), 26 I.L.M. 38 (1987).
300. The Convention explicitly states that actions must be "in conformity with in-
ternational law." The inherent assumption is that by providing for comprehensive coordi-
nate pollution and resource management-the ecosystem approach-they are acting with
such conformity. See id. at arts. 5(1), 5(4).
301. See Speranskaya, supra note 251, at 197-98; Oxman, supra note 295, at 233;
Sohn, Implications of the Law of the Sea Convention Regarding the Protection and
Preservation of the Marine Environment, in LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE, THE DEVELOP-
ING ORDER OF THE OCEANS 105 (1984); Levy, supra note 246, at 326; see also Van
Dyke & Heftel, Tuna Management in the Pacific: An Analysis of the South Pacific
Forum Fisheries Agency, 3 U. HAW. L. REv. 1, 53-55 (1981) (UNCLOS requirements
for comprehensive management mandate coordinated management for all species in re-
gional fisheries agreements).
302. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at art. 192; see Gold, supra note 238, at 285; Juda,
The Exclusive Economic Zone: Compatibility of National Claims and the UN Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, 16 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 1, 39 (1986).
303. See Pardo, The Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Preliminary Appraisal,
20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 489, 490 (1983); Sohn, supra note 301, at 108; Speranskaya,
supra note 251, at 198.
its nationals and vessels in all ocean areas.3°4 These responsibilities
include obligations to minimize and control pollution. 30 5 They also
include an obligation to manage fisheries on an ecosystem model-in
order to avoid overexploitation, to adequately consider the environ-
mental impacts on habitats, and to sufficiently consider the interrela-
tionships of species. 30
Specifically, the provisions for management of the living resources
of the sea adopt the "maximum sustainable yield" standard, but say
that this standard has to be qualified by "relevant environmental and
economic factors," and to take into account the "interdependence of
stocks. ' 307 In addition, nation-states, in managing specific resources,
must "take into consideration the effects on species associated with
or dependent upon harvested species with a view to maintaining or
restoring populations of such associated or dependent species above
levels at which their reproduction may become seriously
threatened." 308 Finally, the Convention requires nation-states to in-
clude in pollution measures all those "necessary to protect and pre-
serve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted,
threatened or endangered species and other forms of marine life." 30 9
All of the provisions of the Convention are intended to be read as
a whole.310 When read in such a manner, the provisions, as described
above, provide for the "ecosystem approach."311
UNCLOS requires that its provisions be implemented in domestic
laws and in bilateral and multilateral treaties and other cooperative
arrangements.312 Thus, for those nations that have ratified UN-
CLOS, a comprehensive approach is mandated." 3
304. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at arts. 218 (ports), 220 (coasts), 56 (EEZ), 94
(obligation of flag state for vessels on the high seas), 211 (pollution from vessels), 217
(enforcement of standards by flag states against vessels), 117-18 (obligation over nation-
als for fishing). For a provision-by-provision analysis of the relevant articles of the Con-
vention applicable to these requirements, see Sohn, supra note 301, at 106-08.
305. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at arts. 194, 207, 210.
306. Id. at arts. 61 (EEZ), 63 (shared stocks), 64 (highly migratory species), 65
(marine mammals), 66 (anadromous stocks), 67 (catadromous species), 117-20 (high
seas).
307. See, e.g., id. at art. 61(3).
308. Id. at art. 61(4).
309. Id. at art. 194(5).
310. See id. at preamble: "The States Parties to this Convention . . . [c]onscious
that the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a
whole . .. ."
311. See Boczek, supra note 119, at 394; Burke, The Law of the Sea Convention
and Fishing Practices of Nonsignatories, with Special Reference to the United States, in
CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, LAW
OF THE SEA INSTITUTE WORKSHOP 319 (J. Van Dyke ed. 1985).
312. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at arts. 117-18 (obligation for fishing), 194, 197
(general obligation for pollution control), 207, 213 (obligation for pollution from land-
based sources), 210, 216 (dumping), 211, 217-20 (vessel pollution).
313. By definition, of course, a treaty is binding on those states who have agreed to
it. This is the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda. Vienna Convention on the Law of the
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The ecosystem approach, however, is not only binding on signato-
ries to the treaty but to all nation states-as a statement of custom-
ary international law. The nations of the world, by their consensus
on the provisions on the treaty, have "codified" and "progressively
developed" 314 the law of the sea provisions dealing with environmen-
tal protection and resource management and, thus, the comprehen-
sive approach.3 15
This acceptance of the treaty provisions has been confirmed by
state practice. UNCLOS has established a series of rules and princi-
ples, including individual and joint responsibility, for comprehensive
and interactive pollution control and resource management, that
have now become part of customary international law.3 16
The basic objectives and obligations of the Convention for compre-
hensive ecosystem management are being followed in nation-state
legislative and treaty practice.3 11 Even when nation-states have non-
conforming practice, they attempt to justify their conduct in terms of
the provisions of the Convention. 318 Finally, the scholarly consensus,
and the most recent decisions of international courts, accept the rele-
Treaties, art. 26, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinaf-
ter Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties]; see H. KELSON, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 454-56 (R. Tucker 2d rev. ed. 1966); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note
119, § 321, § 321 comment a.
314. See UNCLOS, supra note 17, at preamble para. 7.
315. See Kwaitkowski, Convention and Optimum Utilization of Living Resources,
in LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE, THE LAW OF THE SEA: WHAT LIES AHEAD? 246-47 (T.
Clingan ed. 1988) (Proceedings of the 20th Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea
Institute, July 21-24, 1986) (consensus indicates that states intended to create legally
binding principles and rules and thus the provisions concerning fisheries are hardening
into custom); see also MacRae, supra note 29, at 221-22; Sohn, American University
Article, supra note 273, at 279-80; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 119, pt. V, intro-
ductory note at 5; id. §§ 502, 514 comments f & i, 521 comments c & e, 603-04.
Even those states, like the United States, which have refused to ratify the Convention
have accepted the provisions of the Treaty (except for those on deep seabed mining, tuna,
and dispute settlement) as stating present customary international law. See Reagan
Ocean Statement, supra note 108; Malone, supra note 119, at 59-61; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 119, pt. V, introductory note at 5.
316. See Kwaitkowski, supra note 315, at 248, 265; Szekely, supra note 281, at
179-80.
317. See Kwaitkowski, supra note 315, at 252, 258-59, 265; Gold, supra note 238,
at 285, 287; McDorman, Implementation of the LOS Convention: Options, Impediments
and the ASEAN States, 18 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 279, 285-87 (1987); Levy, supra
note 246, at 326-27 (UNCLOS establishes "comprehensive legal framework within
which the development of all possible use of ocean space and its resources will take
place"; each nation has "responsibility to adopt the necessary measures to introduce the
marine dimension into their national development strategies"). Compare Lee, The New
Law of the Sea and the Pacific Basin, 12 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 247, 259-61 (1983)
(calling on nation-states to enact legislation to implement UNCLOS).
318. See Kwaitkowski, supra note 315, at 265.
vant provisions of the treaty as representing the new "state practice"
and thus binding law.319
Because these UNCLOS-based rules are binding, government offi-
cials have an international obligation to seek to conform their coun-
tries' practices to that law. The next part of this article will describe
what those obligations generally entail.
V. SCOPE OF THE ECOSYSTEM MANDATE
The scope of the ecosystem model is broad. It includes not just
management arrangements that consider both pollution and re-
sources, but also a requirement for basic science, assessment, and
monitoring as a basis for comprehensive ecosystem regulation. 2 '
Adequate regulatory controls on activities and limitations on pol-
lutants must first be based on assessment of the present status of the
marine environment. Changes to that environment must then be
monitored. 32 1 A continual evaluation of current information must be
tied into periodic revision of restrictions. 22
Part of the ecological balance is, of course, the organisms that live
in the oceans. Living marine resources are constrained by ecological
laws. Biological and nonbiological factors interact and condition
each other within the same ecosystem. Environmental studies must
therefore not only analyze the impact of activities on such resources
and their habitats, but also the productivity levels of organisms
within particular food chains and the effects of various allowable
levels of exploitation on this productivity.323
Just as living resource management must be based on an ecosys-
tem model, basic research, assessment, and monitoring of the oceans
must also focus on the entire ecological mosaic in a region, including
319. See, e.g., Sohn, The Law of the Sea Crisis, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 237, 266
(1984); MacRae, supra note 29, at 221-22; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 119, pt.
V, introductory note at 5; see also Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary of the Gulf of Maine (Canada v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 294 (UNCLOS pro-
visions on exclusive economic zone and Continental Shelf "were adopted without any
objections" and "may be regarded as consonant at present with general international
law").
320. See Belsky - 1985 SAN DIEGO, supra note 12 (management); Belsky - 1987
LOSI, supra note 12 (assessment and monitoring); Belsky - 1988 AAAS, supra note 12
(science); see also Levy, supra note 246, at 337-38 (research and monitoring).
321. Yuru, supra note 214, at 127; see Wilkinson & Connor, The Law of the Pa-
cific Salmon Fishery: Conservation and Allocation of a Transboundary Common Prop-
erty Resource, 32 KAN. L. REV. 17, 107 (1983) ("The health of a fishery is determined
by the interaction of . . . the biology of the fish, the degree of fishing pressure upon
them, and the condition of their physical environment.").
322. See Steele, Strategies for Marine Pollution Research, in CENTER FOR OCEAN
MANAGEMENT STUDIES, IMPACT OF MARINE POLLUTION ON SOCIETY 282 (1982).
323. Yuru, supra note 214, at 127; see Sherman, Measurement Strategies for
Monitoring and Forecasting Variability in Large Marine Ecosystems, in VARIABILITY
AND MANAGEMENT OF LARGE MARINE ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 12, at 206-07.
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such factors as: pollution and its impact on a particular species and
on other species in its chain; resource catch levels; and the impact of
exploitation of one species on other species. In addition, these scien-
tific studies must also analyze the impact of particular controls on
pollution and catch levels and the impact of fishery limitations on
the reproductivity of a particular species and other species affected
by the productivity of that species. 24
Scientists have long recognized that there should be an ecosystem
approach to both management and research.325 This scientific prefer-
ence for an ecosystem approach to research, like that for ecosystem
management, soon became incorporated in domestic law, and a new
state practice evolved 28 that required regulators to consider and
monitor the cumulative impacts of proposals and actions.3217 This
practice was applied to multinational activities and treaty arrange-
ments and agreements. 28
324. NOAA FISHERY MANAGEMENT STUDY, supra note 214, at 16; 1981 POLLU-
TION PLAN, supra note 103; see Lie, supra note 212, at 325; Yuru, supra note 214, at
126-27; R. Roe, supra note 214, at 34.
325. See, e.g., Creech, In Search of an Ocean Information Policy, 6 OCEAN Y.B.
15, 16 (E. Borgese, N. Ginsburg, J. Baylson, N. Dunning & D. Dzurek eds. 1986) (as
oceans are an ecological system, "one must take an integrated approach to ocean infor-
mation, indeed, develop an ecology of information"); see also Yuru, supra note 214, at
126-27; Lie, supra note 212, at 325.
The requirement of ecosystem management has been termed "ecomanagement" and
environmental assessment and monitoring are accepted as necessary "practical applica-
tion[s] of the ecomanagement system." Mayda, Environmental Legislation in Developing
Countries: Some Parameters and Constraints, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 997, 1001, 1003
(1985).
326. The Draft World Charter for Nature imposed on nations the responsibility to
establish environmental assessment and monitoring procedures, both in their domestic
and international actions, that weigh risks against benefits. See Smith, supra note 286, at
341.
327. See Mayda, supra note 325, at 1006; Lutz, supra note 238, at 495-97; Levy,
supra note 246, at 331 (countries have variety of institutions that generate "information
on the state of knowledge of the marine and coastal endowment"; the goal is to affect
policy and decisions). The United States was an example of this state practice. See Lutz,
supra note 238, at 493; see, e.g., NEPA, supra note 94; OCSLAA, supra note 94, § 20;
43 U.S.C. § 1352 (1982) (providing for baseline information, monitoring, and a compre-
hensive environmental studies program for reviewing the impacts of offshore oil and gas
activities); see also Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 94 (2d
Cir. 1975) (cumulative impacts of ocean dumping).
328. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE NEGOTIATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR
ANTARCTIC MINERAL RESOURCES (1982); Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements of
1972, 23 U.S.T. 1301, T.I.A.S. No. 7312; Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements of
1978, 30 U.S.T. 1383, T.I.A.S. No. 9257 (agreements between the United States and
Canada providing for joint research, information collection, and monitoring); see also
Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wil-
der Caribbean Region, Treaty Doc. No. 98-13, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., arts. 12 & 13
This state practice has been confirmed by United Nations resolu-
tions and reports, expressing a consensus of the international com-
munity.32 It has been cited by legal scholars as supporting the thesis
that there is an international obligation to protect the marine envi-
ronment and that this obligation includes basic research, assessment,
and monitoring.330 Finally, and perhaps of greatest significance, the
obligation for research, monitoring, and assessment is integrated into
the recent codification of marine law in UNCLOS. This, with some
exceptions not relevant to this discussion, has become binding inter-
national law, or at least the best evidence of such law.331
UNCLOS establishes a "framework for the effective conservation
and management of the marine environment . . . [which] has the
consent and support of the organized world community. '3 32 As de-
scribed above, that framework provides for an ecosystem approach to
(1984).
Monitoring and assessment are also being included in multinational arrangements. See
Carroll & Mack, supra note 216, at 37; L. Kimball, The Role and Future of Science in
Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, Paper presented at the Center for Oceans Law and
Policy Seminar, "The Polar Regions" 4 (Mar. 26-28, 1987); see also Zambezi River
Treaty, supra note 292, suggested actions, % 28.
329. The 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment included within
its Principles a need for rational planning, involving the use of science to identify risk to
the environment. The Conference specifically recommended that nation-states individu-
ally and collectively establish adequate environmental assessment and monitoring pro-
grams. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 284, principles 14, 17 & 18; see also United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment: Final Documents, 11 I.L.M. 1416,
1421 (1972) ("Action Plan for the Human Environment" proposed at the Stockholm
Conference includes as one category of recommendations, a requirement for a broad and
inclusive "global environmental assessment program.").
More recently, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) has stated that
international "Principles" include obligations by nation-states for environmental impact
assessment both in their domestic and bilateral and multilateral actions (Goals 2 & 3).
Specifically, these Principles expect nation-states: (1) to assure that before decisions are
made, environmental effects "are to be taken fully into account" (Goal 1); (2) to under-
take environmental assessments for all "significant" activities so as to make sure that
impacts are known and considered (Principle 1); (3) to include in assessments, "at a
minimum," a description of the whole affected environment and the impact of activities
"direct, indirect, cumulative, short-term, and long-term" on the environment (Principle
4). See United Nations Environment Programme, Report of the Working Group of Ex-
perts on Environmental Law on its Second Session on Environmental Impact Assess-
ment, UNEP.WG.152/4 (1987).
330. See Mayda, supra note 325, at 1006; Schneider, State Responsibility for En-
vironmental Protection and Preservation, in INTERNATIONAL LAW - A CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVE 607-08 (1985).
331. See Gamble & Frankowska, The 1982 Convention and Customary Law of
the Sea: Observations, a Framework, and a Warning, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 291 (1984)
(authors propose that effect of UNCLOS on customary law can be divided into catego-
ries-some provisions are now law; some are evolving and therefore the text of Conven-
tion is best evidence of new law).
332. Johnston, Conservation and Management of the Marine Environment: Re-
sponsibilities and Required Initiatives in Accordance with the 1982 U.N. Convention on
the Law of the Sea, in LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE, THE DEVELOPING ORDER OF THE
OCEANS 133 (1984).
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marine management. That framework also requires assessment and
monitoring to implement that ecosystem approach.
Nation-states in their exclusive economic zones are to acquire "the
best scientific evidence" to assure "proper conservation and manage-
ment measures" for living marine resources. This evidence must in-
dude analysis of the effects of harvesting on related species.
333
Nation-states are to control their nationals and coordinate their
activities when resources lay within more than one zone, or within a
zone and in the high seas, or totally within the high seas. 34 Such
coordination includes assuring that the "best scientific evidence" is
obtained for conservation measures and that the interdependence of
stocks is considered.
3 35
These resource management mandates, applicable to domestic ac-
tivities, bilateral and multilateral arrangements, and activities by na-
tionals on the high seas,3 36 are to be in accord with the general obli-
gation of states to "protect and preserve the marine environment.
'3 3 7
Thus, nation-states are to consider relevant environmental factors in
their resource management assessments and decisions .33  They are to
take such measures as are necessary to preserve ecosystems and the
habitat of marine life.339 Such measures shall include environmental
assessment of risks and monitoring of risks and effects. 340 Such as-
sessment and monitoring is to be done directly by each nation-state
and indirectly and cooperatively through international organ-
izations. 41
As a result of this nation-state practice, as confirmed most re-
cently in UNCLOS, the rules for basic and applied research, pre-
mised on an ecosystem approach, can now be said to be "norms" or
rules of international law. 42 The implication of an international rule
333. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at art. 61.
334. Id. at arts. 63-67, 116-18.
335. Id. at art. 119.
336. See id. at arts. 63-67 (species or associated species within the EEZ of more
than one state; or within an EEZ and the High Seas), 117-19 (living marine resources in
the High Seas).
337. Id. at art. 192.
338. See id. at arts. 61(3) (EEZ), 119(1)(a)(High Seas).
339. Id. at art. 194(5).
340. Id. at art. 204.
341. Id. at art. 204; see also id. at arts. 200-01 (obligation of states to promote
studies and acquire data about pollution, including assessment of the nature and extent
of pollution and remedies; and then to determine in light of the information so obtained
"the appropriate scientific criteria" for rules to control pollution).
342. See Boczek, supra note 245, at 291; see also Lutz, supra note 238, at 492-97;
Mayda, supra note 325, at 1006.
mandating an ecosystem approach for both management and science
on United States ocean policy will be the focus of the next part of
this paper.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ECOSYSTEM MANDATE-A
NATIONAL OCEANS POLICY
By definition, rules of international law are binding on nation-
states in their international relations. Those nations that have rati-
fied or adhered to UNCLOS must follow their treaty obligations "in
good faith. 343 For other nations, their customary international law
obligation to follow the comprehensive ecosystem model must simi-
larly be complied with "in good faith. 3 44
This international obligation is broad. The ecosystem comprehen-
sive model must be incorporated into each nation-state's own legal
system, in any new bilateral or multilateral agreement, and in any
formal or informal marine regulatory or management program.
345
In many nations, international law is part of the nation-state's in-
ternal law, unless it is directly inconsistent with other domestic
law.348 Thus, there may be a duty under each nation-state's domestic
law to apply the ecosystem approach.3 47 With such a duty, govern-
ment officials of that nation-state must incorporate the comprehen-
sive model into the administration of all its laws and apply other
statutes and rules in a manner most consistent with an ecosystem
approach.3 48 Failure to do so would be a violation of that nation-
343. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at art. 300; see also Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, supra note 313, at art. 26; text accompanying note 313; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 119, § 321.
344. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW -
CASES AND MATERIALS 36 (1980); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 119, § 102
comment j (customary law and law made by international agreement are deemed to have
equal authority as international law). But see Trimble, Revisionist View of Customary
International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 669 (1986).
345. Schneider, supra note 330, at 602-03, 604; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 119, pt. V, introductory note at 5.
346. See Borchard, The Relation Between International Law and Municipal Law,
27 VA. L. REV. 137, 144 (1940) (British Law); Cohen, Justice for Occupied Territory?
The Israeli High Court of Justice Paradigm, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 471, 484
(1986) (Israeli Law). See generally L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT,
supra note 344, at 118 (majority of nations give effect to international law unless con-
trary controlling municipal law).
347. There is some debate as to whether a "new" customary international law
mandate is automatically incorporated into domestic law and supersedes prior statutes
and judicial precedents. See M. SHAW, supra note 61, at 107-08 (discussing British
cases). Compare Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 1555, 1565 (1984) with Goldklang, Back on Board the Paquete Habana: Resolving
the Conflict Between Statutes and Customary International Law, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 143,
149 (1984). As is discussed at infra, notes 357-59 and accompanying text, this is not a
substantial problem. No statute or judicial precedent is likely to be directly inconsistent
with the ecosystem model.
348. See M. SHAW, supra note 61, at 97-120.
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state's own laws and redressable in that nation's own courts.3 49
The duty to incorporate international law into domestic law and
policy also applies to foreign relations. A country's representatives
have the constitutional obligation to further the laws and policies of
their government.350 This obligation to uphold and further domestic
law means insistence on an ecosystem approach in negotiating bilat-
eral or multilateral marine environmental protection or resource
management agreements. 51
The only complication that may arise in incorporation of the
ecosystem model into the internal laws and policies of nation-states
is the existence in most jurisdictions of numerous statutes, policies,
rules, plans, or treaty obligations that deal separately with marine
pollution problems and that deal individually with particular marine
species 2 However, few, if any, of these policies are directly incon-
sistent with the comprehensive ecosystem model. Enough discretion
is given to each country's regulators to maximize environmental pro-
tection and balance resource management issues so that these re-
quirements can be interpreted so as to be consistent with the ecosys-
349. See L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, supra note 344, at 118;
Borchard, supra note 346, at 144; see, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900). Some commentators have argued that because of a lack of trust in international
tribunals, "domestic courts may, by default, become the only judicial institutions likely to
decide important controversies involving international law." Frankowski, The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 281,
282 (1988).
350. See CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 13 (W. Andrews ed. 1971) (by
definition, "constitutionalism" means the establishment of directives and policy and the
obligation of the governors to adhere to these prescriptions). See generally id. (describing
the "constitutions" of Great Britain, the United States, France, West Germany, and the
Soviet Union-all containing obligations on the Executive to obey and implement the
law). In the United States, the Executive's obligation is expressed in the command of the
Constitution that the President "take care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 3.
351. See Sasse, The Common Market: Between International and Municipal Law,
75 YALE L.J. 695, 712-13 (1966) (citing German and Italian Constitutions).
In describing the authority of the President to exercise foreign policy powers, including
actions with other states, Professor Henkin notes: "President has no power-as such-to
violate international law, just as he has no power-as such ... to repeal a treaty or a
customary principle as law of the land." Henkin, The President and International Law,
80 AM. J. INT'L L. 930, 936 (1986).
352. See generally United Nations Legislative Series, National Legislation and
Treaties Relating to the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/19 (1980); OFFICE
OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR THE LAW OF THE
SEA, THE LAW OF THE SEA: NATIONAL LEGISLATION ON THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC
ZONE, THE ECONOMIC ZONE AND THE EXCLUSIVE ZONE, U.N. Sales No. E.85.V.10
(1986).
tem model.3"' International law and the domestic law of most states
require governments to make that reconciliation where possible. 54
The following section describes how the ecosystem model has been
accepted by the United States as binding customary international
law and thus part of the domestic law of the United States. There is
now both an international obligation and a domestic law requirement
that ocean managers establish a new comprehensive ocean policy
that applies an ecosystem approach to ocean management and
research.
A. The Comprehensive Ecosystem Model in United States Law
The United States has not signed, let alone ratified, UNCLOS.
The mandates of the Convention, including those for a comprehen-
sive ecosystem approach, are, therefore, not incorporated into United
States law as part of the federal constitutional requirement that
"Treaties. . .shall be the supreme Law of the Land." '55 However, as
described above, the ecosystem model is binding not only on parties
to UNCLOS but also on nonsignatories, as customary international
law. UNCLOS is not only a treaty but a codification and articula-
tion of the present state of the rules applicable to the oceans.356
The United States Government has consistently maintained that,
except for certain specific subjects, not here relevant, the United
States accepts the provisions of the Convention as stating present
customary international law. In fact, former President Reagan and
his representatives have indicated that it is in the United States na-
tional interest to promote the comprehensive and ecosystem-based
UNCLOS provisions as being part of customary international law. 57
353. See, e.g., N. SYRODOYEV, SOVIET LAND LEGISLATION 131 (1975) (legislation
in U.S.S.R. provides discretion to regulators to implement Soviet policy of "rationally
utilizing and protecting" land and resources); D. VANDERZWAAG, supra note 228, at 68
(Canadian legislation gives minister of fisheries and oceans "absolute discretion" to regu-
late management of fisheries and to control the disposal of "deleterious substances into
the water"); Voigt, The Baltic Sea - Pollution Problems and Natural Environmental
Changes, in MANAGING THE OCEANS 163 (J. Richardson ed. 1985) (international ar-
rangements for protection of the Baltic Sea area give discretion to regulate to assure
rational protection and proper management and exploitation of resources).. 354. See Borchard, supra note 346, at 144; Lauritzen v. Larson, 345 U.S. 571, 582
(1953) (mutual obligation of nation-states to interpret domestic law in accordance with
international law to avoid instability in foreign affairs).
355. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
356. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 119, pt. V, introductory note at 5-9 (pro-
visions of UNCLOS, with exceptions not here relevant, are customary international law
and part of law of United States). See generally Frankowski, supra note 349 (discussing
the binding nature of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties on nonsignatories as
a statement of "customary law").
357. See Reagan Ocean Statement, supra note 108; Malone, supra note 119, at
59-61; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 119, pt. V, introduction at 5.
There is some debate as to whether the President, who has the constitutional obligation
to "faithfully execute" the laws is always bound by customary international law. The
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The impact of such an acceptance and sponsorship should have a
dramatic impact on our national ocean policy.358 As described above,
international law was evolving until 1982 so as to require a compre-
hensive ecosystem approach to ocean management and science. That
evolution was completed by the drafting and then promulgation of
UNCLOS. By accepting UNCLOS as stating customary law, the
United States has accepted the comprehensive ecosystem model as
courts have stated that the President has constitutional authority as the "sole organ of
the nation in its external relations," United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 319 (1958), and as protector of national security as Commander in Chief, U.S.
CONsT. art. II, § 1. Some therefore argue that the President has the authority to take
some executive action that might constitute violations of international law by the United
States, and that such actions are "political questions" and therefore not reviewable in the
courts. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979). Others argue that such
issues are justiciable, especially when the issue is interpretation and application of do-
mestic international law. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478
U.S. 221, 229-30 (1986). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 119, § 1
reporter's note 2 at 9-13; id. at § 111 comment c; Charney, The Power of the Executive
Branch of the United States Government to Violate Customary International Law, 800
AM. J. INT'L L. 913 (1986).
The premises of this debate indicate that it is irrelevant to the present discussion. The
argument is that the courts should not enforce this customary rule because it is necessary
for the President and other members of the Executive Branch to sometimes "break the
law" in order to help create a new rule of customary international law. See Charney,
supra, at 919. Here, the President seeks to help establish the validity of a new set of
customary norms.
President Reagan has indicated that he accepted the comprehensive ecosystem provi-
sions of UNCLOS as part of customary international law. Moreover, because of concerns
with provisions relating to deep seabed mining and other issues, he sought to convince the
rest of the world that these provisions are part of customary international law, and thus
binding, without the need to adhere to the text of UNCLOS, and thus the provisions
with which he disagrees. In fact, representatives of the United States have indicated that
the federal government is willing to "abide by the package deal-the original package
deal-that was negotiated by the Conference" in its relations with other nation-states.
See Colson, The United States, The Law of the Sea, and the Pacific, in CONSENSUS AND
CONFRONTATION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION, LAW OF
THE SEA CONVENTION 45 (J. Van Dyke ed. 1985).
Thus, it is in the United States' present foreign policy interests to pursue acceptance of
the relevant provisions of UNCLOS as customary international law, binding on all na-
tion-states, and thus binding domestically on the United States. The issue then is not
whether it is binding, but how it is to be interpreted and applied, when incorporated in
our law, and thus in potential conflict with other American statutes. The reconciliation of
statutory mandates and customary international law is one for the courts, and not the
executive. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 119, §§ 113, 114, 115; see also Japan
Whaling Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 230.
358. The United States is in the process of seeking acceptance of the relevant pro-
visions of UNCLOS into customary international law. It thus wishes to create as many
"precedents" as possible for the existence of these norms. See Kriesberg, Does the U.S.
Government Think That International Law is Important?, 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 479, 483-
85 (1986).
binding on it domestically.3 59
Customary international law is part of the law of the United
States.3 60 It is supreme over the law of any individual state within
the United States.3 1 Whether a state law existed at the time of an
emergent rule, or is enacted after its incorporation into federal law,
it will be void if inconsistent with a customary international law
rule.0 2
With one limited exception, international law principles and man-
dates must be obeyed by citizens and government officials. 63 State
and federal courts are bound to give effect to these principles and
mandates.364 Government agents are required to pursue the compre-
359. In The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 712 (1900), the Supreme Court
looked at a Presidential Proclamation as one basis to find that a set of international legal
norms had been internalized into domestic law, placing these norms on "a par with
[other] U.S. law." See Morgan, Internalization of Customary International Law: An
Historical Perspective, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 63, 72 (1987); see also United States v.
Enger, 472 F. Supp. 490, 505 (D.N.J. 1978) (customary international law or "law of
nations" is part of domestic law; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, though not
adopted by United States, codified the customary law and is either declaratory of ex-
isting international law or persuasive evidence of existing international law and thus
binding in American courts).
360. The classic exposition of this rule was given by Justice Sutherland in The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700: "International law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often
as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination."
361. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 119, § 111(1); see Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324,
331 (1937); see also Henkin, supra note 347, at 1559-60.
362. See Frankowski, supra note 349, at 388; Comment, Customary International
Law in United States Courts, 32 VILL. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1987); see also Banco Na-
cional de Cuba, 376 U.S. at 425 (citing Professor Jessup's assertion that rules of interna-
tional law should be not left to divergent state interpretations, and declaring that the
"basic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the National
Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the international commu-
nity must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law").
363. 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 356, 362-63 (1862); see Lobel, The Limits of Constitu-
tional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV.
1071, 1119 (1985).
364. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700; see Peters v. McKay, 238 P.2d 225,
230-31 (Or. 1951); see also Henkin, supra note 347, at 1566.
Professor Henkin has forcefully stated this proposition as follows:
It is old hat that international law is part of the law of the United States.
Therefore, the courts are bound to give effect to international law as part of the
law of the United States.
Essentially, that means giving effect to international law against the United
States government. Let me repeat that. The meaning of the proposition that
international law is part of the law of the United States ordinarily means that
the courts will assure that United States officials do not violate international
law. That is what happened in The Paquete Habana. It is in that context, in
particular, that there is a role for the courts. They are to see to it that the
United States observes international law; they help see the United States car-
ries out its international obligations.
Henkin, The Role of the American Domestic Courts, 9 GEo. MASON U.L. REv. 28, 28
(1986).
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hensive approach as they negotiate bilateral or multilateral ocean
science or management agreements, or informal arrangements.365
The exception to this explicit incorporation of customary interna-
tional law into United States law involves the possibility of an incon-
sistency between the provisions of customary law and those in fed-
eral statutes.366
Though the United States may have an international obligation to
comply with a rule of international law, 367 federal legislation enacted
subsequent to the emergence of that rule is binding domestically.
38
Courts must enforce the subsequent federal statute, even if inconsis-
tent with the international legal commitment of the United States.
36 9
However, under the law of the -United States, that supersession only
occurs when there is a direct conflict.37 0 An act of Congress will only
supersede the customary rule when its clear purpose is to do so. If
possible, the federal statute and the international law rule are to be
365. Schneider, supra note 330, at 602-03, 604 ("basic obligation under interna-
tional law for nation-states to prevent pollution and other destructive impacts on both
inclusive and exclusive resources"; obligation means use of "all instruments of policy
[including] the whole range of diplomatic, economic, ideological and military strate-
gies"); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 119, pt. I, introductory note at 17: "Inter-
national law is law like other law, promoting order, guiding, restraining, regulating be-
havior. States, the principal addressees of international law, treat it as law, consider
themselves bound by it, attend to it with a sense of legal obligation, and with concern for
the consequences of violation." The ecosystem-based provisions of UNCLOS, "by ex-
press or tacit agreement accompanied by consistent practice [have been accepted by "the
United States and states generally"] . . . as statements of customary law binding upon
them .... " Id. pt. V, introductory note at 5.
As an example of how domestic law can force the Executive to promote a certain
policy in international relations, see Lachia, Saving the Earth-U.S. Asks World Bank
to Make Safeguarding Environment a Priority, Wall St. J., July 3, 1988, at 1, col. 1, at
6, cols. 2 & 3.
366. See, e.g., Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453-55 (lth Cir. 1986).
In general, rules of customary international law must give way to an inconsistent fed-
eral statute. Lobel, supra note 363, at 1109; see The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
The general rule for an act of Congress and a rule of international law, whether from a
self-executing treaty, international agreement, or customary rule, is that they are of
equal status in United States law and if there is any direct conflict, the later in time
prevails. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 119, § 115 comment a. There is more diffi-
culty about a newly emergent rule of customary international law and a pre-existing
federal statute.
367. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 119, § l15(1)(b). "Since a conflicting
statute would bring the United States into violation of international law, the prospect of
such conflict may be an appropriate ground for Congress to reject a proposed statute or
for the President to veto it." Id. § 115 comment a.
368. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 193-94 (1888).
369. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 602-03 (1889); see Glennon, Can the
President Do No Wrong?, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 923, 923 (1986).
370. See 2 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 112, at 2 (1942).
reconciled.371
A more difficult problem arises from the emergence of a custom-
ary rule that may be inconsistent with a prior federal statute.
3 72
Some commentators have argued that "new" customary interna-
tional law mandates are thereby "new" provisions of United States
law and thus supersede all prior federal statutes. 7 Others maintain
that customary international law rules do not, in and of themselves,
overrule prior domestic law.374 Only specific federal statutes or im-
plemented treaties can do that.3
75
In any event, even if a new customary rule does not supersede
prior law, a problem will only arise if there is a direct inconsistency
between a federal statute and the new international norm. 76 Where
possible, a pre-existing United States statute is to be construed so as
not to conflict with customary international law. 7
Thus, assuming for the moment no direct inconsistencies between
the ecosystem model and present and future acts of Congress, the
comprehensive approach must be applied by regulators in their set-
ting of ocean policies and in their promulgation of plans, rules, and
regulations.37 8 They must interpret their statutory mandates to in-
clude a comprehensive approach to ocean issues.3 79 Where program
371. See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 119, § 114.
372. See Kirgis, Federal Statutes, Executive Orders and "Self-Executing Cus-
tom," 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 371, 373 (1987); Comment, supra note 362, at 1092-93.
373. See Henkin, supra note 351, at 933.
374. Even those commentators who argue that a newly emergent custom cannot
prevail over a validly enacted federal statute accept a possible exception where the Presi-
dent has actively participated, as a chief diplomat, in the formation of a new rule. In
such situations, the President may have the inherent constitutional power to overrule a
prior statute. See Kirgis, supra note 372, at 373 n.11. As described earlier, President
Reagan, both through his diplomatic agents and by his own statements, accepted the
applicable provisions of UNCLOS as stating a new rule of customary law. Thus, this
possible exception is especially significant when considering the incorporation of the com-
prehensive ecosystem approach into domestic American law. It is additional leverage to
convince regulators as to the applicability of the approach and to convince courts as to
the binding nature of the model when reviewing arguments as to its consistency with
other federal statutes.
375. See Goldklang, supra note 347, at 149; see also, RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 119, § 115, reporter's note 4.376. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
("[A]n Act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any
other possible construction remains."); see McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 19 (1962) (courts should seek to avoid an interpre-
tation of a statute that is against international law to avoid "considerable disturbance not
only in the field of maritime law but in our international relations as well" and also to
avoid "embarrassment in foreign affairs").
377. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 119, § 115(1)(a).
'378. "Customary international law is part of federal common law. Federal com-
mon law is binding on every executive official [unless Congress has by statute created a
different rule]." Glennon, supra note 369, at 923.
379. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 119, § 115 comment a; Paust, The
President Is Bound by International Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 377, 385 (1987) (customary
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administrators have discretion to implement statutory mandates,
they must exercise their discretion so as to be in accord with custom-
ary international law.38 0 Pollution and resource management cannot
be separately considered. Research and management must focus on
the ecosystems involved.38'
Even if separate agencies have differing responsibilities that over-
lap in regards to ocean research or management, they must develop
mechanisms to work together in order to integrate the ecosystem ap-
proach into their plans and rules. If they fail to do so, the President,
or at least the Executive office, must establish those mechanisms.8 2
Failure of the Executive to implement the ecosystem model and
take a comprehensive approach to ocean policy is now a legal is-
sue. 83 Citizens, with appropriate "standing, ' 38 4 who are aggrieved
by the failure of executive branch agencies to apply the comprehen-
international law must be used as aid in interpreting relevant statutory provisions).
See also 4 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 388, at 460 (1942)
(quoting correspondence, dated March 16, 1906, from the Secretary of State as to an
issue of diplomatic taxation:
The law of nations must be construed broadly and in a spirit to safeguard any
right existing by virtue of the law of nations. It is a separate system of juris-
prudence although incorporated bodily in our fundamental law. It must there-
fore be construed with regard to the origin and nature of the right .. .
380. See Paust, supra note 379, at 383.
381. As demonstrated earlier, the present state of customary international law re-
quires a comprehensive ecosystem approach. See supra notes 211-342 and accompanying
text. The recently revised Restatement indicates that the principles which form the basis
for the author's thesis are now part of domestic American law. See RESTATMENT
(THIRD), supra note 119, §§ 514, § 514 comments f & i (obligation to adopt proper
conservation and management measures for exploitation of living marine resources, and
to control pollution, citing UNCLOS), 603, 603 comments a & d (rules for marine pollu-
tion and protection of fragile ecosystems, citing UNCLOS).
382. The President has an obligation to obey and faithfully execute the supreme
federal law, which includes customary international law. This includes assuring that ex-
ecutive departments and agencies implement the principles established by customary in-
ternational law. See Paust, supra note 379, at 382 (citing 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 566, 570-71
(1822) and 9 Op. Att'y Gen. 356, 362-63 (1862)).
383. Both the President and the Congress have indicated their support for the ap-
plicable principles of UNCLOS and for a comprehensive approach to the oceans man-
agement and policy.
It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification or consensus
concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for
the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the courts can then focus on
the application of an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on
the sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national
interest or with international justice.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
384. For a discussion summarizing the present sometimes confusing law of stand-
ing to challenge executive action, see Nichol, Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v.
Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1985).
sive approach, may go to the courts and seek appropriate relief.38 5
The courts are bound to apply international law, resolve disputes,
reconcile statutes to be in accord with the comprehensive approach,
and order federal officials to apply the ecosystem model.386
In short, the courts, and citizens through the courts, are empow-
ered to force the United States to establish a national oceans pol-
icy.3 87 This policy will require an ecosystem approach to fisheries
and pollution research and regulation. It will mandate reconciliation
of conflicting goals and uses in coastal and ocean management. It
will force an appropriate balancing of protection as against develop-
ment. It, by necessity, will lead to new mechanisms to develop an
ocean agenda and then implementation of that agenda.388
385. Most federal environmental statutes and the Administrative Procedures Act
provide for citizens' suits to challenge executive action by an individual or group that is"adversely affected or aggrieved." See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702
(1982); FWCPA, supra note 94, § 505(g); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1982); see W. ROD-
GERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 1.13, at 76-89 (1977).
386. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 195 (1887) ("The duty of the
courts is to construe and give effect to the latest expression of the sovereign will."). The
issue of applying customary international law rules to the discretion given to the Presi-
dent and Executive Departments and agencies is one "that must be drawn by the judici-
ary." Paust, supra note 379, at 383.
387. Some commentators have argued that the courts are the best place for pro-
moting adherence to international law. See R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 12 (1964). The courts are the most dispassionate of
all possible decision-makers. Kline, An Examination of the Competence of National
Courts to Prescribe and Apply International Law, I U.S.F. L. REv. 49, 82 (1966). They
are intended to function independently and "to ascertain norms with a view to a truly
internationalist perspective." Comment, supra note 362, at 1126.
388. One argument against judicial review of international law or foreign policy
decisions is that, by definition, foreign policy issues are "political in nature" and should
not be a function of the court system. In a 1985 article, Professor Lobel explored the"political question" argument and the changing nature of the "political question" doc-
trine. See Lobel, supra note 363, at 1153-79. He noted that the courts are not merely
agents of domestic law but also of the "international order . . . . No broad rule of judi-
cial abstention is warranted." Id. at 1171.
There may, of course, also be arguments that establishing a comprehensive ecosystem
approach to oceans management and policy is undemocratic as allowing law proposed
and developed by other nations to supersede our domestic policy, as expressed by legisla-
tors in individual statutes, and that therefore the courts should not act to enforce and
apply such customary rules or doctrines. This argument "misses the relationship between
American democracy and respect for legal values in international society. Disrespect for
law in the conduct of our international relations may be connected to an undermining of
democracy at home." Id. This argument was forcefully rejected by the United States
Supreme Court more than 80 years ago when it said:
Undoubtedly, no single nation can change the law of the sea. . . . Like all the
laws of nations, it rests upon the common consent of civilized communities. It
is of force, not because it was prescribed by any superior power, but because it
has been generally accepted as a rule of conduct. . . . This is not giving to the
statutes of any nation extra-territorial effect . . . . [I]t is recognition of the
historical fact that by common consent of mankind these rules have been ac-
quiesced in as of general obligation. Of that fact, we think, we may take judi-
cial notice . ...
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 711 (1900).
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The next section of this article will demonstrate that present fed-
eral law is not inconsistent with an ecosystem approach. It will be
followed by a description of how specific statutes will have to be in-
terpreted and applied to implement the comprehensive model.
B. Incorporating the Comprehensive Ecosystem Model into
United States Ocean Law and Policy
The incorporation of the ecosystem approach into United States
ocean law and policy assumes that this approach is not directly in-
consistent with any present federal law. The nature of United States
legislation dealing with environmental protection and natural re-
source management assures that there is little likelihood that such a
direct conflict occurs. Almost all federal laws provide very broad pol-
icy guidelines seeking maximum environmental protection and bal-
anced resource management. 389
Congress routinely delegates to administrative discretion the mul-
titude of decisions necessary to implement its policies.3 90 The judg-
ment of the regulator as to statutory language is given great defer-
389. See Charney, The Exclusive Economic Zone and Public International Law,
in WOODS HOLE OCEANOGRAPHIC INSTITUTE, MARINE POLICY AND OCEAN MANAGE-
MENT CENTER, ASSESSING OCEAN GOVERNANCE, REPORT OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE
OCEAN POLICY ROUNDTABLE app. four at 7, 10-11 (1983) (no legislation needed to con-
form American law to UNCLOS, as existing legislation and EEZ Proclamation suffi-
cient). See generally Belsky, supra note 13.
See, e.g., Murphy & Belsky, supra note 52, at 307. For a more detailed discussion of
the broad scope of environmental statutes and the power of regulators to exercise their
discretion in the implementation of these statutes, see Belsky, supra note 88, at 15-18,
24-26, 44-52, 71-77.
390. See W. ROSENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY 44 (1985). Pro-
fessor Rosenbaum notes that: "Even when delegation is not clearly intended, administra-
tors assume the power to make public policy when they choose how to implement policies
permitting different options; hence the existence of administrative discretion."
Dean Douglas Costle, former Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency,
has defined the job of the regulator as follows:
Under our constitutional system, the regulator starts where Congress leaves off:
with delegated authority to make rules, often including the authority to deter-
mine whether there is a need for a rule in the first place; to inspect for viola-
tions; to determine whether violation has or has not occurred; and to proceed
against alleged violators of the rules.
Costle, Environmental Regulation and Regulatory Reform, 57 WASH. L. REV. 409, 411
(1982).
The only possible limitation on this grant of discretion has been the growth of congres-
sional staffs who were given the responsibility of assuring oversight to "control the regu-
lators." See Hill, The Third House of Congress Versus the Fourth Branch of Govern-
ment: The Impact of Congressional Committee Staff on Agency Regulatory Decision-
Making, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 247, 254, 256 (1986).
ence.39 1 However, the courts are given the ultimate authority to
interpret environmental and natural resource laws and to eliminate
the ambiguities, fill in the silences, and straighten out the
overlaps.392
This general congressional method of operation has been applied
to oceans policy. "Congress has increasingly relied upon the agencies
to do whatever is right by granting them very broad mandates of
limited substantive guidance. '"3 It allows executive agencies to in-
terpret statutory language 394 and the courts give deference to these
395interpretations.a°
This broad discretion given to regulatory agencies is, of course,
constrained by specific provisions included in statutes.396 Thus, agen-
391. See, e.g., Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) ("plainly
erroneous" standard); Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 105 (1971) ("reasonable-
ness" standard). See generally Weaver, Judicial Interpretation of Administrative Regu-
lations: The Deference Rule, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 587 (1984).
392. See Coffman, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretations of Statutes,
6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 2 (1983)(citing the provisions of the federal Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1982)); W. ROSENBAUM, supra note 390, at 47;
see, e.g., United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1267 (5th Cir. 1979) (court uses Con-
vention on Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone "to supplement the statute" and
interpret congressional report language as to Coast Guard's enforcement authority).
393. Stelle, Conflict Resolution and Multiple-Use Management in the Exclusive
Zone, in MARINE TECHNOLOGY SOCIETY & INSTITUTE OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRON-
ICS ENGINEERS, OCEANS '84 - EXCLUSIVE PAPERS ECONOMIC ZONE, supra note 13, at 12.
Mr. Stelle, on the staff of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, cites as
examples of these broad mandates, fisheries management and ocean pollution: "Thus,
Congress directs the Secretary of Commerce to regulate fishing to achieve the greatest
overall benefit for the nation, or the Environmental Protection Agency to protect the
oceans from unreasonable degradation."
394. Statutes contain broad definitions and very general language. See, e.g.,
MPRSA, supra note 94 (provisions on ocean dumping):
The Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States to regulate the
dumping of all types of materials into ocean waters and to prevent or strictly
limit the dumping into ocean waters of any material which would adversely
affect human health, welfare, or amenities, or the marine environment, ecologi-
cal systems, or economic potentialities.
Id. at § 2(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1982).
"In carrying out the responsibilities and authority conferred by this subchapter, [federal
officials] ...are authorized to issue such regulations as they may deem appropriate."
Id. at § 108, 33 U.S.C. § 1418 (1982).
Regulators have used these broad grants to first reject the idea of regulations on ocean
incineration and then to promulgate regulations in this area. See Comment, The United
States Environmental Protection Agency's Proposal for At-Sea Incineration of Hazard-
ous Wastes-A Transnational Perspective, 21 VAND. J. INT'L L. 157, 171-73 (1988).
395. See Secretary of the Interior v. California, 454 U.S. 312, 320 n.6 (1984) (in
interpreting the application of the Coastal Zone Management Act's consistency provi-
sions to offshore drilling activities, the Supreme Court noted that "under normal circum-
stances [an agency's] understanding of the meaning of [a statutory provision] would be
entitled to deference by the courts . . .But [here] the agency has walked a path of such
tortured vacillation and indecision that no help is to be gained in that quarter.").
396. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm.,
454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981) (administrative interpretation must give way to "plain meaning"
of the statutory command).
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cies must implement their specific statutory responsibilities and in-
terpret their statutory mandates not only in terms of the particular
statute establishing a policy or program, but also in light of other
statutes that establish requirements for all such programs. 9 7 This
responsibility exists even if the result of application of an additional
statute compels a different result than would have occurred by appli-
cation of a single specific statute.3 98
The courts will enforce these obligations found in differing statutes
and will attempt to reconcile any potential differences by construing
overlapping obligations so as to avoid conflicts. 99 If "two statutes
are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of the courts . . . to regard
[both] as effective.
400
An identical process is followed when reconciling statutory man-
dates and the requirements of treaty or customary international law.
The broad discretion given to federal officials is also constrained by
applicable international law. Federal officials must implement poli-
cies and programs, and interpret statutory mandates, in light of ap-
plicable international law.4 01 The courts will enforce these multiple
obligations .and attempt to reconcile any potential differences by in-
terpreting statutory language to best conform with international
397. One statute that governs most ocean activities or programs is NEPA, supra
note 94. NEPA provides that, unless there is a specific statutory exemption, (1) "the
policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and ad-
ministered in accordance with the policies" established by the statute, id. at § 102, 42
U.S.C. § 4332 (1982); and (2) each agency must prepare and include in every recom-
mendation and report, or proposals for legislation and other "major Federal actions sig-
nificantly affecting the quality of the human environment," a detailed environmental im-
pact statement. Id. at § 102(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1982).
Another statute that is applicable to ocean policies and programs is CZMA, supra
note 94. CZMA establishes procedures by which the Department of Commerce can ap-
prove state management programs, id. § 306, 16 U.S.C. § 1455 (1982), and provides
that "each Federal agency conducting or supporting activities directly affecting the
coastal zone shall conduct or support such activities in a manner which is, to the maxi-
mum extent practicable, consistent with approved state management programs." Id. §
307(c)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1) (1982). It also provides for "consistency" of develop-
ment projects undertaken by federal agencies and of federal licenses and permits. Id. §
307(3), (4), 16 U.S.C. § 1456(3), (4) (1982); see Archer, California v. NOAA: May
NOAA Require Changes in State Coastal Management Programs?, TERRITORIAL SEA 1,
3 (Summer 1988).
398. See Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976).
399. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1018 (1984); Watt v. Alaska,
451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981); see, e.g., Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428, 438-
39, 443-444 (1967) (interpretation of Federal Power Act in light of provisions of Anad-
romous Fish Act and policies established by Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act).
400. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. at 1018.
401. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10,
21-22 (1963).
law.402 As with overlapping statutes, the fact that applying a custom-
ary rule to a statutory command might change what would result if
the statute alone was applied is of no legal consequence."0 3
The process by which the courts apply customary international
law is not easy.404 Because customary law is part of the law of the
United States, it need not be pleaded and proven.40 5 Rather the
court can take judicial notice of the existence of a rule, after a re-
view of relevant state practice, the position of the United States gov-
ernment, the works of scholars, and any codification generally ac-
cepted as a consensus of nation-state opinion.40 6 Here, such a rule
exists. It provides for a comprehensive ecosystem approach to all
ocean-related actions. When there is a potential overlap of a binding
international custom and domestic law, it is the obligation of the
courts to resolve differences and uphold the importance and rele-
vance of international law.407
Thus, despite the existence of multiple statutes governing ocean
management and policy, there now exists the ability to formulate a
comprehensive approach to the oceans or a "national oceans policy."
The applicable provisions of UNCLOS-both those that are a codifi-
cation of long-accepted custom and those that suggest the "progres-
sive development" of new custom4 8 -are to be used as a means to
interpret statutory mandates and to coordinate federal policies, pro-
402. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 27, 30-31 (1982). In Weinberger,
the Court accepted the maxim that "an Act of Congress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains." Id. at 27. It then
accepted the Vienna Convention on Treaties, although not a treaty binding on the United
States, as a statement of the codification of customary international law. Using the Vi-
enna Convention, it interpreted a federal statute's use of the word "treaty" as having the
meaning given in the Vienna Convention. Id. at 31-32; see also Frankowski, supra note
349, at 383 (implicit in a series of federal decisions is that the United States is bound by
the law expressed in the Vienna Convention which is invoked, despite the nonratification
of the Convention by the United States); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 493, 493 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
403. See Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976).
404. See Oliver, Remarks - The Revised Draft Restatement of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States and Customary International Law, 79 PROc. AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. 78, 79-80 (1985); Comment, supra note 362, at 1100-01; Glennon, Raising The
Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary International Law of the Executive Uncon-
stitutional?, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 321, 353-56 (1985).
405. The Paquette Habana 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
406. Id.; see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 429
(1964).
407. See Henkin, supra note 364, at 31-32: "My conclusion is that the best thing
that the American courts can do in support of international law is to make the United
States government observe it."
408. In Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982), the Court accepted the provi-
sions of the Vienna Convention on Treaties as stating customary international law and
binding. This treaty not only "codified" previous principles but also included provisions
which reflected the "progressive development of international law." Frankowski, supra
note 349, at 287.
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grams, and rules.40 9 Because of the supremacy of federal law, the
customary international law requirement of comprehensive ecosys-
tem management will supersede any inconsistent state law or
policy.
410
Former President Reagan, by Executive Proclamation, accepted
the comprehensive ecosystem approach as part of domestic law.
4 1'
President Bush now has the duty to require that his executive officers
in "their construction of statutes under which they act" follow this
approach, and to provide procedures to "secure that unitary and uni-
form execution of the laws which ... the Constitution evidently
contemplated in vesting general executive powers in the President
alone." 412 If the President fails to establish mechanisms to assure
this "unitary execution," the courts will have the responsibility of
assuring that the comprehensive ecosystem approach is lifted from a
possible "twilight existence" to a binding doctrine.413
VII. APPLYING THE COMPREHENSIVE ECOSYSTEM APPROAH-A
FEW EXAMPLES
The previous section described why the ecosystem approach must
be used as a basis for integrating ocean statutes and regulatory ac-
tions into a comprehensive policy. I will now attempt to illustrate
how such an approach can be used with specific statutes to achieve
such a policy.
409. The Supreme Court has termed this process of incorporation of customary
international law into the interpretation of federal statutes as having a federal common
law "informed" by international law principles. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para
el Comercio, 462 U.S. 611, 623 (1983). For a discussion of the various methods by which
nation-states can establish a national oceans policy, -based on the principles of UNCLOS,
see Levy, supra note 246.
410. See MacRae, Preemption in the Fisheries and the United Nations Law of the
Sea Treaty, 4 DICK. J. INT'L L. 143, 162-64 (1986).
411. See supra notes 357-60 and accompanying text.
412. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926).
413. See New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 383 (1934), where Justice Car-
dozo points out that "international law ... has, at times, like the common law within
states, a twilight existence during which it is hardly distinguishable from morality or
justice, till at length the imprimatur of a court attests [to] its jurist quality." See also
Lillich, The Proper Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order, 11 VA. J.
INT'L L. 9, 12 n.17 (1970) (domestic courts must be relied upon to "perform the interna-
tional function of upholding rights and duties grounded in international law").
A. Management of Living Marine Resources
A key aspect of a comprehensive ecosystem approach to oceans
management is the establishment "of an ecosystem-wide manage-
ment program for fish and other living marine resources which per-
mits multi-species management of those resources." '414 The new in-
ternational law norm must be integrated into the numerous statutes
that provide for the study, protection, control, and management of
living marine resources.41
Special statutes establish: procedures for the protection of endan-
gered species and marine mammals and the habitats of all fisher-
ies;4-1 6 programs for research and development of resources;41 7 and
standards for management of commercial fisheries.4 18 As described
earlier, protection and management of these resources has been on a
species-by-species basis-without regard to the interaction of species
or the impact of other ocean activities on their habitat or life-cycle.
This ad hoc approach is not required by federal law. Rather, the
statutes that govern fisheries may be interpreted to include an
ecosystem approach,419 and since that interpretation is possible, it is
now required.
The Endangered Species Act, for example, provides broad author-
ity to protect endangered or threatened species.420 Yet the statute
has been applied so as to minimize conflict by limiting the geograph-
414. R. Roe, supra note 214, at 33.
415. The former Assistant Administrator for the National Marine Fisheries Ser-
vice has stated that: "In the case of living marine resources, Congress has defined the
public interest in more than 106 federal laws." Leitzell, The Federal Government Role in
the Fishing Industry, in CENTER FOR OCEAN MANAGEMENT STUDIES, THE U.S. FISHING
INDUSTRY AND REGULATORY REFORM 119 (T. Hennessey ed. 1983).
The statutes that provide for conservation and management of living marine resources
include the Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and Management Act, and specific laws
that govern specific species, that provide for coordination with other federal programs,
that provide for research and development of specific species or of specific geographic
regions, and that provide for assistance to recreational and commercial fishing. See CoM-
MERCE OCEAN POLICY, supra note 15, at app. A - Legislative Authorities for Federal
Ocean Activities, at a-3 to a-7. In addition, they include more general statutes, like the
National Environmental Protection Act that provide procedures to be followed in imple-
menting fisheries programs. See Belsky, The Regulatory Review Process, in CENTER FOR
OCEAN MANAGEMENT STUDIES, THE U.S. FISHING INDUSTRY AND REGULATORY RE-
FORM, supra, at 8.
416. See, e.g., ESA, supra note 94; MMPA, supra note 94; Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act, Pub. L. No. 85-624, 72 Stat. 566 (1958) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§
661-668ee (1986) (habitat protection)).
417. See, e.g., State Commercial Fisheries Research and Development Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 779-779F (1986).
413. MFCMA, supra note 94.
419. See, e.g., COMMERCE OCEAN MANAGEMENT, supra note 16, at 70-71
(MFCMA can be interpreted to consider interrelationships and comprehensive
management).
420. ESA, supra note 94, at § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1982); see Smith, The Endan-
gered Species Act and Biological Conservation, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 361, 384 (1984).
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ical area preserved and focusing on the particular species to be pro-
tected, rather than looking at the ecosystem. 2' The new customary
international law requirement of a comprehensive approach now
mandates that such conservation must focus on the ecosystem.
Similarly, the Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and Management
Act establishes an elaborate mechanism for regional councils, to pro-
pose, and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to imple-
ment, fisheries management plans. 22 Broad discretion is given to the
councils and NMFS to consider all relevant factors in developing
fishery plans and regulations. 23 In addition, recent amendments also
give the councils the duty to consider and include in plans informa-
tion on habitats and assessment of habitat changes on fishery re-
sources. 24 Yet, until 1987, fisheries assessment, monitoring, plans,
and regulations, focused on particular species in particular regions
without considering the ecosystem of that species.425 In addition,
421. See Smith, supra note 420, at 386. This reluctance to apply the ecosystem
approach is despite the expressed purpose of the Endangered Species Act "to provide a
means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species
may be conserved." ESA, supra note 94, at § 2(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)d (1982).
422. See MFCMA, supra note 94. Subchapter IV of the MFCMA establishes na-
tional standards for the development of fisheries plans by regional councils, and then
review and approval by the Secretary of Commerce. The power to establish interim plans
and to enforce all plans is also given to the Secretary of Commerce. The Secretary has
delegated responsibility for administration of the MFCMA to the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, which, in turn, places its supervision within its National
Marine Fisheries Service. See Belsky, supra note 415, at 9-11.
423. See Comment, supra note 226, at 155; Young, supra note 38, at 243. The
stated goal of the MFCMA is "to conserve and manage fishery resources found off the
coasts of the United States." MFCMA, supra note 94, at § 2; see Young, supra note 38,
at 211. The national standards state that any fishery plan and regulation are to provide
conservation and management measures to prevent overfishing. These measures are to be
based upon the best scientific information available. While the plans and regulations are
based on an "optimum yield" standard, 16 U.S.C. § 1851(1) (1982), that term is defined
to mean "maximum sustainable yield ... as modified by any relevant economic, social
or ecological factor."Id at § 1802(18) (emphasis added); see A. McEvoy, THE FISHER-
MAN'S PROBLEM - ECOLOGY AND LAW IN THE CALIFORNIA FISHERIES - 1850-1980, at
242 (1986). Even "maximum sustainable yield" is capable of an ecosystem interpreta-
tion, as it can be defined as an "upper limit of harvest which can be taken year after year
without diminishing the stock so that the stock is truly inexhaustible and perpetually
renewable." See MacRae, supra note 410, at 154. Finally, the Act specifically encour-
ages an ecosystem approach, as it states that an individual stock shall be managed
throughout its range and interrelated stocks of fish shall be managed as a unit in close
coordination to the extent practicable. MFCMA, supra note 94, 16 U.S.C. § 1851(3)
(1982); see also Magnuson, supra note 38, at 437.
424. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1852-53 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988). See generally Kennedy,
The 1986 Habitat Amendments to the Magnuson Act: A New Procedural Regime for
Activities Affecting Fisheries Habitat, 18 Envtl. LAW. 339 (1988).
425. See Gordon, supra note 211, at 163; R. Roe, supra note 214, at 33-35.
fisheries plans and regulations did not consider the effects of marine
pollution and conflicting resource uses on the fisheries.426 Requiring
application of the ecosystem model is not only feasible,427 but now
the acknowledged policy. 428 The NMFS and its parent agency, the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, must accept
their new responsibility as stewards of living marine resources and
consider the relationships among resources and the impacts of ex-
ploitation and other ocean activities on the ecosystem.429
The application of the new international law mandate to living
marine resource management is relatively straightforward. One
agency can adopt the ecosystem mandate and apply it.430 Much
more difficult, but still possible, and thus mandatory, will be apply-
ing the model to other resource management and environmental pro-
tection statutes.43'
B. Conflicting Uses and Pollution
As noted above, fisheries management did not consider the impact
of other ocean uses and pollution on their plans and regulations.
These uses, and the pollution that can result from them and from
onshore activities, are governed by numerous statutory and regula-
tory provisions, implemented by many different agencies.43 2 There
426. There is no provision in the MFCMA on the effects of pollution or conflicting
resource uses. See Young, supra note 38, at 253. Of course, this silence is not inconsis-
tent with an ecosystem approach. The new international law norm can fill in this "gap"
and now mandate such a comprehensive approach.
427. The concept of "optimum yield" in MFCMA allows "multiple objective deci-
sion-making [in] marine fishery management, with explicit recognition of. . . ecological
objectives." Rettig, The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act: Contin-
uing Challenges for State Governments, in PROCEEDINGS, UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE,
CENTER FOR THE STYLE OF MARINE POLICY, COASTAL STATES ARE OCEAN STATES 14
(1987). New technology now allows remote sensing and modeling for research and man-
agement based on large ecosystems. See Platt & Sathyendranath, Oceanic Primary Pro-
duction: Estimation by Remote Sensing at Local and Regional Scales, 241 SCIENCE
1613 (1988).
428. See Rettig, supra note 427, at 33-34; Ocean Sci. News, Feb. 17, 1987, at 2
(quoting William E. Evans, who at the time was the head of the National Marine Fisher-
ies Service, and who then became the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration, as indicating that research and management of fisheries are to be
based on a comprehensive approach).
429. Johnson, supra note 253, at 158-59.
430. The President has the power to require the Councils and NOAA to apply the
ecosystem approach and can review plans and regulations to assure compliance with this
new standard. See Steinberg, OMB Review of Environmental Regulations: Limitations
on the Courts and Congress, 4 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 404 (1985). Compare Taylor &
Surprenant, The Role of OMB in Federal Fisheries Management, in TERRITORIAL SEA I
(October 1983) (application of President through Executive Order of procedures to re-
view fishery plans and regulations).
431. See Steele, supra note 322; Stelle, supra note 393.
432. 1983 Ocean Policy Commission, supra note 94, at 10-12. This problem is, of
course, not unique to the United States. See Levy, supra note 246, at 329-30.
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have been minimal attempts to have the laws interpreted or the reg-
ulations redrafted and implemented so as to require full considera-
tion of the impact of these uses and the resulting pollution on the
ecology. While there are numerous requirements for "consideration"
of cumulative and external impacts on the marine environment, 33 or
of the impact on fisheries, 3 4 there has been, until now, no mandate
to assure that such integration occurs and thus no mechanism to pro-
vide such an integration. 35
Such an ad hoc approach is now in violation of international law.
Unless a specific statutory command bars application of the ecosys-
tem approach to these laws and regulations, it is also now in viola-
tion of American law. No such direct inconsistency exists. Pollution
and resource management statutes call for a "balancing" of interests
and that "balance" must now be shifted to require the exercise of
discretion to incorporate the ecosystem model. 36
The law governing management of offshore oil and gas indicates
the process that must be followed. The Outer Continental Shelf
(OCS) Lands Act was amended in 1978137 to, among other things,
provide for increased environmental protection. 38 The need to pro-
tect the coastal and marine environment was to be balanced against
increased energy needs. 39 Specifically, the statute: requires a leasing
plan to be prepared and periodically revised that "to the maximum
extent practicable . . . balance[s the] potential for environmental
damage, the potential for the discovery of oil and gas, and the poten-
tial for adverse impact on the coastal zone"; 440 requires regulations
to provide for the conservation of natural resources and to allow sus-
pension or cancellation of leases where there is "serious harm" to life
433. See, e.g., NEPA, supra note 94, at § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)
(1986); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16 (1987); OCSLAA, supra note 94, at § 25, 43 U.S.C. §
1451 (1986).
434. See, e.g., Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 662 (1986).
435. See Knecht & Kitsos, supra note 124, at 15.
436. See Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 891 (1st Cir. 1979) (OCSLA
involves balancing).
437. OCSLAA, supra note 94.
438. See Kitsos, Federal-State Relations in the Management of Offshore Miner-
als: The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act At Work, in PROCEEDINGS, UNIVERSITY OF
DELAWARE, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF MARINE POLICY, COASTAL STATES ARE OCEAN
STATES 71-72 (1987).
439. OCSLAA, supra note 94, at § 102(2), 43 U.S.C. § 1802(2) (1986); see
Hoagland, Federal Ocean Resource Management: Interagency Conflict and the Need for
a Balanced Approach to Resource Management, 3 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 1, 21
(1983).
440. OCSLA, supra note 55, § 18(a)(3).
(including fish) or to the marine, coastal or human environment;441
and allows for restrictions of development and production when nec-
essary for the protection of the "human, coastal, or marine environ-
ment. ' 4 42 It also requires all leasing, exploration, and development to
be consistent with the leasing plan and environmental and other
regulations.443
This balancing process assumed that comments from other federal
agencies, state and local governments, and private parties as to the
impact of exploration and development would be taken into account
in the leasing policy and program.444 It should also assume that the
requirements of other statutes will be integrated into the decision-
making process.445
The OCS leasing policy is an example of the inadequacy of previ-
ous attempts to develop a national oceans policy. The Department of
the Interior is responsible for OCS leasing.446 While it must "con-
sider" the comments of others and the impact of the requirements of
the governing statute and other laws, 47 the Department does not
adopt a comprehensive approach to consider the impact of leasing on
the whole ecosystem involved.448
Other agencies-with specific responsibilities to protect fisheries,
habitats, and the marine environment-and interested parties, may
seek to convince the Department of Interior, but there is no mecha-
nism to force the Department to take an ecosystem approach. 49 Un-
441. Id. at § 5(a).
442. Id. at § 25(h).
443. Id. at §§ 18(d)(3), 11(b), 25(h).
444. See Murphy & Belsky, supra note 52, at 311; Hoagland, supra note 439, at
21. As one commentator has noted:
The OCSLAA does not mandate exploitation of oil and gas resources at the
expense of other important resources. The Secretary of Interior's power to
enter into oil and gas leases is discretionary. The Secretary may withhold from
leasing those areas in which offshore drilling operations would not be in the
public interest because they are too dangerous to the marine environment.
Jones, Harvesting the Ocean's Resources: Oil or Fish?, 60 So. CAL. L. REv. 585, 646
(1987).
445. For a description of the major statutes affecting the OCS leasing policy and
program, see Vass, A Comparison of American and British Offshore Oil Development
During the Reagan and Thatcher Administrations, 21 TULSA L.J. 23, 39-43 (1985).
446. OCSLA, supra note 55, at § 2(b), 43 U.S.C. § 1331(b) (1982).
447. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 887-88 (1st Cir. 1979)
(fisheries); OCSLAA, supra note 94, at § 18, 43 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982) (leasing pro-
gram); id. at § 19, 43 U.S.C. § 1345 (1982) (coordination with state and local govern-
ments); id. at § 25, 43 U.S.C. § 1351 (1982) (development); Murphy & Belsky, supra
note 52, at 316-18.
In addition to the OCSLAA, other statutes, like NEPA, the MFCMA, and the Fish
and Wildlife Coordination Act, provide for comments by affected citizens and federal
agencies as to the impact of oil and gas development on fisheries and the environment,
and the appropriate balance to be set. See Kennedy, supra note 424, at 343; Hoagland,
supra note 439, at 20-21.
448. See Hoagland, supra note 439, at 8, 10.
449. See Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 886 (1st Cir. 1979). There is, in
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less a specific mandate is given to exclude a particular area from
leasing,4 50 the Department of the Interior feels free to disregard the
comments of outsiders, including other agencies.45 1 The courts have
been unwilling, based on their interpretation of the applicable stat-
utes, to force such a comprehensive approach.4 52 In fact, the Secre-
tary of the Interior and the courts have applied the OCS "balancing
requirement" as a mandate for expedited offshore leasing and ex-
ploitation.455 Inadequate consideration has been given to the impact
on offshore habitats and the quality of the coastal and marine envi-
ronment." 4 The standard established is that of "unreasonable risk to
the fisheries" and environment.455
The new customary rule mandating an ecosystem approach
changes the calculus. The federal agencies involved must take a
comprehensive look at all activities including offshore oil and gas ex-
ploitation. If they fail to develop a method to do so, then the courts,
when faced with a challenge to a lease or exploration and develop-
ment, must apply the ecosystem standard and mandate such coordi-
nation.456 "Unreasonable risk" is no longer the test. The new re-
quirement is for an appropriate balancing that preserves the present
and future ecosystem.451
effect, no "interagency balancing." Hoagland, supra note 439, at 32.
450. One attempt to force an ecosystem approach, although in a limited geo-
graphic area, is the provision of MPRSA, supra note 94, that allows NOAA to designate
marine sanctuaries. 16 U.S.C. § 1432 (1986). This provision however, is seldom used to,
in effect, "carve out" an area from OCS development in order to protect the ecosystem.
See Hoagland, supra note 439, at 23-32.
451. See Norse, Marine Pollution and the Reagan Administration's Oil and Gas
Program, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER OF ABA COMMITTEE ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 2-3 (Spring 1983).
452. See, e.g., California v. Watt, 712 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (five year leasing
program); Conservation Law Found. v. Andus, 623 F.2d 712 (1st Cir. 1979) (Georges
Bank lease sale); see also Comment, The Seaweed Rebellion Revisited: Continuing Fed-
eral-State Conflict in OCS Oil and Gas Leasing, 20 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 83, 104-05
(1984) (deference to Secretary of Interior).
453. See Vass, supra note 445, at 58; Jones, Major Issues In Developing Alaska's
Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Resources, I ALASKA L. REV. 209, 210-11 (1984);
see also Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 336 (1984); California v.
Watt, 712 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
454. See Jones, supra note 444, at 619-23.
455. See Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 889 (Ist Cir. 1979); see also
Jarman, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Exclusive Economic Zone, 65 OR. L. REV. 1,
29 (1986).
456. Lawsuits are presently pending challenging the Department of Interior's new-
est revision of its leasing program. No issue was raised, however, as to the application of
the new customary international law rule mandating the ecosystem approach. isee
COASTAL ZONE MGMT., Sept. 20, 1988, at 1-4; Ocean Sci. News, Oct. 5, 1988, at 5-8.
457. One commentator describes the process of integrating all ecosystem values
The law governing other activities, like coastal discharges, ocean
dumping, and vessel pollution, must also go through a similar rein-
terpretation. 458 The Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries
Act, for example, provides the standards for ocean dumping. 459 It
states that its purpose is to limit the dumping of materials that "ad-
versely affect human health . . . the marine environment, ecological
systems, or economic potentialities."46 The regulatory mandate is
broad and subject to interpretation. 46 1 The new rule of ecosystem
management requires that regulations and permits issued pursuant
to those regulations, consider the effects of and need for ocean
dumping before allowing such dumping to occur.46 2 The courts are to
review the regulations and permits and apply the ecosystem model.
As with offshore oil and gas exploitation, legislative language that
limits discharges that "unreasonably degrade" the environment
46 3
must be reinterpreted to recognize the cumulative and comprehen-
sive impact of discharges on the ecosystem.464 Rather than allowing
into the OCS leasing process as similar to the "public trust" obligations of the federal
government for other areas. See Jarman, supra note 455, at 29-32.
458. Land use in the coastal zone is generally governed by individual state law,
and by the federal Coastal Zone Management Act for those states that have adopted
approved coastal zone plans. See infra notes 489-98 and accompanying text. Pollution
from coastal discharges, therefore, is a result of individual state coastal land use laws and
policies, and the water quality requirements under the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act. FWPCA, supra note 94, at § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1982) (regulations for dis-
charge of pollutants); id. at § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982) (provision for permits of
discharges); id. at § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982) (dredge and fill permit system); see
Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193 (1980). State laws and the FWPCA
must now be interpreted to require an ecosystem approach when regulations are promul-
gated, and permits are issued, for actions that could affect the marine ecosystem. For a
discussion of the problem of coastal pollution, see COASTAL ZONE MGMT., Sept. 30,
1988, at 1-4 (reporting on Congressional hearings).
459. MPRSA, supra note 94, at §§ 101-205, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-45 (1986); see
Comment, supra note 394, at 171.
460. MPRSA, supra note 94, at § 2(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1986).
461. For example, the EPA at one time did not interpret the MPRSA to allow it to
regulate airborne pollutants and ocean incineration. Later, it interpreted the law to allow
such regulation. Comment, supra note 394, at 172.
462. See id. at 187-88.
463. The MPRSA, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1986), precludes the dump-
ing of sewage sludge and industrial waste as of December 31, 1981. Sewage sludge and
industrial wastes are defined, however, to mean waste "the ocean dumping of which may
unreasonably degrade or endanger human health . or the marine environment, [or]
ecological systems." 33 U.S.C. § 1412a(d) (1986).
464. In City of New York v. EPA, 543 F. Supp. 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), the court
interpreted the ban on ocean dumping of municipal wastes and sludge as not barring
New York from continuing to dump, as it was not shown that such dumping "unreasona-
bly degrades the environment." The court stated that EPA was to "balance" ocean
dumping needs and harms. As a result, EPA eased its standards for ocean dumping. See
F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 426
(1984); Swanson & Devine, The Pendulum Swings Again: Ocean Dumping Policy, 24
Et4VIRONMENT 14-15 (June 1982). This weighing now would have to include the ecosys-
tem model's mandate of a comprehensive and cumulative approach to all ocean pollution
and its interactive effect on the present and future living resources in that ecosystem.
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ocean dumping to continue until proven to be harmful, it should be
stopped until shown not to be harmful to the environment, including
living marine resources and their habitats.6 5
C. Research, Assessment, and Monitoring
As described earlier, the ecosystem model includes two aspects.
First, it mandates that management of the ocean consider and inte-
grate pollution control and resource protection and exploitation. Sec-
ond, it requires that actions taken in response to the model be based
on adequate research, assessment, and monitoring. Like the mandate
for comprehensive management, the requirement of adequate sup-
port for ecosystem science is part of American law, and statutes that
provide for funding and research must now be interpreted so as to
provide for this "ocean information policy.
' 466
The triggering mechanism for implementing this mandate can be
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the National
Ocean Pollution Planning Act (NOPPA). NOPPA requires compila-
tion of all government research, assessment, and monitoring pro-
grams, and the preparation, submission, and biennial revision of a
federal pollution plan identifying national needs and establishing pri-
orities for government action.467 It also requires appropriate coordi-
nated action to assure that the budgets of all federal agencies are in
accord with the plan. 468 Finally, it requires that the plan contain rec-
ommendations for changes in the overall federal ocean effort-both
goals and funding.469 While NOPPA has led to reports on actions
and descriptions of priorities,470 it must now be interpreted to be an
"action-forcing" mechanism to require review of federal programs in
light of the new science mandate. It is also the mechanism to force
the setting of priorities in terms of the comprehensive ecosystem re-
465. See COASTAL ZONE MGMT., Aug. 20, 1988, at 4. On October 19, 1988, Con-
gress enacted changes to the MPRSA, setting a deadline of December 31, 1991 for the
end of all ocean dumping of sludge. Enforcement will be by an escalating schedule of
fees and fines. CONG. Q., Oct. 22, 1988, at 3061-62.
466. See Creech, supra note 325, at 16. For a description of the information re-
quirements detailed in UNCLOS, see id. at 22; see also INSIGHT, June 27, 1988, at 22
(call for action by the federal government to establish a Bureau of Environmental Statis-
tics that would provide annual reporting on environmental information and thus make it
easier to obtain adequate funding for necessary research).
467. NOPPA, supra note 200, at § 4, 33 U.S.C. § 1703 (1986).
468. Id. at § 4(b)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1703(b)(4) (1986).
469. Id. at § 4(b)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1703(b)(3)(1986).
470. See 1981 POLLUTION PLAN, supra note 103.
quirement for adequate research, assessment, and monitoring.471
While NOPPA can be used to provide for an overall plan of ac-
tion, NEPA can be used to force individual actions to be responsive
to the new international law mandate. NEPA requires that federal
agencies adopt an "integrated" approach to planning and decision-
making and include in every recommendation and report for "major
federal actions" a detailed environmental impact statement that de-
scribes adverse environmental effects. 47 12 This requirement should
now be interpreted to require federal actions that impact the marine
environment to include an assessment of the consistency of that ac-
tion with the ecosystem model, and whether there is sufficient infor-
mation available to indicate that consistency or inconsistency.473
Application of the new ecosystem research, assessment, and moni-
toring requirements should also be read into the various statutes that
provide for individual agencies to conduct research. 7 4 For example,
Section 20 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act requires that
the Department of Interior conduct studies to "establish information
for assessment and management of environmental impacts" prior to
lease sales, and then additional studies to monitor the impact of ac-
tivities on the environment. All relevant information collected shall
be considered by the Secretary in making all decisions.47 5 This provi-
sion should now be read to require an ecosystem approach to such
information collection and also to require the Department to ade-
quately fund such research, assessment, and monitoring.476
471. In the past, development of the plan and the setting of research and funding
priorities, has been reactive. While regional meetings are held to identify science priori-
ties, and recommendations are made by a National Ocean Pollution Planning Office,
each agency sent in a list of actions and budget line items and then these were organized
into a plan. The Office of Management and Budget reviewed the plan in terms of its own
agenda. No real attempt was made to use the requirements of the National Ocean Pollu-
tion Planning Act to force federal agencies and then the Office of Management and
Budget to address the national needs for comprehensive research, assessment, and moni-
toring. See NOPPA 1982 Hearings, supra note 204, at 29-39.
472. NEPA, supra note 94, at § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1986).
473. See United Nations Environment Programme, Report of the Working Group
of Experts on Environmental Law on its Second Session on Environmental Impact As-
sessment, UNEP.WG.152/4 (1987) (establishing goals and principles for environmental
impact assessment); see also Council on Ocean Law, OCEANS POL'Y NEws, Mar. 1987,
at 2-3 (describing work of UNEP in setting environmental assessment standards).
474. Many federal agencies have authorization to conduct ocean-related research,
assessment, and monitoring. Some statutes, like the OCSLA, provide direct authorization
for such research. Other statutes, while not authorizing a specific research task, provide
general authority to conduct or support programs and activities related to resource man-
agement or ocean pollution. See National Marine Pollution Program-Agency Summa-
ries-FY 1982 Update, Appendix to 1981 POLLUTION PLAN, supra note 103, app. no. 1,
at 11-263 (NOAA's Legislative Mandate).
475. OCSLAA, supra note 94, 43 U.S.C. § 1346 (1986).
476. This interpretation is perfectly consistent with the statute. In fact, the goal of
the OCSLAA Amendments of 1978 was to require adequate science as a basis for deci-
sions. See Outer Continental Shelf Lands Acts Amendments of 1977, H.R. REP. No. 95-
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Similarly, the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management
Act (MFCMA) requires the Secretary of Commerce to "initiate and
maintain a comprehensive program of fishery research to carry out
and further the purposes, policy and provisions of the [Act]." The
research is to include basic science, assessment, and monitoring, and
to consider the interdependence of fisheries and the impact of pollu-
tion.4 " This mandate can and should be interpreted to require an
ecosystem approach to research and adequate assessment and moni-
toring to insure implementation of that approach.
478
D. Coastal Activities and Uses
The ecosystem approach, of course, is not only applicable to fed-
eral activities and activities authorized by federal permits or licenses.
As binding national law, it is applicable to state laws, policies, and
programs that impact the coasts and oceans. For example, the
ecosystem requirement also applies to management of state fisheries.
Through the 1953 Submerged Lands Act,479 the states are given the
authority to manage the fisheries in three-mile (and in some cases
three marine league) zones adjacent to their coasts.480 The MFCMA
provides that the federal government is to be responsible for fisheries
outside of this "coastal zone" adjacent to the state. Each coastal
zone is generally still responsible for managing the fisheries in its
three-mile zone.48'
As described above, federal law, including customary international
law, preempts any inconsistent state law. Fisheries are a valid "na-
tional concern" and under federal constitutional law, they are an as-
pect of "interstate commerce" and thus able to be regulated by the
federal government.482 Thus, federal law can preempt state laws
where those laws interfere with a national plan for fishery regulation
premised on the national control of interstate commerce.
483
590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 154-55 (1977). The statute itself mandates periodic reports on
the "cumulative" impact of activities on the ocean environment. OCSLAA, supra note
94, at § 20(3), 43 U.S.C. § 1347(e) (1982).
477. MFCMA, supra note 94, at § 304(e), 16 U.S.C. § 1854(e) (1986).
478. See Ocean Sci. News, Feb. 17, 1987, at 1-2 (then Director of National
Marine Fisheries Service and later Administrator of NOAA describes plans for compre-
hensive and ecosystem approach to research and management).
479. Submerged Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 83-31, 67 Stat. 29 (1953) (codified at 43
U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1986)).
480. Id. at § 3, 43 U.S.C. § 1303 (1986).
481. See MFCMA, supra note 94, at § 101, 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (1986).
482. See MacRae, supra note 410, at 152.
483. See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941); see also Comment, supra note
The MFCMA allows the federal government to force states to
work together and to work with the federal government in develop-
ing fishery management schemes or be preempted by federal plans
and regulations.4" 4 Provisions of the MFCMA that purport not to
affect state jurisdiction and control over fisheries in the three-mile
adjacent coastal zone, and to allow state regulation of state regis-
tered fishing vessels must now be read in conjunction with the new
federal requirement of ecosystem management.48 5 These provisions
allow state authority and state registration of vessels "except as pro-
vided in subsection (b)." Subsection (b),486 however, gives the fed-
eral government the power to regulate where there is a "substantial"
and "adverse effect" of state action or inaction on fishery manage-
ment plans (FMPs). The MFCMA must now be interpreted to in-
clude an ecosystem approach and thus FMPs must now be developed
on an ecosystem basis.
A comprehensive ecosystem approach must include those re-
sources in the coastal zone adjacent to the states, as well as those in
the remaining portion of the exclusive economic zone.48 7 Thus, the
federal government can require the states to cooperate in an ecosys-
tem approach or preempt state laws and thus mandate an ecosystem
approach in coastal fisheries.4 8
Other federal statutes confirm the state's obligation to apply the
ecosystem approach in their coastal zone.489 For example, a specific
priority of the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) is
to provide for a comprehensive, coordinated approach for the protec-
tion of the coastal environment and resources49-- in effect, an
26, at 317.
484. See Rettig, supra note 427, at 23-24; R. Roe, supra note 214, at 36.
485. See MFCMA, supra note 94, at § 306(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1856(a) (1982); see
also Comment, supra note 26.
486. MFCMA, supra note 94, at § 306(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1856(b) (1986).
487. See MacRae, supra note 410, at 163-65.
488. See id. at 165; see also Maine v. Kreps, 563 F.2d 1043, 1049 (1st Cir. 1977)
(one of goals of MFCMA was to support efforts by federal government "to obtain an
internationally acceptable treaty at the [LOS Conference]").
489. With the establishment by UNCLOS of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone
and an expanded territorial sea of 12 miles, some commentators have called for revision
of the Submerged Lands Act and other statutes to give more authority to the states in a
wider (12 mile) coastal zone. See Knecht & Westermeyer, State v. National Interests in
an Expanded Territorial Sea, 11 COASTAL ZONE MGMT. J. 317, 318-19 (1984). Others
have argued that the expanded zones should not lead to a larger state coastal zone, but
increased federal-state cooperation in "an effective ocean management partnership." See
Shapiro & Shapiro, Opportunities for a State-Federal Partnership in an Expanded Ter-
ritorial Sea, I I COASTAL ZONE MGMT. J. 335, 350 (1984). In any event, whether the
states have responsibility for an expanded zone or share responsibility for such zone, the
ecosystem model, as binding federal law, must be the premise for any action.
490. CZMA, supra note 94, at §§ 302-303, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-52 (1982); see
Comment, supra note 452, at 89; COMMERCE OCEAN MANAGEMENT, supra note 16, at
75.
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ecosystem model. 491 The CZMA was designed to "preserve, protect
and develop and, where possible, to restore or enhance the resources
of the Nation's coastal zone."4 92 It does this through a detailed pro-
gram of approving state plans for coastal management, supplying
federal funding for the preparation and implementation of that plan,
and then requiring consistency of federal activities with that plan.493
At this point, almost all coastal states have approved Coastal Zone
Management plans which govern their laws and policies for their
coastal zones.494 These state plans must be in accord with national
policies and laws. 95 Included within these national policies and laws
are CZMA requirements for protection of the resources and environ-
ment of the coastal zone, consideration of ecological values, and
comprehensive planning for resource and pollution control manage-
ment.496 These requirements must now be interpreted to mandate an
ecosystem approach to coastal planning, research, and management.
Failure to comply with this mandate by the states should lead to
federal withdrawal of approval of a plan and funding for the state
program.497
Of course, even if a state does not have an approved coastal plan,
or refuses to comply with the new ecosystem standard and loses ap-
proval of its program, it is still bound by supreme federal law to
apply the ecosystem model.498
491. See Evans, The Coastal Zone Management Experience as a Model for Col-
laborative Resource Management, in PROCEEDINGS, TEXAS A & M UNIVERSITY, NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE STATES AND AN EXTENDED TERRITORIAL SEA, Dec. 9-11,
1985, at 101-02 (1987) (collaborative planning process).
492. CZMA, supra note 94, at § 303, 16 U.S.C. § 1452 (1986).
493. For short descriptions of the mechanics of the CZMA, see Grasso, Federal
Offshore Leasing: States' Concerns Fall on Deaf Ears, 2 FLA. J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
249, 252-55 (1986); Comment, supra note 452, at 88-91.
494. See Evans, supra note 491, at 102.
495. For example, the CZMA provides that plans must provide for "adequate con-
sideration of the national interest involved in" energy facility siting. CZMA, supra note
94, at § 306(c)(8), 16 U.S.C. § 1455(c)(8) (1982). Approval of a plan, and evaluation of
the plan, and possible withdrawal of approval are to be based on the state's compliance
with national policies. Id. at § 312, 16 U.S.C. § 1458 (1986).
496. Id. at § 303, 16 U.S.C. § 1452 (1986).
497. The CZMA requires a federal review of state performance as being in accord
with the standards established by the act and then withdrawal of approval and funding if
a state fails to comply with new federal requirements for a plan. Id. at § 312, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1458 (1986).
498. The supremacy clause of the Constitution mandates that state laws or policies
will be preempted if inconsistent with federal law, including customary international law.
See supra notes 361-62 and accompanying text; see also Lutz, Interstate Environmental
Law: Federalism Bordering on Neglect?, 13 Sw. U.L. REV. 573, 577-83 (1983).
E. Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements
In addition to the obligations of the United States to develop
mechanisms to coordinate and establish a national oceans policy,
there is also an obligation to apply this policy in international rela-
tions. The United States negotiates fisheries treaties, resource trea-
ties, and pollution agreements. 99 In such negotiations, the President
and his representatives in the State Department and other agencies
have an obligation to promote American policy and law.500 That pol-
icy and law must be now premised on the ecosystem model.
In future negotiations on fisheries, nonliving resource manage-
ment, and pollution, federal officials must now explicitly urge that
other nations accept the new customary international law rule and
incorporate a comprehensive model into research into the ocean ecol-
ogy, and assessment and monitoring of impacts of activities on the
ocean 01 In developing joint arrangements for management of re-
sources and for the setting and enforcement of standards to control
marine pollution, the United States must urge that an ad hoc, spe-
cies-by-species and pollutant-by-pollutant approach is inconsistent
with international law.502
VIII. CONCLUSION
There have been increasing public calls for a revitalized policy to
protect our ocean space. 0 3 The ecosystem model is designed to set
that new policy. The reconciliation of present ocean statutes and pol-
icies into a comprehensive ecosystem approach will not be easy. As
described in the first part of this article, there have been numerous
attempts to force the federal government to adopt a comprehensive
national oceans policy. All have failed. However, until now there has
not been a mechanism to force the Executive to establish coordinat-
ing mechanisms, either in the White House or Office of Management
and Budget. Now such a vehicle exists.
499. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 226, at 158 nn.53, 54 (listing fisheries trea-
ties); Comment, supra note 284, at 109 (pollution treaty with Mexico); Laughlin, supra
note 298 (Antarctica).
500. See supra note 365 and accompanying text.
501. See supra notes 320-42 and accompanying text.
502. See UNCLOS, supra note 17, at arts. 192, 193 (obligation to protect and
preserve marine environment and to exploit resources in accordance with that obliga-
tion), 117, 118 (conservation and management of living resources); see also id. at arts.
194(5) (protection of fragile and rare ecosystems), 197 (cooperation for protection of the
marine environment), 204 (assessment and monitoring), 207(4) (cooperation to develop
rules for control of land-based pollution), 210 (control of pollution from dumping), 211
(control of pollution from vessels).
503. See Editorial, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 12, 1987, at 190; Toufexis, The Dirty
Seas, TIME, Aug. 1, 1988, at 44; Morganthau, Don't Go Near the Water, NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 1, 1988, at 42.
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The various federal agencies must adopt a comprehensive ecosys-
tem approach as they interpret and apply their various statutory
mandates. Congress has the responsibility to oversee these agencies
and to force them to accept their new duty. Alternatively, Congress
could elect to give them the authority, by superseding legislation, to
disregard the comprehensive approach, but if it did so, the United
States would be in violation of international law. Unless and until
the Congress repeals the ecosystem mandate by future statutes, the
courts have the authority and responsibility to listen to challenges to
regulatory actions and policies, and either interpret statutory man-
dates in light of the new international law doctrines, or order agen-
cies to do so.
50 4
The President, and his delegates, obviously do not wish the courts
to interfere in the implementation of domestic law. Nor do they wish
Congress to overrule their recently established "oceans policy" which
they are seeking to have other nations accept. The strategy should be
to preempt such actions and establish some method or structure to
have the comprehensive ecosystem model incorporated into regula-
.tory policy and actions.505 Establishment of these mechanisms and
then implementation of the comprehensive approach could mean a
viable national oceans policy, based on an integrating theme. Failure
to do so will lead to litigation and the needless and detrimental delay
of the inevitable implementation of a national oceans policy pre-
mised on the comprehensive ecosystem model.
504. See Steinberg, supra note 430, at 424-25 (summarizing the power: of the
courts to enforce the law; of the Congress to oversee implementation of the laws; and of
the Executive Branch, through an arm like the Office of Management and Budget, to
coordinate federal decision-making).
505. One commentator has noted that to have an "ocean decision framework" one
federal agency should have "plenary responsibility that can provide a forum for integrat-
ing the preferences of many special purpose agencies and interests." Hershman, The
Coastal Decision-Making Framework as a Model for Ocean Management, in PROCEED-
INGS, TEXAS A & M UNIVERSITY, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE STATES AND AN Ex-
TENDED TERRITORIAL SEA, Dec. 9-11, 1985, at 92 (1987).

